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The labor market is central to many issues in economics, including business cycles, unem-
ployment, inequality, education, and growth. Moreover, it is the largest single market in
most economies and it is fundamental in determining individual and household well-being.
Therefore, a good understanding of the many phenomena that we observe in modern societies
requires knowledge of the functioning of the labor market. It is the aim of this dissertation
to improve and to deepen this knowledge and it does so by investigating three important
labor market phenomena. In what follows I will provide a brief description of each of the
chapters.
In the rst chapter, I address the divergence of unemployment rates between the U.S.
and Europe. The motivation for the analysis is based on the following observation: After low
levels of unemployment until the late 1970s, European unemployment became high relative
to that in the United States. Labor markets in Europe started to deteriorate at a time when
there was a substantial acceleration in the arrival of new technologies as measured by the
rate of capital-embodied technical change. There is convincing empirical evidence, some of
which is provided by Oliner and Sichel (2000), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) and van Ark et
al. (2002), indicating that certain economies in Europe have been lagging behind the U.S.
(and other European economies) in the adoption and usage of new technologies.
In the rst chapter I argue that the coexistence of a technology decit - resulting from slack
technology adoption - and the divergence of unemployment rates across economies are not
coincidental. I develop a theoretical model and show that the speed with which rms in an
economy adopt new technologies is a key determinant for how the economy's labor market
reacts to an acceleration in capital-embodied growth. I nd that the observed cross-country
dierences in rms' technology adoption can account for a large part of the observed di-
vergence of unemployment rates across economies. The mechanism I propose can explain
both (a) the divergence of unemployment rates between the major European countries and
the U.S. and (b) the observed variation of unemployment rates across European economies.
Previous work in this elds could explain just the rst feature but failed to account also for
the divergence of unemployment rates across European economies.
In the second chapter, I investigate the life-cycle dynamics of individual job mobility.
The central question I pose is: Why does individual job mobility systematically dier across
age groups? What we observe in the data is that young individuals typically change jobs very
frequently and retain each new job just for a short period of time. By contrast, experienced
2
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DOI: 10.2870/1904workers tend to hold stable jobs, but more importantly, they are also less likely to separate
from a new job than the young. This pattern is a common characteristic of all labor markets
in OECD countries, though it is particularly pronounced in the U.S.
The literature considers the initially high, but declining, turnover for the young to be the
outcome of a search process in which workers experiment with jobs in order to nd the
right match. This explanation is incomplete as it implies that each prime-age worker, who
is laid o from a long-term job and seeks to nd a new occupation would, necessarily, have
to go through the same wasteful search process as at the beginning of the career, which is
empirically not the case.
The objective of this chapter is to contribute to the understanding of the observed pattern
of individual job mobility along the life-cycle. To this end, I rst present new empirical
evidence documenting the life-cycle dynamics of job mobility in the U.S. labor market. Sec-
ond, in order to account for the observed pattern, I construct a life-cycle model of the labor
market whose main characteristic is an information imperfection in the matching process.
I model the imperfection as a noisy signal about the match quality that a rm and worker
observe when they rst meet. The key ingredient is that the imperfection is assumed to be
worker-specic and in particular, it is linked to an individual's previous labor market history.
Thus, the informativeness of the signal diers across workers as each of them has built up
an idiosyncratic labor market history. The structural parameters of the model are estimated
using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY 79) covering the
period between 1979 and 2006.
The estimated model can account very well, qualitatively and also quantitatively, for the
observed pattern of job mobility along the life cycle. The model predicts that (a) young in-
dividuals are substantially more likely to separate from a new job than experienced workers,
(b) the hazard rate of separating from a new job is increasing in the length of the retention
period and (c) the hazard rate of separating from any given job is declining with tenure, for
all age groups. Moreover, the model matches the observed extent of job turnover early in
the career as well as the gradual decline in later stages. The implied path for the cumulated
number of jobs, at each age, as a fraction of the career total is consistent with what we
observe in the data.
The third chapter empirically sheds some light on the causes and consequences of
job separation. In particular, it addresses the following three questions : (a) What are the
factors determining the separation hazard of employment relationships? (b) Which employer-
employee matches are more likely to dissolve due to a layo rather than a voluntary quit?
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, respectively, on re-employment
wages? Those questions are addressed using data on U.S. white males from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. The amount of labor reallocation taking place in modern
economies is typically very large. According to Fallick and Fleischman (2004), 6:7% of all
U.S. employee-employer matches are dissolved in an average month. At the same time, 4:3%
of the civilian noninstitutional population aged 16 and over began to work in a new job.
Many of the newly created matches survive only for a short period of time. A signicant
proportion, however, is more durable and turns into medium and long-term jobs. This raises
an obvious question, namely: what are the underlying factors and determinants that make
some of the new matches likely to survive longer than others. Job survival is not a purely
random process and we may presume that it is in fact governed by a given (possibly very
large) set of determinants.
In this chapter, I identify worker- and match-specic factors that are causal for the observed
systematic dierences in the actual duration of employment spells. An employment spell
can end due to a quit or a layo. Both have very dierent implications for an individual's
economic well-being. A layo is typically perceived as an adverse (and often unexpected)
economic shock whereas, a quit is considered as something positive, as it often leads to an
immediate (and foreseen) transition to another job and thereby to an improvement in an
individual's economic situation. I also provide a set of factors which help to assess whether
a given match is more likely to dissolve due to a layo rather than a voluntary quit? And
lastly, I very brie
y analyze the eects on re-employment wages of a voluntary quit and a
layo.
The chapter oers a set of answers to the aforementioned questions, some of which conrm
previous ndings in the literature, whereas others provide new facts and insights and also
pose a challenge to conventional theoretical labor market models, such as the standard job
ladder model. I intend to use the controversial elements as a point of departure for future
research on individuals' labor market dynamics.
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Technology Adoption, Turbulence and the Dynamics of
Unemployment
Abstract
The divergence of unemployment rates between the U.S. and Europe coincided with a
substantial acceleration in capital-embodied technical change in the late 70s. Furthermore,
evidence suggests that European economies have been lagging behind the U.S. in the adop-
tion and usage of new technologies. This paper argues that the pace of technology adoption
plays a fundamental role in the manner in which a labor market reacts to an acceleration
in capital-embodied growth. The framework proposed oers a novel explanation for the
divergence of unemployment rates across economies that are hit by the very same shock
(i.e. the acceleration in embodied technical change) but dier in their technology adoption.
Moreover, the results of the paper challenge the popular - but controversial - view that high
European unemployment is the result of institutional rigidities by claiming that institutions
are not the principal cause, per se, but rather that they amplify certain forces that promote
the emergence of high unemployment.
JEL Classication: J24, J64, O33
Keywords: Unemployment, Matching, Turbulence, Technology Choice, Capital-embodied
Technical Change, Skill Loss




After low levels of unemployment until the late 1970s, European unemployment became
high relative to that in the United States. Labor markets in Europe started to deteriorate
at a time when there was a substantial acceleration in the arrival of new technologies, as
measured by capital-embodied technical change. Documented by Gordon's (1990) in
uential
work on the quality-adjusted price of capital, and more recently by Cummins and Violante
(2002), the rate of change in the relative price of new capital investments in the U.S. has
decreased substantially from  2% before the mid-70s to  4:5% in the 1990s, suggesting an
acceleration in capital-embodied technical change. There is convincing empirical evidence,
some of which is provided by Oliner and Sichel (2000), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) and van
Ark et al. (2002), indicating that certain economies in Europe have been lagging behind
the U.S. (and other European economies) in the adoption and usage of new technologies.
This is re
ected by a persistent technology gap exhibited by those countries - as measured
by labor productivity growth in the manufacturing sector, the share of information and
communication technologies (ICT) in investment and its contribution to output growth.
This paper argues that the coexistence of a technology decit - resulting from slack
technology adoption - and the divergence of unemployment rates across economies is not
coincidental. I show that the speed with which rms in an economy adopt new technolo-
gies is a key determinant for how the economy's labor market reacts to an acceleration in
capital-embodied growth. I propose a framework in which cross-country dierences in rms'
technology adoption can account for a large part of the observed divergence of unemployment
rates across economies. The mechanism in this paper can explain both (a) the divergence
of unemployment rates between the major European countries and the U.S. and (b) the ob-
served variation of unemployment rates across European economies. Previous work in this
eld could explain only the rst feature but failed to account for the divergence of unem-
ployment rates across European economies.
Moreover, the results of the paper challenge the popular - but controversial - view that
high rates of European unemployment are the result of labor market institutions by claiming
that institutions are not the principal cause of high unemployment, per se. Rather, they
represent a tendency to amplify certain forces that promote the emergence of high levels of
unemployment1.
1The controversy comes from the fact that the institutions that are held responsible were also present in
the 1960s, yet in the 1960s unemployment was much higher in the U.S. than in Europe, see e.g. Blanchard
and Wolfers (2000).
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DOI: 10.2870/1904The analysis in this paper is based on a labor market matching model that is augmented
by an endogenous technology choice by rms and a skill accumulation technology for workers.
The channel through which rms' technology adoption aects an economy's labor market
performance works as follows. The frequency with which rms adopt new technologies de-
termines how long a rm's production technology is kept in operation. If updating is fast
(slack) technologies are replaced rather (in)frequently and therefore workers stay with a cer-
tain technology for a relatively short (long) time. Constant advancements at the technology
frontier gradually render each existing technology in the economy obsolete. Consequently,
rms with infrequent technology updating operate technologies that are, on average, far-o
the frontier. Workers that are attached to those obsolete technologies will possess a produc-
tion knowledge - that is the set of skills and abilities needed to operate the specic technology
- that is also relatively outdated with respect to the production knowledge associated with
the frontier technology2. If, on the other hand, rms update rather infrequently then work-
ers' production knowledge is, on average, less obsolete as the rms' technologies stay closer
to the frontier.
Therefore, the frequency with which rms adopt new technologies determines the aver-
age degree of workers' human capital obsolescence in an economy and thereby, aects the
expected job creation costs for rms. This is due to the fact that a rm, when hiring a new
worker, needs to provide costly training in order to overcome the worker's skill obsolescence
- i.e. to make the worker's human capital compatible with the rm's technology3. These
costs are increasing in the degree of obsolescence. Hence, more obsolete skills require more
training which will drive up expected costs of creating a job.
An acceleration in the rate of embodied technical change - similar to that observed in the
mid 1970s - causes the human capital of unemployed workers to depreciate more quickly, as it
makes the gap between workers' current level of knowledge and that at the frontier widening
more rapidly. This raises the expected training costs of rms when hiring workers. Higher
training / job creation costs reduce the net present value of a job for a rm and discourages
job creation. The negative eect on job creation is stronger - and the associated rise in un-
employment is higher - in economies in which rms update their technologies less frequently.
2The process of technical change gradually renders a worker's human capital obsolete by driving a gap
between a worker's current level of knowledge and that required at the technology frontier.
3The vintage specicity of workers' production knowledge implies that if a worker gets matched with a
technology dierent from her current one then there will be a skill mismatch - in the sense that the worker's
current level of knowledge is not fully compatible with the respective technology.
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DOI: 10.2870/1904This is due to the fact that in those economies workers stay with the same technology for
a longer period of time, increasing the average degree of human capital obsolescence among
workers entering the unemployment pool.
In recent years, economists have oered numerous explanations for the emergence of high
European unemployment in the late 1970s, involving factors such as overly generous welfare
systems, slow TFP growth or capital market imperfections4. One particularly in
uential
strand in the literature emphasizes the interaction of macoeconomic shocks and labor mar-
ket institutions as the main driving force for high levels of European unemployment. Key
references include Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2007), Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) and
Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007). The framework proposed by Ljungqvist and Sargent
(1998) is the rst rigorous attempt to study the shock-policy interaction within a calibrated
model. A related explanation is oered by Marimon and Zilibotti (1999). The line of ar-
gument proposed by these authors is as follows. European unemployment increased due to
reduced workers' incentives to exit unemployment. Workers in Europe prefer to collect gen-
erous unemployment benets rather than to work for a low wage. Wages are low because the
technology shock has made workers' skills obsolete - as in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) - or
made it increasingly dicult to match with existing vacancies - as in Marimon and Zilibotti
(1999). The mechanism in those papers operates primarily through the labor supply side.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007) is a renement that considers a matching framework in which
rms adjust labor demand in the aftermath of the shock. The shock considered in Ljungqvist
and Sargent (1998, 2007) refers to a general change in the economic environment, i.e. an in-
creased degree of economic turbulence, rather than an explicit shock to technological change.
Recently, a number of economists have pointed to the potential signicance of embodied
technical change in order to explain the dierences in labor market outcomes across coun-
tries. Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007) was the rst work to highlight the interaction
between shocks to capital-embodied technical change and labor market institutions. In their
model, an increase in embodied technical change - such as that observed in the mid-70s -
leads to a sharp reduction in rms' labor demand in a (European-type) welfare state econ-
omy, whereas it has only mild eects on labor demand in a (U.S.-type) laissez-faire economy.
Consequently, unemployment rises by much more in the welfare state.
4See Nickell (2003) for a recent survey of research on the issue of European unemployment. Blanchard
(2005) is an excellent assessment of the state of the contemporary literature regarding the European unem-
ployment question.
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are designed to reproduce the movements of an average European unemployment rate but
they fail to account for the large heterogeneity of unemployment rates across European
countries. In fact, Blanchard (2005) suggests that discussing "European unemployment"
is misleading since high average European unemployment re
ects high unemployment in
four large continental countries (Germany, Italy, Spain and France) whereas unemployment
is low (and comparable to the U.S. rate) in many other European countries. Arguably, a
theory that addresses the European unemployment experience but fails to explain the large
heterogeneity of labor market outcomes across European economies clearly con
icts with an
essential aspect of actuality and is likely to disregard relevant factors.
The underlying determinants for the observed divergence are unlikely to be of an insti-
tutional nature. Even though changes in labor market institutions can account for parts of
the rise in European unemployment - as shown by Nickell et al. (2005) - a sizable fraction
remains unexplained. This paper proposes a framework in which ex-ante dierences in rms'
technology adoption across countries can account for a large part of the observed divergence
of unemployment rates across economies. It does not rely on dierences in institutional set-
tings but rather stresses the role of the particular technological environment in explaining
the unemployment experiences of Europe and the U.S.
The model builds upon the matching framework by Mortensen and Pissarides (1998). It
augments the standard model by an endogenous technology choice by rms and a skill accu-
mulation technology for workers. However, the model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) -
as Hornstein et al. (2007) - display one stark feature: workers are not constrained by any skill
requirements when moving across technologies of dierent levels of advancement. In other
words, individuals in those models can switch to more advanced technologies without any
extra cost. It is, therefore, equally costly for rms to hire a worker coming from a high-tech
or low-tech job5. However, one might conjecture that technologies dier with respect to the
set of skills and abilities required to operate them. Newer and more advanced technologies
require a dierent set of skills than older and less advanced ones. Arguably, in a framework
that considers capital-embodied technical change, the issue of workers' skill obsolescence is
of particular relevance since the set of skills needed (e.g. for the most advanced technology)
is subject to change over time.
5The only cost of the labor reallocation process is due to search. The explicit acquisition of skills, however,
is generally uncoupled from a worker's previous experience.
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account for increased human capital obsolescence caused by a shock to embodied technical
change. This will be an important determinant for the dynamics of job creation in the
aftermath of a shock. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2007) also consider a form of human
capital obsolescence but the mechanism proposed in this paper is signicantly richer. Unlike
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2007), which are not explicit about the underlying economic
mechanism, the degree of skill obsolescence in this paper is endogenous as it is driven by rms'
technology choices. Thereby, the paper adds microfoundation to the turbulence approach
forwarded by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998). In that way, the mechanism also provides a
rationale for higher turbulence (skill obsolescence) since it directly relates increased human
capital obsolescence to the observable acceleration in capital-embodied technical change in
the mid 1970s.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents a variety of facts
that motivate the analysis. Section 1.3 presents the theoretical model. Sections 1.4 and 1.5
brie
y discuss the parametrization and calibration of the model and sketch the algorithm
used to solve the model. Section 1.6 presents and discusses the results and Section 1.7
performs a variety of sensitivity checks. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 The Facts
1.2.1 Unemployment
In the postwar period up until the late 1970s, unemployment in Europe was low relative to
that in the U.S. The data summarized in Table 1.1 shows that during the whole period up
until the 1980s, unemployment in the U.S. was signicantly higher than in Europe. In the
1960s and early 70s, the average unemployment rate in European was around 2:5% whereas
the U.S. gure was around 5%. However, the picture changed dramatically after the mid-
1970s. Unemployment in Europe experienced a sharp and persistent increase up to a level
of around 9% whereas U.S. unemployment rose by much less. This rise in Europe, however,
was not homogenous across economies. In some countries the increase in unemployment was
much less pronounced (as in Sweden, Denmark or Austria) than in others (such as France,
Germany or Italy). Therefore, the use of the average rate of unemployment is actually very
misleading. Table 1.1 reveals that there is in fact substantial variation of unemployment rates
across European economies. Over the period 2000   06, for instance, six out of the twelve
European labor markets in Table 1.1 produced unemployment rates that are just slightly
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European countries, in particular Germany, France and Italy, the European unemployment
puzzle vanishes6. High unemployment is not, therefore, a phenomenon that is specic to
Europe, per se, but rather to certain countries.
1960 - 69 1970-74 1975-79 1980 - 89 1990 - 99 2000 - 06
U.S. 4,78 5,38 7,04 7,27 5,71 5,11
Euro Area 2,16 2,62 4,76 8,36 9,55 8,43
Austria 2,13 1,30 1,56 2,70 3,87 4,36
Belgium 1,93 2,04 5,96 9,54 8,47 7,74
Denmark 1,11 1,16 5,22 6,67 6,93 4,71
Finland 2,20 2,40 5,16 4,79 11,87 8,84
France 1,75 2,68 4,84 8,54 10,60 9,19
Germany 0,65 0,90 3,12 5,83 6,29 8,46
Italy 4,86 5,42 6,46 8,39 10,25 8,39
Netherlands 0,84 1,98 5,62 8,16 5,41 3,53
Norway 0,00 1,60 1,90 2,81 4,80 3,99
Spain 2,39 2,92 6,12 15,44 15,89 10,29
Sweden 1,70 2,24 1,86 2,59 7,21 5,96
UK 1,61 2,44 4,54 9,45 8,00 5,01
Source: European Commission,Annual Macroeconomic Database (AMECO)
Table 1.1: Average annual unemployment, in %, by subperiod
A distinguishing feature of the U.S. labor market is its 
uid nature. The average duration
of unemployment is low relative to many European countries, as evidenced by a rapid real-
location of labor across sectors7. Table 1.2 shows that in the period 2000   04, the fraction
of unemployed being jobless for less than one month is 37:22% in the U.S. while it is around
5% in Germany, France, Spain and Italy. In contrast, only 9% of the unemployed in U.S.
stay out of work for more than one year whereas the number for Germany, France, Spain
and Italy ranges from 40% to 58%. Evidently, high unemployment rates in some European
countries are the result of a massive share of long-term unemployed.
6The so-called "European Unemployment Puzzle" refers to high and persistent rates of unemployment in
Europe relative to that in the United States.
7Farber (1999) nds that in the U.S. half of all new jobs end in the rst year and at any point in time
about 20% of workers have been with their current employer for less than one year.
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< 1 month 7.4 5.76 22.18 5.34 4.48 16.2 5.1 21.34 37.22
[1, 3) months 11.18 11.7 18.96 16.78 18.46 23.98 8.92 22.56 30.8
[6, 12) months 17.12 16.64 18.28 18.84 19.48 15.68 15.66 16.16 8.06
 12 months 50.7 50.32 20.88 41.86 39.7 24.66 58.36 21.28 9.02
Source: OECD, Numbers indicate the fraction of unemployed by duration, period: 2000-04
Table 1.2: Average duration of unemployment
1.2.2 The Arrival Rate of New Technologies
There is evidence, some of which is provided by Cummins and Violante (2002), Greenwood
and Yorukoglu (1997) and Pakko (2002), that the rate of arrival of new technologies has in-
creased quite substantially since the late 1970s. Cummins and Violante (2002) constructs an
aggregate index of investment-specic technological change. They nd that average annual
growth rates were stable around 4% until the late 1970s but then there was a sharp accelera-
tion in the 1980s that lead to annual growth rates of more than 6% in the 1990s. As argued
by Hornstein and Krusell (1996) and Yorukoglu (1998), an increase in the arrival rate of new
technologies has important consequences for the process of technology adoption. A higher
rate of technological change means that new technologies, which dier substantially in their
characteristics from existing ones, are introduced at a faster rate. This raises the issue of
compatibility problems between consecutive vintages. The improved technology embodied
in new capital changes the technological standards and decreases the compatibility between
old and new vintages. Yorukoglu (1998) argues that the more advanced the new technology
is relative to the existing one, the lower is the initial experience with the new production
technology.
This implies that, as the rate of technological change increases, agents will be less familiar
with the new technology and it will be more costly to adopt. Therefore, in times of rapid
technological change we should see an increase in the technology gap and a rise in the adop-
tion costs per unit of investment. Regarding the former, Cummins and Violante (2002) nds
that the technology gap in the U.S. (which they dene as the gap between the productivity
of the best technology and the productivity of the average practice in the economy) was 15%
in 1975. In 2000, the gure had jumped to 40%. These ndings suggest that rms were not
able to keep track with the accelerated process of technical change, or in other words, the
increased speed of technological change has outpaced rms' technology updating.
Concerning technology updating costs, Bessen (2002) provides evidence that adjustment
costs rose sharply during 1974-83 and more than doubled from the early 1960s to the late
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nds that the costs associated with adopting a new technology amounted to
0:35$ per dollar of investment in the period 1961   73. In the period 1974   83, adjustment
costs rose sharply to 0:79$ per dollar of investment and peaked at 0:90$ in 1984   88. As a
result, the adoption costs as a percentage of aggregate output increased from 2:4% in 1973
to 6:5% in 1983. Bessen (2002) argues that the rise in costs is specically associated with a
switch in rms' investment towards new technologies.
1.2.3 Technology and Growth Gap
Economic growth in Europe was strong until the 1980s but became weaker in the subsequent
decades. As a result, a persistent growth gap, in both GDP growth and labor productivity
growth, between the U.S. and most European countries has emerged since the 1980s. By
taking data on relative manufacturing output per person, Scarpetta et al. (2000) shows that
the productivity level for Germany and other European countries was converging toward the
U.S. level until the 1980s but has since diverged.
Figure 1.1: Investment in new technologies and LPD growth, Data is from van Ark et al.
(2002) and Timmer et al. (2003)
At the same time, several Europe economies have lagged behind the U.S. in terms of
adoption and usage of new technologies. Timmer et al. (2003) reports that many EU coun-
tries have been seriously lagging behind the U.S. in the share of ICT investment in GDP.
8He estimates technology adoption costs in the U.S. manufacturing sector for the period 1961-96.
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fact that slower rates of ICT investment are key in explaining the poorer European produc-
tivity performance. Figure 1.1 illustrates the strong positive relation between the level of
investment in new technologies and labor productivity growth.
Lower investment rates in ICT mean that newer technologies have been adopted less force-
fully. In fact Oliner and Sichel (2000) and Jorgensen and Stiroh (2000) provide evidence
that, to a large degree, the U.S.-EU productivity gap can be traced back to the delayed
adoption of new technologies in Europe. This nding is conrmed by a number of studies,
including Daveri (2002), Colecchia and Schreyer (2002) and van Ark et al. (2002). Fur-
ther, Daveri (2002) and van Ark et al. (2002), among others, nd that the diusion of new
technologies in Europe is following a similar pattern to that observed in the U.S., albeit at
a considerably slower pace. This pattern is clearly observable in Table 1.3. It shows that
ICT investment intensities were increasing in all countries over time but (a) most European
countries started investing in ICT with a signicant delay and (b) the gap between the U.S.
and most European economies has not narrowed greatly.
1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
U.S. 2.5 3.4 3.3 3.7 4.2
EU 1.2 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.6
Denmark 1.5 2.3 2.9 3.1 3.6
Finland 1.1 1.5 1.9 2.9 4.3
France 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.4 2.1
Germany 1.3 2.2 2.4 2.0 2.5
Italy 1.5 1.9 2.3 2.0 2.5
Netherlands 1.6 1.9 2.4 2.1 2.9
Spain 0.9 1.5 2.5 1.7 2.1
Sweden 1.6 2.5 2.7 3.4 4.7
United Kingdom 0.8 1.6 2.3 2.8 3.0
Source: Timmer et al. (2003)
Table 1.3: ICT investment as a share of GDP
However, the lagging technology diusion is not a feature that applies to Europe in gen-
eral. As Figure 1.1 illustrates there is in fact a remarkable cross-country heterogeneity with
respect to investment in new technologies. Several European countries - most notably Swe-
den, Denmark and the UK - feature ICT investment rates that are comparable to the U.S.
rate whereas other countries - such as Spain, Italy or France - seem to be lagging behind.
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spect to the speed with which rms invest in new technologies. Consequently, the technology
gap will also be very dierent across countries.
A question that is of interest in this context is why technology adoption is so dierent
across economies. There exists a bulk of empirical studies, for instance McGuckin and van
Ark (2001) and McGuckin et al (2005), arguing that structural impediments in product mar-
kets hamper the successful implementation of new technologies across industries in Europe.
These barriers mostly come in the form of burdensome regulations. Regression estimates
by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) suggest that strict product market regulations that curb
competition hinder the adoption and diusion of new technologies and thus have a nega-
tive eect on productivity. More evidence provided by Gust and Marquez (2002) suggests
that countries with more burdensome regulatory environments tend to adopt new technolo-
gies more slowly and also have slower productivity growth. These studies argue that as
adoption costs may dier across countries, so that low adjustment cost countries adopt new
technologies rst.
Figure 1.2: Regulation and investment in new technologies, Data is from Nicoletti et al.
(1999) and Timmer et al. (2003)
This pattern is also re
ected in Figure 1.2, which plots the strictness of an economy's
regulatory environment and the degree of technology diusion, as measured by the ICT in-
vestment intensity. The measure of regulation (computed by the OECD) captures the degree
of an economy's regulation in product markets, administrative burdens for start-ups and the
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that have a very strict regulatory environment tend to invest less in new technologies. Gust
and Marquez (2002) conrms that dierences in regulations are causal for the observed cross
country heterogeneity in the adoption of new technologies9.
The conjecture that a country's technology adoption behavior is key for understanding its
post-1970s labor market performance is supported by comparing the technology/unemployment
experience of countries like Sweden, the UK or Denmark with that of countries such as Italy,
Spain, France or Germany. Countries belonging to the rst group feature a technology
adoption behavior similar to the U.S. At the same time, the unemployment rates of those
economies are comparable to the U.S. rate. By contrast, economies of the second group seem
to adopt new technologies at a substantially slower rate whilst suering from persistently
high unemployment.
1.3 The Model
As an analytical framework I use a vintage technology/vintage human capital model with
frictional labor markets. Firms are heterogeneous with regard to the installed production
technology. When a new job, i.e. a new production unit, is created it adopts the most ad-
vanced technology that is currently available. Each period, rms have the choice of keeping
their old technology, upgrading the existing one or destroying the job. Agents are hetero-
geneous with respect to their human capital endowment. Workers accumulate job-specic
skills that are scrapped in the event of a lay-o. The accumulation of specic skills captures
the notion of technology learning that increases the productivity of an existing production
unit over time. This feature is consistent with empirical results. For instance, Jensen et
al. (2001) nds that gains in productivity of an existing production plant resulting from
the accumulation of experience are high and signicant10. The specication implies that
technologies of dierent vintages co-exist within productive process of the economy. The use
of vintage technology is supported by empirical ndings that demonstrate a high persistence
of rms' technology11.
9More evidence for the negative relationship between a country's technology adoption and the strictness
of its regulatory environment is provided by Colecchia and Schreyer (2002) and Jerzmanowski (2006).
10They nd that for a plant that was created in 1967, technology learning accounts for an increase in own
productivity of about 57% over the period 1967   1992.
11Studies, e.g. by Baily et al. (1992) and Bartelsman and Drymes (1998), suggest that roughly 60% of
the rms keep their current level of technology in each period. Moreover, both studies and the ndings of
Dunne (1994) conrm that plants with relatively poor productivity can restructure their technology and
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Time is discrete and denoted by t 2 f0;1;2;:::g. The economy is populated by a continuum
of individuals that are either workers or entrepreneurs. Workers are either employed or un-
employed. Individuals are innitely lived but they face a constant probability of death that
is given by . All individuals are risk neutral and they have no access to savings technologies.
An Agent's objective is to maximize expected wealth - which in the absence of a storage
technology - is given by the innite stream of discounted future income.
At each point in time t, there exists a range of sector-neutral technologies denoted by
at; 2 fat;0;at;1;:::;at;Tg that dier with respect to their date of creation. The vintage of a
certain technology is denoted by . The leading edge technology is given by at;0 whereas at;T
is the oldest that is still in use. T is determined endogenously and can be interpreted as the
critical age at which a technology is scrapped. New technologies arrive at a deterministic
rate g. Hence at+1;0 = gat;0, where at+1;0 and at;0 denote the leading edge technologies of
tomorrow and today respectively. Newer technologies are, therefore, more productive.
Each employed worker is equipped with a certain stock of human capital, denoted by h.
Human capital stock is proportional to the level of specic skills the worker has accumulated
on his current job. The accumulation of skills is stochastic. Specic skills, denoted by s,
can take on values s 2 S = fs0;s1;:::;sIg where s0 < ::: < sI. s0 and sI are, respectively,
the lowest and highest potentially attainable skill levels. The transition across skill levels is
governed by a Markov process with transition probabilities given by p(s;s0). More precisely,
p(s;s0) denotes the probability that a worker with current skill level s experiences an up-
grade of his skills to level s0 where s0  s. Furthermore, I assume s0 = 0, which implies that
immediately after the creation of a new production unit or the renovation of an existing one,
i.e. when  = 0 there exists no job/technology specic knowledge. This specication is sup-
ported by empirical evidence provided, for example, by Cochran (1960), Garg and Milliman
(1961), Rusell(1968) and Pegels (1969). They nd that after a change in a rm's production
technology, productivity initially drops and then gradually rises. The drop suggests that
production knowledge does not apply equally across old and new production technologies
and the subsequent increase provides evidence for the existence of learning. The stock of
move up in the relative productivity scale. This can be interpreted as evidence for rm's updating eorts.
More explicitly, Dunne (1994) nds that old and young plants appear to use advanced technology at similar
frequencies. Given that old plants had installed a dierent technology when they were created, this implies
that at a certain point in time they must have updated their technology.
18
Duernecker, Georg (2010), Three Essays on Frictional Labor Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/1904human capital embodied in a worker is given by
h = f
h(s) = (1 + s) (1.1)
where  > 0. The functional form of fh implies that the returns to learning are positive.
This is consistent with ndings, e.g. by Bahk and Gort (1993) and Jovanovic and Nyarko
(1995). Bahk and Gort (1993) uses plant age as a proxy for the vintage of a technology and
nd that technology learning accounts for an annual increase in output of 1%.
There is a single homogeneous consumption good in the economy that is produced by a
continuum of rms. Each rm has a single job that is either vacant or lled with a worker.
Firms are heterogeneous with regard to the level of technology specic skills embodied by
the employed worker s and the vintage of the implemented technology . When a new rm
is created it installs the most advanced technology that is available, i.e. at;0. Hence, upon
the rm's creation,  = 0. Firm's output is a function of the installed technology and the
worker's stock of human capital. Output is produced according to a constant returns to scale
production function given by
yt(;s) = at ;f
h(s) = at ; (1 + s) (1.2)
In each period rms have the choice of keeping their old technology, upgrading the existing
one by installing the frontier technology or destroying the job. When a rm decides to
upgrade, it has to incur a cost  that is assumed to depend on the technology gap, i.e. the





where  > 0,  > 0. A rm's relative productivity dierential with respect to the tech-
nology frontier is denoted by g. We will refer to this dierential as a rm's technology gap.
The width of this gap is determined by the vintage of a rm's technology  and the growth
rate of the technology frontier. Faster growth at the frontier implies a more rapidly widening
technology gap.
In addition to job specic skills, workers are equipped with a set of abilities that enables
them to operate the technology they are currently matched with. This particular form of
human capital, which we call a worker's production knowledge, does not add anything to
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worker's production knowledge is characterized by its limited transferability across vintages.
Hence, if a worker gets matched with a dierent (and probably more advanced) technology
there is a discrepancy arising between the worker's current production knowledge and that
required to operate the new technology. This discrepancy can be best understood by consid-
ering the limited transferability as an implicit form of human capital obsolescence. The less
a worker's production knowledge can be transferred to a new technology the more obsolete
it becomes relative to the production knowledge required for the new technology. Thus, we
can understand t() as a form of training cost the rm has to incur in order to provide the
worker with the necessary skills to enable him to operate the new technology12.
1.3.2 Unemployment
An existing match can be dissolved for to two reasons; exogenous destruction that occurs at
the rate  or endogenous destruction by rms. A rm destroys its jobs when its production
technology is too obsolete and updating was not optimal in the past. Workers that have
been laid o are entitled to government sponsored unemployment insurance. This insurance
provides the worker with benet payments during the period of unemployment. Benet
payments, denoted by bt(s), are a constant fraction  of the average after-tax wage within
the respective skill class, i.e. bt(s) = (1 w)
P
 t(;s)!t(;s), where t(;s) denotes the
measure of workers with skills s that are operating vintage  and (1   w)!t(;s) denotes
the after-tax wage13. Unemployed workers don't receive benets inddenitely. Instead, each
period, an unemployed person that is still entitled to receive benets faces a constant prob-
ability, 
, of losing the entitlement. If that happens, bt(s) = 0 for the remainder of the time
spent unemployed.
Therefore, the state vector of each unemployed worker consists of the following three
elements: (1) the benet entitlement, e 2 f0;1g, (2) the amount of job specic skills accu-
mulated in the previous occupation, s, and (3) the degree of obsolescence of the worker's
production knowledge, captured by . To better understand the latter suppose that when
12We nd that the convexity of  is not critical to our results. We obtain virtually the same results with
a linear cost function.
13Alternatively, one could make the benets proportional to the individual's pre-displacement wage, i.e.
bt(;s) / !t(;s). We refrain from doing this for to two reasons: (a) it would be computationally burdensome
given that we would need to keep track of each individuals' last wage income and (b) we think that s and 
are suciently correlated across matches so that considering  would not add any considerable value.
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he possesses the required production knowledge. This knowledge diers across vintages.
Non-zero growth in the leading edge technology and the limited transferability property of
the worker's production knowledge imply that a worker's current production knowledge, over
time, becomes increasingly obsolete with respect to that required to operate the state-of-
the-art technology. The process of human capital obsolescence also applies to unemployed
individuals. Consequently, when an unemployed worker gets re-matched with a new rm
(one that embodies the leading edge technology) there is a discrepancy between the individ-
ual's current production knowledge (linked to vintage ) and that required to operate the
new technology. This discrepancy is captured by .
1.3.3 The Labor Market
The labor market is frictional. This means that at each point in time there exists a certain
number of open vacancies denoted by vt and a pool of job-searching individuals, ut. The
total number of unemployed workers is given by ut =
P
s;e ut(;s;e). New matches are
determined by a matching function that is homogeneous of degree one, bounded above by
minfvt;utg and increasing in both arguments.





where  m > 0 and d 2 [0;1]. The probability that a rm meets an unemployed individual










The last term is implied by the homogeneity assumption on m. Note that t = vt=ut
is a measure of labor market tightness. Similarly, let pt denote the probability that an
unemployed worker encounters an open vacancy14.
pt = m(vt;ut)=ut = m(t;1) (1.6)
The existence of a matching function in the labor market implies that workers looking
for a job trigger a congestion eect on each other. The greater the number of individuals
looking for a job the lower is the probability of encountering a vacancy. The same is true
for rms with open vacancies. Therefore, a rm's incentive to post a vacancy is strongly
aected by the tightness in the labor market.
14Notice that all heterogeneity is driven by workers as vacancies are all identical, ex-ante.
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The government in this economy levies a tax on labor income and redistributes the revenues
in the form of unemployment benets. The government is assumed to run a balanced budget
every period. Hence wWt = Bt, where W is the total wage bill, w is the tax on labor income
and B denotes total benet payments.
1.3.5 Value functions and the rm's updating problem
Given capital-embodied growth there exists a natural trend in the model's key variables. To
render the model stationary we divide all growing variables by the common growth factor
at;0. To indicate that a variable is stationary we simply remove its time subscript, e.g.
u = ut=at;0.
The Value Functions
All decisions within a rm/worker match - also those concerning matching and technology
upgrading - are taken jointly. Regarding the timing of decisions, I assume that a rm and
a worker rst decide on the technology upgrade and, conditional on the upgrading decision,
they then bargain over wages. The value functions for an employed worker and a rm are,
respectively,  E and  J after the upgrading decision, while before the upgrading decision they
are given as E and J. The state variables characterizing a match are the level of skills
embodied in the worker, s, and the vintage of the installed technology, . Hence, for a given
wage rate ! (;s) we can write  J as follows:




0)J ( + 1;s
0) (1.7)
 is the rate of exogenous job destruction, with probability  the worker dies between
two consecutive periods and  is the discount factor. The instantaneous return for a rm is
given by output net of wage payments, i.e. y (;s)   ! (;s). If the match survives to the
next period, the age of the installed technology will be  + 1 and the worker's skill level is
s0 2 S. The value of a job for an employed worker after the upgrading decision is
 E (;s) = (1   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w)!(;s) and the discounted future surplus. If the match is hit by an exogenous destruction
shock the worker transits to unemployment. Then he is initially entitled to UI benet claims
and the value of unemployment is W(;s;1).
The updating problem
The cooperative nature of decision making implies that at each point in time a rm/worker
pair seeks to maximize the joint surplus of the match. This rule also applies to nding the
optimal point in time for a match when to update its production technology. Notice that
the production knowledge that an employed worker possesses is outdated compared to that
required to operate any newer technology. This a consequence of constant advancements
in the frontier technology and the limited transferability of workers' production knowledge.
Both factors render a worker's current production knowledge obsolete with respect to the
knowledge required for newer technologies. To overcome this obsolescence, an upgrading rm
has to invest in a worker's training, which is costly. The costs associated with a technology
upgrade, denoted by (), are assumed to be proportional to the rm's technology gap. The
rationale being that the longer a worker is attached to a certain technology, less production
knowledge is useable for the new technology and more training will be necessary.
The technology will be renovated when the joint gain from upgrading is positive. This is
the case when the following condition holds:
 J (0;0) +  E (0;0)   () >  J (;s) +  E (;s) (1.9)
A rm upgrades by adopting the frontier technology, so  = 0. Upon upgrade, the
worker loses his specic skills accumulated with the previous technology, hence s = 015. The
upgrading costs are not borne by the rm alone but shared between the rm and the worker.
More precisely, total costs, (), are allocated to maximize the surplus i.e.
15The feature that, upon upgrading, rms jump back to the frontier comes from assumption. However,
for the parameterized cost function used here, we would obtain the same result if we let the rm choose
the particular technology. This comes from the fact that both the productivity advantage a rm enjoys by
adopting any newer technology and the associated costs remain unchanged over time. Hence, to adopt any
technology that is less advanced then the frontier would have already been optimal at the time when this
technology itself was the frontier technology.
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IJ and IE are the adoption costs borne by the rm and the worker respectively and 
indicates the rm's weight in the bargain. The outcome of the upgrading problem is a cost
sharing rule that solves Equation (1.10) and a policy function, T(;s), which determines, for




As previously stated, the bargaining process is sequential. Before the rm and the worker
bargain over the wage they decide whether or not to upgrade the production technology. For
matters of completeness, we can also state the value function for an employed worker and a
rm at the beginning of a period, i.e. before the upgrading decision.
J(;s) = maxf  J(;s);  J(0;0)   I
J(;s);0g (1.11)
E(;s) = maxf  E(;s);  E(0;0)   I
E(;s);W(;s;1)g (1.12)
Each period the rm and the worker can also decide to dissolve the match, which will
be optimal if the joint surplus of staying in the match - with or without upgrading - is less
than zero.
Wage setting
The second step in the intra-match, decision making sequence concerns the wage bargain.
Conditional on the outcome of the upgrading decision the rm and the worker engage in a
bargaining process in which they choose a wage rate to maximize the joint surplus of the




   E(;s)   W (;s;1)
1  (1.13)
as before,  indicates the bargaining power of the rm. Optimality implies that
(1   )  J(;s) = 
  E(;s)   W (;s;1)

(1.14)
16The cost sharing rule must satisfy (1   )[  J(0;0)   IJ    J(;s)] = [  E(0;0)   IE    E(;s)].
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(1.14) that has to hold for all pairs of (;s), we can write the wage as
(1   
w)!(;s) = (1   )y(;s) +  [W(;s;1)   g(1   )W(
0;s;1)] 








Cost sharing applies not just to ongoing matches that update their production technology
but also to newly formed matches. Unemployed workers suer from skill obsolescence in the
same way as employed workers. To make the production knowledge of a newly hired worker
compatible with the installed technology, rms that are newly matched have to invest in
workers' training. Similar to the problem above, the costs for a new match are allocated
according to
max
IE;IJ[  J(0;0)   I
J(;s;e)]







Notice that the worker's benet entitlement aects the degree to which the total training
costs are shared. This is intuitive as a worker with UI benet claims has a higher outside
option and a higher opportunity costs of working, compared to a worker with claims. To
make such a worker agree on forming the match and leaving unemployment, the rm has to
oer a greater share of the total surplus. This is done by letting the worker pay a smaller
fraction of the total costs.
The value function of an unemployed worker with benet entitlement e 2 f0;1g, that is
associated with vintage  and has accumulated skills s in his last occupation is as follows
W(;s;e) = be(s) + g(1   )p()
  E(0;0)   I
E(;s;e)

+ g(1   )(1   p())
[(1   




where the subscript e attached to a variable determines its value conditional on the UI
benet entitlement. The respective variable is 0 for e = 0 and equal to its actual value for
e = 1. E.g. 
e = 
;(
e = 0) for e = 1;(e = 0). With probability p() an unemployed worker
encounters a vacancy and becomes employed in the next period. The value of the match
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the worker stays unemployed in the next period as well. In this case - and if still entitled
to UI - he loses the benet claims with probability 
. We have to keep track of a worker's
benet entitlement because, in the case of a match, it will determine a worker's power in
the wage bargaining process. A worker not receiving benets has a lower outside option and
has, therefore, a lower reservation wage17.
In order to ll a vacant job, rms have to actively search for workers by posting vacancies.
Denote with V the value of a vacancy and let  be the cost of keeping the vacancy open.
Given free entry, in equilibrium all gains from posting vacancies must be exhausted, hence
V = 0. In other words, the cost of opening up a vacancy must equal the expected return.
The implied zero-prot condition is








With probability q(;s;e) the rm meets a worker with characteristics (;s;e), in which
case the net surplus of a match is  J(0;0)   IJ(;s;e). There is no directed search in the
model and so the rm can expect to be matched with any worker. This is taken into account
by summing over all possible combinations of states (;s;e). Condition (1.18) pins down the
degree of labor market tightness in equilibrium.
1.4 Solving the model
The solution to the model is a set of policy functions that characterize the optimal decision
behavior of employed workers, rms with a lled job and rms with dormant jobs. Decisions
are taken jointly, hence we do not need to separately consider policy functions for employed
workers and rms with a lled job. It suces to focus on a decision rule associated with a
job/worker pair. The relevant state variables for an existing match are the vintage of the
installed technology, , and the level of specic skills, s. For each possible pair of states
(;s), the policy function T(;s) determines the optimal decision which is an element in the
action space fupdate, not update, destroy the jobg18.
The free entry condition that yields the zero (expected) prot condition implicitly de-
termines the vacancy posting behavior of rms with a dormant job. Firms keep posting
vacancies as long as the return exceeds the costs, i.e. as long as V > 0. Notice that when
17This is in addition to the eect on the cost sharing rule.
18An alternative interpretation of T(;s) is that for each skill level s 2 S it determines the critical age of
the installed technology for which it is optimal to upgrade or to destroy the job.
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solving the model is reduced to nding a tax rate, w, and labor market tightness, , so that
the government budget is balanced and ex-post matching probabilities are consistent with
agents' ex-ante beliefs.
The algorithm that is constructed to this end is structured in the following way. In an
inner loop agents solve their maximization problem taking the tax rate, w, and the tight-
ness, , as given. To compute the value functions I use a discrete state space in the  and
the s dimension. The existence of destruction and death shocks ensure the boundedness of
the space of vintages . The process governing the workers' skill accumulation is a four-state
discrete valued Markov process and so the space of possible skill levels consists of four values.
Using the resulting policy function T(;s); one can compute the stationary mass functions
of unemployed workers u(;s;e) and of existing matches (;s). The matching probabilities
(1.5), together with u(;s;e) and the zero prot condition (1.18) is used to update the value
of  leaving the tax rate unchanged.
The inner loop has converged when the value of  is found that is consistent with agents'
prior beliefs. Using the stationary distributions one can compute aggregate variables, in-
cluding total government expenditures and revenues. In an outer loop, these values are
subsequently used to update the guess of w in a way such that the government budget con-
straint is balanced. The model is solved once the xed point in w is found. The equilibrium
of the model consists of
 a wage schedule !(;s) and a rm's policy function T(;s) that maximize the joint
surplus of each rm/worker pair (;s),
 a labor market tightness  that ensures zero expected prots,
 a tax rate w that balances the government budget and
 distributions of unemployed workers u(;s;e) and matches (;s) that are time invari-
ant
1.5 Parametrization and Calibration
The model period is set equal to half a quarter. In total there are 13 parameters (see Table
1.4) to be set. Seven of them, (;;;;;d;;g), are parameterized, i.e. I use existing
micro-evidence to infer about the actual parameter values. The personal discount factor
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working age face a constant probability of dying  = 0:0025 so that, on average, they spend
50 years in the labor force. Firms' bargaining weight, , is equal to 0:5, which is also the
elasticity of the matching function with respect to the stock of vacancies. This value is rather
standard in the literature on search and matching. The value of  = 0:2 is chosen so that
the progress ratio i.e. the ratio of peak to initial productivity is equal to 1:2. Jovanovic and
Nyarko (1995) reports progress ratios from a dozen empirical studies. Their suggested range
is 1:14 2:9. Given that 1:2 is a rather conservative choice, we will consider alternative val-
ues in Section 1.7. Setting the parameters of the cost function is not an easy task since the
Explanation Variable Value
Discount Factor  0.9945
Probability of dying  0.0025
Firm's bargaining weight  0.5
Vacancy cost  0.14076
Parameter of production function  0.5
Parameter of matching function  m 0.7702
Parameter of matching function d 0.5
Parameters of cost function  1
Growth rate of technology frontier g 0.025
LS WS
Separation rate  0.0212 0.0137
Parameter of cost function  0.024 0.024-0.057
Replacement rate  0 0.45
Probability of loosing benet entitlement 
 - 0.0417
Table 1.4: Parameter Values (One period is half a quarter)
empirical literature is rather silent regarding training/updating costs. However, there exists
a consensus that training costs are a convex function of the technology gap19. Therefore,
I set  = 1. The choice of the second parameter in the cost function, , will be discussed
shortly. The transition probabilities associated with the skill accumulation are set so that
intra-rm technology learning lasts, on average, for 10 years. This value is consistent with
ndings by Bahk and Gort (1993), which reports that intra-rm capital and organizational
learning continues for up to 10 years after birth20.
19However, as stated previously, convexity of the cost function is not critical for our results.
20The lower (upper) bound of the range of attainable skills is set equal s0 = 0 (sI = 1).
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that the steady state generated by the model matches certain features of the U.S. economy
for the period before 1975. The pre-1975 steady state of the laissez-faire economy (henceforth
LS) - which we consider as our benchmark - is calibrated to match the following targets (1)
an average duration of unemployment of 11:4 weeks that is consistent with BLS-data for the
period 1960-75, (2) an average vacancy duration of 6.5 weeks as reported by van Ours and
Ridder (1992), (3) a technology adoption cost to GDP ratio of 2:4% as estimated by Bessen
(2002) for 1973 and (4) and unemployment rate of 4%. The parameter values that match
these targets are the following. The semi-quarterly vacancy cost  = 0:14076 compares to 1:5
months of wage payment, a value that is in line with ndings by Bentitola and Bertola (1990)
and Felbermayer and Prat (2007). Exogenous layos occur with probability  = 0:0212, i.e.
once every 5:9 years. The scale parameter in the matching function is equal to  m = 0:7702
and the curvature parameter of the training cost function is equal to  = 0:024.
For the welfare-state (henceforth WS) there are two more parameters to be set. The
replacement rate is set equal to 45%. The OECD reports replacement rates for the early
1970s in Europe lying in the range between 30% (Germany) and 50% (Netherlands). The
semi-quarterly probability of losing the benet entitlement is 
 = 0:0417. It follows that
people receive benets, on average, for 3 years.
For the benchmark case I set the annualized growth rate of embodied technical change
equal to 2:5%. Given the dierences in the institutions, the same LS job destruction rate, ,
generates a steady state unemployment rate of 5:2% in the WS economy. However, average
unemployment until the early 70s in Europe was around 3:5%. To account for this fact we
follow Hornstein et al. (2007) and recalibrate the separation rate for the WS economy21. In
order to match low European unemployment in the 70s we set the semi-quarterly separation
rate equal to  = 0:0137. A welcome side eect of lowering  is that we automatically in-
21One might conjecture that introducing layo taxes - as in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007) - would be
equally successful in resolving the problem. As emphasized by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), layo taxes
reduce incentives to create jobs and to destroy them. The net eect on labor market tightness (and hence
on unemployment) turns out to be ambiguous. In this framework however, a ring tax payed by the rm in
the event of an endogenous or an exogenous separation would inevitably raise unemployment. This is due
to the fact that, for the current calibration, endogenous job destruction does not exist in equilibrium. The
only source of job destruction is exogenous separation. Hence, the channel through which ring taxes could
potentially lower unemployment, i.e. via locking workers into their jobs, does not take eect. As a result,
layo taxes would only decrease the surplus of a job for a rm and consequently depress job creation.
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and Manning (1999), the duration of unemployment in European countries was already sub-
stantially higher relative to the U.S. by the 1970s. We, therefore, believe that our calibration
nicely captures the main characteristics of (and dierences between) European and U.S. la-
bor markets. The set of parameters and their associated values are compactly summarized
in Table (1.4)
1.6 Results
The goal of this paper is to provide an understanding of the linkage between rms' technol-
ogy adoption behavior, labor market institutions and the labor market performance of an
economy. The analysis is motivated by the fact that there are substantial and highly per-
sistent dierences in unemployment rates between major European countries and the U.S.
and also across European economies. These dierences emerged in the late 1970's at a time
when there has been a major increase in the arrival rate of new technologies. Given these
observations it is clear that we need to evaluate the model along two dierent dimensions.
First, we need to consider a pre-1975 period that is characterized by a low arrival rate of new
technologies. The results of this scenario are then contrasted with the results of a post-1975
scenario in which the arrival rate is high. Secondly, in order to mimic the existing technology
gap between (and among certain) European countries and the U.S., we need to account for
dierences in technology updating and is done by considering various dierent updating cost
scenarios. It is not the aim of this paper to explain why Europe has been lagging behind the
U.S. in the implementation and usage of new technologies. It takes the observed dierences
in technology updating as given and seeks to analyze its eects on labor markets outcomes.
1.6.1 The pre-1975 period
Cross-country dierences in the frequency of technology upgrading are likely to be the result
of dierent regulatory environments. The evidence presented in Section 1.2 argues that
there is substantial heterogeneity in the nature of regulatory environments across European
countries. This translates into dierences in the underlying adoption-cost structure and
causes dierent rates of technology adoption across countries. In order to account for this
we consider dierent cost scenarios for the WS economies. To this end we pick values for
the cost parameter  in the range 0:024   0:057. This range yields average updating costs
that are comparable with 4:21 13:49 weeks of average post-update wage payments. Higher
costs curb rms' incentives to adopt new technologies and so we observe rms with higher
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75 outcomes of the calibrated model and contrasts the results of the laissez-faire economy
with those of the dierent cost scenarios of the welfare-state economy.
In the benchmark case, rms upgrade their production technology every 14:44 quarters
in the LS economy and - depending on the cost structure - every 14:66   24:64 quarters in
the WS economy. The implied technology gap - i.e. the average distance of rms to the
leading edge technology ranges from 8:59   11:97 quarters.
L-F, pre 75 Welfare state, pre 75
Gap to Laissez-Faire, in quarters 0 0.22 2.02 4.37 6.16 8.03 10.2
Average time until update, in quarters 14.44 14.66 16.46 18.81 20.6 22.41 24.64
Average distance to tech. frontier 8.59 8.93 9.6 10.2 10.83 11.44 11.97
Unemployment rate, in % 4.02 3.48 3.73 3.97 4.24 4.58 4.94
Duration of unemployment, in weeks 11.54 14.43 15.51 16.55 17.74 19.2 20.81
% of unemployed w/ spells  3 months 81.05 69.94 66.43 63.31 60.05 56.43 53.34
% of unemployed w/ spells [6, 12) months 3.46 8.22 10.00 11.65 13.41 15.38 17.03
% of unemployed w/ spells  12 months 0.13 0.82 1.27 1.81 2.55 3.59 4.9
Equilibrium tax rate, in % 0 1.28 1.37 1.45 1.54 1.65 1.77
L-F: Laissez-Faire Economy ( = 0), Welfare State Economy ( = 0:45)
Table 1.5: Steady states for the period before 1975
The technology choice - labor market linkage
Those dierences in rms' technology choice do not leave labor market variables unaected.
For the purpose of understanding the linkages between rms' technology choice and the labor
market we rst dene two concepts that will also prove useful later on. Denote with zu the
average degree of skill obsolescence of unemployed individuals. A worker's skill obsolescence
is proportional to his technology gap, so we can write zu as
zu = z;s;eu(z;s;e)z=u
where z denes the technology gap in terms of the productivity dierential, i.e. z =
31
Duernecker, Georg (2010), Three Essays on Frictional Labor Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/19041   e g, and u is the total mass of unemployed workers22.
Let ctr denote expected training costs a rm has to incur in the event of a match, which
we can write as
ctr = z;s;eu(z;s;e)(z)=u
The maximum age of a technology  can be also expressed in terms of the implied
productivity dierential, i.e. the maximum productivity gap with respect to the frontier
z = 1   g . The linkage between the rms' upgrading choice and the labor market is
the following. Dierences in the updating frequency, , directly translate into dierent val-
ues of z. This is illustrated in rows 1   2 in Table 1.6. The longer rms wait to update,
the more outdated the technology at the time of the actual replacement. In other words,
for less frequent updating the average technology gap of rms z increases. Consequently,
workers that are attached to these technologies while being employed exhibit a higher degree
of skill obsolescence. These workers eventually become unemployed (due to exogenous or
endogenous job destruction), making the average degree of skill obsolescence in the pool of
unemployed individuals will be higher. This is illustrated in the third row of Table 1.6. Put
dierently, as z rises the distribution of unemployed (across z) shifts to the right and the
mass of individuals with relatively more obsolete skills increases.
The degree of skill obsolescence of an unemployed worker determines the amount of train-
ing that is necessary in the event of match. Therefore, a higher degree of skill obsolescence
in the pool of unemployed implies that rms can expect larger training expenses when being
matched with a worker. This is demonstrated in the fourth row of Table 1.6. Depending
on the cost regime, expected training costs amount to 6:79%   17:8% of rm's output. Ar-
guably, larger job creation costs reduce rms' incentives to post vacancies, as illustrated
in the fth row of Table 1.6. Lower job creation leads to a fall in workers' probability to
encounter a vacancy. Consequently, the 
ow out of unemployment is reduced and so causes
both the average duration and the level of unemployment to rise. Unemployment rates in
the benchmark case range from 3:48%   4:94%.
Table 1.5 contains results concerning the duration of unemployment. The percentage of
jobless workers with unemployment lasting less or equal than 3 months in the laissez-faire
22Recall that u(s;j;z) is the mass of jobless workers with previous skills s, benet entitlement e and
technology gap z.
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the WS outcome are substantially lower (53:34%   69:94%). This is in line with ndings
by Machin and Manning (1999). They report that the duration of unemployment in Europe
was substantially higher than in the U.S. already in the 1970s. The model also does well
in predicting the proportion of long-term unemployed workers in the LS economy. The g-
ure produced by the model (3:46%) is close to U.S. data (4:58%). The gure for the WS
is substantially higher - i.e. it ranges from 8:22% - 17:03% - emphasizing that long-term
unemployment was already a severe problem for European economies in the 70s.
L-S Welfare State
Average time until update, in quarters 14.4 14.6 16.5 18.8 20.6 22.4 24.6
Average z at update, in % 8.63 8.75 9.77 11.1 12.1 13.1 14.3
zu, in % 7.39 8.44 8.93 9.35 9.81 10.3 10.7
Average job creation costs, in % output 7.14 6.79 8.81 10.7 12.7 15.2 17.8
Vacancy/employment ratio, v
1 u, in % 2.25 1.23 1.15 1.08 1.01 0.93 0.86
Unemployment rate, in % 4.02 3.48 3.73 3.97 4.24 4.58 4.94
Table 1.6: Comparison of cost regimes, pre 75
On the whole, the steady states for the laissez-faire and the welfare-state economy gener-
ated by the baseline parametrization can consistently capture the main features of European
and U.S. labor markets of the period before 1975.
1.6.2 The post-1975 period
Having analyzed the linkage between rms' technology adoption and labor market outcomes
we are now ready to make a next step. Fact II presented in Section 1.2 stated that in the
late 1970s, there has been a substantial acceleration in capital-embodied technical change.
To analyze the eect of this change on labor market outcomes we conduct the following
experiment. We increase the growth rate of the technology frontier to g = 4% to see how
this change aects unemployment in economies that dier in their technology updating. As
argued previously, a higher rate of arrival of new technologies raises the issue of compatibility
problems between vintages. Hence, to overcome the same technology gap adjustment, costs
are likely to be higher in a world with rapid technical change.
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evidence, we re-calibrate the cost parameter . We set  to match an adoption cost to
output ratio of 6:5%; which concurs with the ndings of Bessen (2002) for the U.S. for the
period after 1975. The implied value is  = 0:0668. There is a lack of similar estimates
for European countries, hence we determine  for each of the WS scenarios in the following
way. The rate of embodied technical change increased uniformly in the U.S. and in Europe,
implying we should observe the same compatibility problems in European countries as well.
We can expect European rms being confronted with an increase in costs of a similar order
of magnitude as those in the U.S. In the calibration we pick the post-75 value of  so that
the relative increase in updating costs for each of the dierent updating scenarios in the WS
case exactly matches the increase in costs in the laissez-faire economy. Table 1.7 reports the
post-75 steady states of the laissez-faire economy and the dierent scenarios of the welfare
state.
L-F, post 75 Welfare state, post 75
Gap to Laissez-Faire, in quarters 0 -1.55 1.26 3.93 6.73 9.61 12.85
Average time until update, in quarters 20.74 19.1 22.01 24.68 27.47 30.35 33.59
Average distance to tech. frontier 9.18 9.15 10.09 10.92 11.76 12.64 13.54
Unemployment rate, in % 6.29 5.48 6.54 7.61 8.84 10.38 12.22
Duration of unemployment, in weeks 18.47 23.22 28.03 32.95 38.82 46.36 55.72
% of unemployed w/ spells  3 months 58.2 48.42 41.42 36.45 31.25 26.44 22.36
% of unemployed w/ spells [6, 12) months 14.42 19.52 22.54 24.08 24.93 24.38 23.94
% of unemployed w/ spells  12 months 3.05 7.09 11.87 16.9 22.62 29.72 36.33
Equilibrium tax rate, in % 0 1.94 2.27 2.58 2.93 3.34 3.81
L-F: Laissez-Faire Economy ( = 0), Welfare State Economy ( = 0:45)
Table 1.7: Steady states for the period after 1975
A shock to capital embodied technical change: laissez-faire vs welfare state
An increase in capital-embodied technical change raises unemployment in the laissez-faire
economy by about 2:27 percentage points - see Column 1 in Table 1.7. This closely matches
the post-75 increase in U.S. unemployment. In the data, we see a jump in U.S. unemployment
34
Duernecker, Georg (2010), Three Essays on Frictional Labor Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/1904in the late 1970s that leads to average unemployment of 6:38% for the period 1975-200023.
The increase in unemployment is fuelled by an increase in the duration of unemployment
which is also in line with the data. In the period 1975-2005, the average duration of un-
employment lasted for 15:33 weeks, which is slightly less than the model predicts. From
the rst columns in Table 1.5 and in Table 1.7 we see that a rise in the arrival rate of new
technologies had, on the whole, a rather modest eect on the LS labor market.
The eects in the WS economy, however, are more diverse. The change in unemploy-
ment in response to a shock in capital-embodied growth depends crucially on an economy's
ex-ante technology updating frequency. Columns 2   7 in Table 1.7 illustrate this pattern.
An economy having a technology gap of 4 quarters experiences a rise in unemployment up to
7:61%. For a gap of 6 quarters unemployment increase to 8:84% whereas a gap of 10 quarters
pushes unemployment up to 12:22%. These gures broadly match the post-75 unemployment
experience of major European welfare state economies with sluggish technology adoption.
Leading examples are Germany (7:7%), France (10:55%) or Italy (10:86%). However, as
columns 2   3 in Table 1.7 demonstrate, unemployment rates in a welfare state with gener-
ous UI need not necessarily be high. Economies with suciently high upgrading frequencies
experience a signicantly less pronounced increase in unemployment. In both economies
depicted in columns 2   3 in Table 1.7 the technology upgrading is virtually the same as in
the LF economy. Thus, there is practically no technology decit. The unemployment rates
we get for these economies are in the range 5:48%   6:54%. This is close to the laissez-faire
gure but, more importantly, it is substantially lower than the rates in welfare states that
suer from sizeable technology gaps. The intuition for this will be provided shortly.
These gures are very much in line with data on countries like Sweden (with an unem-
ployment rate of 5:78%), the Netherlands (6:45%), Denmark (6:67%) or Austria (3:81%). All
these economies feature frequent technology upgrading (like the US) and, at the same time,
unemployment rates remained at rather moderate levels. Therefore, the key factor that de-
termines the change in unemployment, in response to a shock in capital embodied technical
change, is clearly an economy's frequency of technology updates. Generous unemployment
benets do not seem to matter, which is in sharp contrast to the results of Ljungqvist and
Sargent (1998).
The non-core role of UI (for the response of unemployment) is supported by the experience
23Unemployment in the U.S. was mainly above average in the 80s and early 90s. Our model can account
for this movement but not for the subsequent decrease that started in the mid-90s.
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provide generous UI, exhibit no - or just a small - technology gap and at the same time they
perform remarkably well in terms of labor market indicators. Overall, this model is able to
account for the large variation in unemployment rates we see across European economies. For
that, it does not have to rely on institutional dierences but rather it stresses the importance
of observable technological dierences and their linkages to the labor market24.
The eects of capital-embodied technical change on unemployment
The key result of this paper is that, in response to an acceleration of capital-embodied tech-
nical change, unemployment rises more than proportionally in economies that feature less
frequent technology updating. This pattern is graphed in Figure 1.3. The solid and the
dashed lines represent WS unemployment rates for the pre-75 and the post-75 era respec-
tively. Each point in the x-dimension represents a particular cost scenario associated with
a certain updating frequency. After the simulated shock, the economy jumps to the point
on the dashed line that is exactly above the respective pre-75 point. For completeness, the
gure also illustrates the response of unemployment in the LS economy. Evidently, as the
rate of arrival of new technologies accelerates unemployment in the WS reaches high levels
rather quickly as the technology gap widens.
This section provides intuition behind this result. For this, we make use of the two
concepts previously employed, i.e. the average degree of skill obsolescence of unemployed
individuals, zu, and the expected training costs for rms, ctr.
To get a more complete picture of the driving mechanism we also perform the following
counterfactual analysis. In a rst step we increase only the growth rate of the technology
frontier, g, to 4%, and leave the cost parameter  unchanged. Hence, we disregard the
24It is well known that the persistent increase in unemployment rates in the major European was driven
primarily by an increase in the fraction of long-term unemployed. The 
ows into unemployment were roughly
the same in the pre- and the post-1975s era. Out
ow rates, however, dropped signicantly. As a consequence,
the duration of unemployment and the fraction of long-term unemployed rose. This phenomenon is well
captured by our model. The results in Table 1.7 show that both indicators experience a signicant increase
in the post-75 period. The duration of unemployment was generally low in the pre-75 era but experienced
a dramatic increase as the rate of arrival of new technologies started to accelerate. The fraction of long-
term unemployed (i.e. those with spells  6 months) in welfare states with sluggish updating ranges from
40:98% to 60:27%. This is broadly consistent with actual data for welfare states like Germany (39%), Spain
(51:6%) or France (55:1%). Likewise, the results for economies with frequent updating (26:61%   34:41%)
can broadly match real-world counterparts like Sweden (25:44%) or Austria (37:75%). Also the result for
the LS economy (i.e. 17:47%) is consistent with the corresponding U.S. gure, (15:53%)
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an acceleration in the arrival rate of new technologies. The results are represented by the
rst rows in Panels I-III in Table 1.825. In a second step we set g to 4% but also account for
compatibility issues by changing the cost parameter . We set  so that the resulting
adoption cost to GDP ratio in the LS economy equals 4:5%. This is less than in the
benchmark scenario for which this ratio is 6:5%. Hence, the problems of compatibility
considered are less severe relative to the benchmark case.
Figure 1.3: Unemployment Rates
The results are given by the respective second rows in Table 1.8. For matters of com-
parability, we also report the outcome of the benchmark scenario in the respective third
rows. The two key elements for understanding the divergence of unemployment rates across
economies are (a) the post-75 response of rms' critical gap, i.e. z, and (b) the change in
the degree of skill obsolescence of unemployed, zu. We discuss both separately.
From the second column in Table 1.8 we can infer that the critical gap, z, increases for
all scenarios, even in the case of constant costs26. However, economies that feature sluggish
technology updating experience a more than proportional increase in z. This is due to the
25Notice that the numbers indicate the change relative to pre-75 outcomes.
26Recall that the critical gap is dened as z = 1   e g

where  indicates the maximum age of a
technology. For constant costs, T naturally decreases as it is optimal for rms to update earlier. This
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wages payed within a match drop27. This raises the joint surplus of each existing match28.
However, the increase is not the same for all rms.
Cost z in %p zu in %p JCC, in %  v
1 u, in % u, in %
Panel I: LS
= +3.3 +2.1 +2.4 -9.1 4.4
4.5 +5.3 +2.8 +5.3 -17.5 4.8




= +3 +2.3 +2.4 -9.7 3.8
4.5 +4.4 +2.9 +5.1 -18.1 4.2




= +4.8 +3.8 +6.9 -20.7 6.1
4.5 +7.3 +5.2 +14.9 -35.8 7.3
6.5 +14.3 +9.4 +41.3 -62.6 12.2
z
WS   z
LS - indicates the technology gap relative to the LS case, %p = change in percentage points,
z = change in rm's critical gap, u = unemployment rate,  v
1 u = change in vacancy/employment
ratio, JCC = change in expected costs of job creation, zu = change in average degree of unemployed
skill obsolescence
Table 1.8: Counterfactual Analysis
The longer is the updating horizon, i.e. the higher is , the longer is the time period for
which a rm/worker pair will benet from lower wages. Consequently, the increase in the
joint surplus is higher for matches that update less frequently. A higher surplus postpones the
updating date, which implies that the increase in the the critical gap, i.e. , will be larger
decrease, however, is outweighed by the increase in the growth rate g so that the overall impact on z is
negative. As costs increase the maximum age, , decreases by less or even rises. Hence, in the scenarios
that consider also compatibility problems, the critical gap z rises by more.
27This is because wages are proportional to a plant's current (relative) productivity, i.e. !(;s) / y(;s) =
 ag (1 + s), see Equation (1.15).
28To be precise, a lower wage increases the rm's surplus, J(;s), but at the same time it reduces the
worker's value of the job, E(;s). However, it also reduces the worker's outside option, W(;s;1), through
lowering (a) the unemployment benets, b(s) / !(;s), and (b) the value of being re-matched. As such, the
overall eect on the joint surplus is positive.
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as we also consider the issue of vintage incompatibility (represented by the middle and far
right number in each column). Using the same logic we have developed previously, it is
straightforward to understand the remaining gures in Table 1.8. In eect, these results
are mostly implied by the response of the critical gap z. Recall that z determines the
degree of skill obsolescence in the pool of unemployed, zu. The more than proportional rise
in z for late-updating economies translates into a relatively stronger increase in the degree
of workers skill obsolescence, zu (see column 3 in Table 1.8). This pushes training costs
and consequently dampens rms' vacancy posting. As a result, the decline in job creation
and therefore, the rise in unemployment is more severe for economies with less frequent
technology updating.
The second eect concerns the change in the skill obsolescence of unemployed workers.
The degree of obsolescence of workers' production knowledge depends on two factors; (a)
the growth rate of the frontier where higher growth implies faster depreciation and (b) the
duration of unemployment, as the longer an individual stays out of work then the longer
he is exposed to the depreciation process. The rst factor implies that the post-75 rise in
capital-embodied growth has increased the degree of obsolescence in all economies. However,
this negative eect is stronger in economies with sluggish technology upgrading given that
workers in those economies face a higher duration of unemployment (see Table 1.7).
1.7 Sensitivity Analysis
1.7.1 The role of unemployment insurance
It is often argued that the generous UI system in Europe is the main reason for high rates of
unemployment. Cutting back benets in our model would, for suciently sluggish updating,
denitely decreases unemployment. The results in Table 1.7, however, show that even within
a welfare state that provides generous UI, low levels of unemployment are achievable. What
matters for unemployment is primarily the speed with which rms adopt newly available
technologies and the generosity of the public UI system is of second order importance only.
To provide further support for this hypotheses, we run an experiment in which we vary
the generosity of the UI system. To this end we pick replacement rates of  2 f0;0:25g and
29There is also a second eect that comes through a standard capitalization eect. A higher g increases
a rm's surplus by lowering the eective discount rate. Again, rms with a longer updating horizon will
benet more from lower discounting.
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For matters of comparability we show just the two extreme updating cases, i.e. those with
technology gaps of 0 and 10 quarters. For each of the two cases (organized in Panels I and
II) we report the results of each policy regime, i.e.  2 f0;0:25;0:45g. The second column
contains the change in unemployment in response to the standard pre/post-75 rise in g, i.e.
2:5% ! 4%. Arguably, the generosity of the UI system (as measured by ) plays a rather
limited role for explaining both the post-75 increase in unemployment and the divergence of
unemployment rates across OECD countries. For frequent technology updating (Panel I),
the response of unemployment is virtually independent of the generosity of unemployment
insurance. In the benchmark case, i.e.  = 0:45, only 0:55 percentage points of the total post-
75 increase in unemployment are due to the existence of generous UI. For sluggish updating
(Panel II), the eect of benets is higher. The contribution of UI to the total increase in
unemployment equates to 2:37 percentage points. Nevertheless, a large proportion of the
increase remains to be explained primarily by rms' technology choice.




0 1.45 17.46 12.99 20.35 -
0.25 1.74 20.35 13.18 20.39 0.47




0 4.91 38.07 18.39 56.82 -
0.25 6.61 48.99 19.73 57.51 11.54
0.45 7.28 55.72 20.04 59.02 15.14
u - change in unemployment rate, %p - change in percentage points, z
WS   z
LS - indicates the
technology gap relative to the LS case,  = Replacement rate, Duration of unemployment is in weeks,
JCC - change in JCC relative to case with  = 0, JCC = expected costs of job creation, zu = average
degree of unemployed skill obsolescence.
Table 1.9: The Eect of Unemployment Insurance
The reason why UI has a bigger impact in the case of slow updating is intuitive. For
the cases depicted in Panel II, workers stay unemployed for a relatively long period of time
30Note that the case  = 0 is basically equivalent to a LS economy, but it diers from the previous section
in terms of the replacement rate, . In this section, we keep the original parametrization of  for the welfare
state, i.e.  = 0:0137 and only lower .
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prolonging the period of workers' unemployment (see Column 4). Therefore, job creation
costs rise by more when updating is sluggish causing a bigger increase in unemployment.
However, this should not conceal the fact that the overall importance of UI in explaining the
post-75 increase in unemployment is rather limited. This result is in sharp contrast to the
results of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2007), as mentioned previously.
Evidently, there is not much gain from making the UI system more stringent. Reducing
the replacement rate to 25% would lower total unemployment by a mere 0:65   1:31 per-
centage points depending on the initial technology gap. More importantly, one should not
overlook the dramatic increase in unemployment in an economy that provides just minor
unemployment insurance but suers from large technology gaps. Suppose  = 0:25 and
updating occurs, on average, every 7:5 years. This would generate an unemployment rate of
around 9:25% which exemplies, once again, that very slack technology adoption can have
serious consequences for the labor market even in economies that do not provide generous
benets.
1.7.2 Do specic skills matter? The eects on wages and unemployment
The purpose of this section is to analyze to what extent the accumulation of job specic skills
aects the equilibrium outcomes. Sluggish technology updating implies that workers operate
a certain technology for a relatively long period of time and so accumulate a substantial
amount of specic skills, s31. The amount of skills determines an individual's wage and
thereby aects his UI claims in the case of unemployment. Consequently, displaced workers
with high technology tenure have a valuable outside option and possess strong bargaining
power. This reduces rms' surplus in the case of a match and discourages job creation. We
will refer to this eect as skill effect.
However, there is another eect that potentially counteracts this skill effect. When
updating is frequent workers operate technologies that are, on average, more productive.
Higher productivity translates into higher wages32. We will refer to this eect as vintage
effect. Which of these two eects dominates is a quantitative question and will depend on
the speed and the scope of technology learning.
31In the benchmark case of Section 1.6, the average skill level of workers is up to 21% higher in an economy
that updates less frequently.
32Put dierently, wages in fast-updating economies are high because workers operate technologies that
are, on average, very productive, whereas wages in slow-updating economies are high because workers have
accumulated a lot of skills that make them more productive.
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omy without learning. In this way we are able to identify the relative dierence in wages
that is solely due to the dierent vintages that are in place. We nd that the vintage ef-
fect creates a wage dierential of 15:46% between in/frequent updating economies33. We
next reintroduce technology learning according to the baseline calibration and we nd that
the wage dierential shrinks to 11:8%. Hence, the skill eect accounts for 3:66 percentage
points of the total wage dierential. The eect of technology learning on wages under the
baseline calibration is rather modest. This is because (1) the scope for technology learning
is fairly limited as the progress ratio, the ratio of initial to peak productivity, is 1:2 and
(2) the speed of learning is relatively slow34. On average, agents tap the full potential of
a technology only after 10 years35. Increasing the speed of learning does not have much
eect. If we raise the speed with which skills are accumulated so that the full potential is
reached, on average, after 5 (2:5) years the skill eect accounts for 4:4 (4:7) percentage points.
However, the picture changes signicantly when we consider higher values of the progress
ratio, i.e. when we increase the scope of learning. When we set the progress ratio to 1:5 and
consider 10, 5 and 2:5 years of learning we get skill eect amounts of 8:33%, 10:65% and
11:4% respectively. More and faster learning therefore leads to higher wages. One would
expect higher wages to cause higher unemployment through raising the workers' outside
option36 but is not the case here. By comparing two economies that dier only in the speed
or the scope of technology learning we see that unemployment will always be lower in the
fast-learning economy. This is intuitive as technology learning implies that workers can raise
a plant's productivity at no cost. Consequently, rms' average productivity is higher in
economies with learning. In the baseline scenario, average worker productivity exceeds that
of an otherwise identical economy without technology learning by 14:3%. As a result, the
value of a match for a rm will be higher, which encourages job creation (by 19:18%) and
thereby lowers unemployment (by 1:73 percentage points)37. If we increase the speed or the
33Frequent (infrequent) updating refers to the case of a WS economy with a technology gap (relative to
the LS case) of 0 (10) quarters.
34A progress ratio of 1:2 means that the maximum increase in productivity due to technology learning
amounts to 20%. A value that lies in the range 1:14   2:9 is suggested by Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995).
35In the benchmark case, this will happen rather rarely given (1) an average rm life of 9:1 years and (2)
technology updates that occur (depending on the respective cost scenario) every 4:75   8:25 years.
36The rise in the workers' value of unemployment comes through the increase in unemployment benets
that is due to higher wages, b(s) / !(;s).
37These numbers result from the scenario with sluggish updating. In an economy that updated at the
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this that the more workers can learn about a certain technology, i.e. the more productivity
can be raised above its initial level, the higher is the value of a match and hence, the more
protable it is to create new jobs.
1.8 Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to provide a proper understanding of the linkages between an
economy's technology adoption behavior, labor market institutions and unemployment. To
this end, a labor market matching model was constructed that has been augmented by an
endogenous technology choice by rms and a skill accumulation technology for workers. This
paper shows that the frequency with which rms in an economy update their production
technologies is a key determinant for manner in which the economy's labor market responds
to an acceleration in capital-embodied growth. The main result of this paper is that cross-
country dierences in rms' technology adoption behavior can account for a large part of
the observed divergence of unemployment rates across OECD economies that are hit by
the very same shock (i.e. the acceleration in capital-embodied technical change in the mid
1970s). Unlike previous work in this eld, the framework I propose is able to explain both,
(a) the divergence of unemployment rates between the major European countries and the
U.S. and (b) a large part of the observed variation in unemployment rates across European
economies. Furthermore, the results of this paper reject the popular but highly controversial
hypotheses that generous unemployment benets are the main reason for high unemploy-
ment in Europe. The analysis shows that even in welfare-state economies with a generous
UI system, low rates of unemployment are possible if the frequency of rms' technology
upgrading is suciently high.
The policy implications coming out of this analysis are evident. Rather than thinking
about cutting back unemployment benets, which might create large losses in welfare, poli-
cymakers should create conditions that prevent the emergence of a technology decit. The
evidence presented in Section 1.2 hints strongly toward a negative correlation between the
strictness of product market regulations and investment in new technologies. Therefore, the
removal or the relaxation of burdensome regulatory practices appears to be a natural mea-
frequency of the benchmark LS economy the corresponding gures would be as follows: the average produc-
tivity and job creation would be, respectively, 13:45% and 7:19% higher and unemployment would be 0:35
percentage points lower.
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important would be the subsidizing of training of unemployed people, for instance, by pro-
viding state-nanced unemployment training. This measure would certainly prevent the
obsolescence of unemployed workers production knowledge. As a result, it would facilitate
the re-integration of individuals into the labor market since it makes it less costly for rms
to hire workers38.
38If, however, state-nanced training is a substitute for the training provided by rms it could potentially
create moral hazard on the rm's side.
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Informational Frictions and the Life-Cycle Dynamics of
Job Mobility
Abstract
This paper studies the life-cycle dynamics of individual job mobility. After entry into the
labor market, young individuals typically change jobs very frequently and retain new jobs
just for a short period of time. In later stages of their career, workers tend to hold stable jobs
and they are signicantly more likely to keep a new job than in the early years. This paper
argues that the labor market experience that individuals accumulate early in their career
aects their job mobility in later stages. We construct a life-cycle model of the labor market
whose main characteristic is an information imperfection in the matching process. The key
ingredient is that the imperfection is assumed to be worker-specic and in particular, it is
linked to an individual's previous labor market history. We estimate the model by indirect
inference on data from the NLSY 79 and nd that it can capture very well the observed
life-cycle prole of individual labor market mobility.
JEL Classication: C15, D83, E24, J62
Keywords: Job mobility, Job turnover, Life-cycle, Signaling, Information imperfections,
Indirect Inference




Why does individual job mobility systematically dier across age groups? What we observe
is that young individuals typically change jobs very frequently and retain each new job just
for a short period of time. By contrast, experienced workers tend to hold stable jobs, but
more importantly, they are also less likely to separate from a new job than the young. On
the aggregate level, this leads to high rates of job turnover and unemployment among the
young but comparatively moderate gures for prime-age workers. This pattern is a common
characteristic of all labor markets in OECD countries, though it is particularly pronounced
in the U.S.
The literature considers the initially high, but declining, turnover for the young to be
the outcome of a search process in which workers experiment with jobs in order to nd the
right match. Accordingly, individuals hold a number of jobs in the rst years after labor
market entry. Eventually, after a series of failures, one job turns out to be a good match and
lasts several years. This explanation is incomplete as it implies that each prime-age worker,
who separates from a long-term job and seeks to nd a new occupation would, necessarily,
have to go through the same wasteful search process as at the beginning of the career. This
is clearly not the case. Empirical research has uncovered that the job mobility of newly
employed workers is declining with age since prime-age workers are signicantly less likely
to separate from a new job than young adults1. Evidently, mismatch is a phenomenon that
is strongly concentrated among young, but appears to be less common among job seekers of
higher age cohorts.
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the observed pattern
of individual job mobility along the life-cycle. To this end, we rst present new empirical
evidence documenting the life-cycle dynamics of job mobility in the U.S. labor market.
Second, in order to account for the observed pattern, we construct a life-cycle model of the
labor market. The framework we propose formalizes the hypotheses that the labor market
experience individuals accumulate in the initial period after labor market entry aects their
job mobility in later stages of the career. Third, to evaluate the empirical content of our
1Notice that I refer to the reemployment dynamics after a layo and not after a voluntary separation.
This distinction is important as jobs that follow a voluntary separation are typically more stable than jobs
that succeed a layo. At the same time, we also know that job separations of prime-age workers are more
likely to be voluntary than for the young. Due to this "composition eect" in the nature of separations we
would automatically observe a dierence in the separation hazard across age groups
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Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY 79), covering the period between 1979 and 2006.
Using the estimated parameters, we perform an empirical validation in which we compare
the model's predictions regarding selected individual and aggregate labor market outcomes
with their empirical counterparts. In what follows, we provide a brief sketch of each of the
three parts of the paper and present some of the main results.
Using data from the NLSY 79, we establish a number of empirical facts on individual job
mobility in the U.S. We focus on white male labor force participants, mainly for homogeneity
reasons. The main facts are:
 The probability of separating from a new job declines signicantly with age: 60% of
all new jobs among U.S. white males aged 18  20 years end within the rst year. For
workers aged 30 34 years, this number is 40% and individuals aged 38 years and over
face a 23% likelihood of separating from a new job within a year.
 The survival probability of new jobs drops when we consider a longer retention period:
workers aged 18   20 years have a 12% (7%) probability of retaining a new job for
at least three (ve) years, for individuals aged 38 years and over this number is 45%
(36%).
 Job mobility is highest when workers start their careers, in later stages job changes
become substantially less frequent. At the age of 45 years a typical U.S. white male
has held, on average, around 9 full time jobs, 50% of which are held within 5 years of
labor market entry and 75% within the rst 10 years.
 There is substantial variation in the total number of jobs across individuals. Some
individuals will hold very few jobs in their entire career whereas others change jobs
frequently. All workers, however, share the common characteristic that the turnover
uniformly declines along the career path.
 Unemployment is extremely high for individuals aged 18 20 years but it falls sharply,
within the age interval 18   25 years, from an initial rate of 25% down to roughly
8%. It continues to decline, up to age 35 where it levels out at a rate of 3%. For the
remaining part of the working life cycle, that considered here, unemployment stays low
and 
uctuates in a narrow range between 2%   3%2.
2In the work presented here, we observe each individual up to a maximum age of around 47 years. Thus,
we can not capture the unemployment dynamics before retirement.
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turnover for individuals early in their career. In later stages, job attachments become sub-
stantially more durable and job changes less frequent.
To shed light on this issue we construct and estimate a life-cycle model of the labor
market whose main characteristic is an information imperfection in the matching process.
We model the imperfection as a noisy signal about the match quality that a rm and worker
observe when they rst meet. The key ingredient is that the imperfection is assumed to be
worker-specic and in particular it is linked to an individual's previous labor market history.
Thus, the informativeness of the signal diers across workers as each of them has built up
an idiosyncratic labor market history. The intuition is that an individual's labor market
history seems likely to convey information about the worker's productive ability in a given
job. The more information is available about past jobs the easier it is for the employer to
screen the worker and assess their suitability for a particular job. Therefore, young workers
are typically associated with less informative signals than experienced individuals, who have
already built up an extensive history3.
In the presence of imperfect information, the true quality of a match can turn out to dier
from the employer's ex-ante perception. Hence, employers occasionally make mistakes by
matching with the wrong workers. The true match quality is an experience good about which
agents learn over time, based on observed output. Thereby, mismatches are detected and
eventually dissolved. The survival probability of a given match is endogenously determined
as it is conditional on the accuracy of the original signal. Given an informative signal, the
true quality corresponds to the agents' ex-ante perception, whereas, with noisy information
employers are more likely to be wrong. As a result, we observe dierent patterns of match
separation and job mobility across agents that dier from each other in their labor market
history and, in particular, in the amount of experience they have accumulated. The life cycle
dimension is an important ingredient in this model. It allows us to capture the transition
process through which young workers mature (by accumulating labor market experience)
and by which they gradually move out of the initial state that is characterized by high job
mobility.
3An alternative interpretation is as follows. One might think that the lack of experience causes young
individuals to have an inaccurate perception about a particular job, which is expressed by a less informative
signal. On the other hand, experienced workers can better assess, ex-ante, the suitability of a given job
based on their experience accumulated on past jobs.
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the NLSY 79. Each individual in the NLSY 79 is observed since the point in time when it
rst enters the labor market until to date (conditional on not dropping out). This allows us
to construct the entire labor market history of each individual using the information on the
individual's actual labor market transitions. The empirical validation of the model delivers
the following results:
 The estimated model can account very well, qualitatively and also quantitatively, for
the observed pattern of job mobility along the life cycle. In line with the data, the
model predicts that (a) young individuals are substantially more likely to separate from
a new job than experienced workers, (b) the hazard rate of separating from a new job
is increasing in the length of the retention period and (c) the hazard rate of separating
from any given job is declining with tenure, for all age groups. Moreover, the model
matches the observed extent of job turnover early in the career as well as the gradual
decline in later stages. The implied path for the cumulated number of jobs, at each
age, as a fraction of the career total is consistent with observations in the data.
 In the quantitative part, we distinguish between two worker types which can be consid-
ered as representing young and experienced workers. The model allows for some of the
structural parameters, i.e. those that are governing the signaling process and, thus,
the determination of the information imperfection to dier across those two worker
types. By how much they actually dier from each other is uncovered by the estima-
tion. We nd that the information imperfection, that is integrated into the matching
process, is clearly worker-type-specic. Signals are fairly precise for individuals with a
great deal of experience, whereas the average labor market entrant is associated with
relatively noisy information. This is re
ected by a signal to noise ratio that is, the
model predicts, roughly 4:5 times higher for experienced workers.
 The fundamental question, however, is for how long a labor market entrant has to stay
in the market until the upgrade from high to low noise type is realized? In other words,
how much labor market experience does a worker have to accumulate in order to be
considered as a low noise type? The model estimates that the cumulated number of
years of tenure required for a type change to occur is equal to 5:25.
 As mentioned previously, the quality of a given match is an experience good, about
which agents learn over time. Learning is assumed to be "all-or-nothing", such that
in each period there is a constant probability that the match quality is either fully
revealed or nothing is learned. We estimate this probability and nd that it takes, on
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match.
 The question that remains is how well the worker-type specicity of informational
frictions, which we incorporate, can account for the observed life-cycle pattern of job
mobility. To address this issue, we consider a variant of the original model that allows
for other factors, which may potentially aect job mobility, to dier across worker
types, namely (a) the job quality and (b) the exogenous rate of job destruction. The
estimates of the augmented model are then used to disentangle the eect associated
with each of the factors and to measure their respective contribution in explaining the
observed pattern. The statistic we use in this exercise, to compare the model to the
data, is the one-year job retention rate for newly employed workers4. We nd that the
full model can account for 98:5% of the total observed increase in the retention rate
over the life cycle. The informational frictions alone can explain a sizable fraction of
this increase, 41:8%. Further, allowing the (true but initially unobserved) job quality
to systematically dier across worker types adds 45:5% to the explanatory power of
the model5. The residual 11:2% can be explained by letting the rate of exogenous job
destruction to be type-specic.
The question at the core of this paper is: Why are young individuals more likely to
separate from a new job than experienced workers? In the work presented here, we focus
primarily on the role of informational frictions and we nd that they can explain a sizable
fraction of the observed patterns. Apart from the information-channel, there are certainly
other important factors that shape these patterns. One might think that the young have
a higher outside option than prime-age worker or that young adults can often rely on the
support of their parents in case of an adverse economic event, such as job loss and unemploy-
ment. Typically they, too, have fewer nancial obligations regarding child care, the nancing
of housing, etc. All of these factors are likely to aect their behavior as a higher outside
option, generally, makes a job loss less "painful".
4The one-year job retention rate measures the probability that a newly employed worker retains her
current job for at least one year. We focus on this measure since we believe that it best captures the
observed age-specicity of job mobility.
5With type-specic job quality, we will observe one type of worker, say the young, to be in jobs that
are, on average, worse than the jobs of experienced workers. Reasons for those systematic dierences could
be factors related to agents' experience, such as (a) agents' search behavior: the young search less directly
than the experienced and are, therefore, more likely to end up in a mismatch, or (b) the level of job-specic
human capital: the lack of experience may render the jobs of the young less productive.
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that the job search of an individual at the beginning of a career is rather "undirected".
Given the lack of labor market experience, young individuals will have a rather inaccurate
perception about which job is the right one. Hence, they may consider many jobs as suitable
and the likelihood that the one they pick results in a mismatch will be high. Over time, the
search behavior becomes more directed as agents learn, on the basis of their performance
on previous jobs, for which jobs they are better suited than others. As a result, the range
of jobs in which agents search narrows down as the career progresses. Those jobs that are
selected, in the end, are likely to be good matches6.
The standard job ladder model, as is used by Pissarides (1994), Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) and Burdett and Coles (2003), cannot be used to explain the decreasing job mobility
over the life cycle. More specically, the job ladder model formalizes the idea that individu-
als start to work in relatively mediocre jobs but, over time, they climb up the job ladder by
quitting their current job and accepting a new one. The process implies that workers select
themselves into increasingly better (payed) jobs. Typically, the distribution from which wage
oers are drawn has constant support. Consequently, the higher up a worker is in the ladder
the less likely he is to receive an even better oer. By contrast, workers in the lower part
have a higher probability of receiving a better oer and are, therfore, more likely to separate.
Thus, the job ladder model predicts that workers with more labor market experience, who
are presumably higher up in the job ladder, face a lower separation hazard than the young.
However, this model exhibits the very counterfactual prediction that all the workers, irre-
spective of their level of experience, have the same separation hazard after they experience
a layo. In the language of the model, a layo makes workers fall o the ladder and so they
will again face the same (high) separation hazard as they did prior to the previous climb-
ing up process. This prediction is clearly contradicted by the data, as it can be observed
that experienced workers face a substantially lower hazard rate than the young, including
after a layo. The model that is proposed in this paper can account for this feature, as
it makes the reemployment dynamics after a separation dependent on the worker's level of
labor market experience. The key implication that can be drawn from this is that young
6This channel is investigated by Papageorgiou (2009). He proposes a model in which workers learn
about their unobserved skills and self-select into the occupation that best matches their abilities. Young
workers, who have little experience, are the least informed about their type, they are less likely to choose
the occupation in which they perform best and are more likely to switch aa a result. This framework can
successfully account for the observed decline in occupational mobility with age.
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reemployed after being laid o.
A sound understanding of individuals' job mobility is key for the design and the im-
plementation of labor market policies. Our results indicate a potentially important path
dependency in the working life cycle of individuals. We nd that the job situation a worker
faces in the later stages of their career is closely linked to the outcomes and the experience
accumulated during the early years. Therefore, any labor market policy that aects the
working conditions of the young is likely to generate spillovers into the entire working life
cycle. The nal part of this paper contains further considerations in that direction.
The model presented here draws upon, and extends, the literature on learning in labor
market settings. This literature typically assumes that agents initially have limited infor-
mation about the productivity of a job-worker match but that they learn it over time. The
model in Jovanovic (1979) was the rst that introduced ex ante uncertainty about job quality
into a matching model. In this framework, agents update their prior beliefs in a Bayesian
fashion by using the information contained in current period output. Over time, bad matches
are detected and eventually dissolve. Pries (2004) proposes an alternative learning mecha-
nism which is "all-or-nothing". Agents observe an initial signal about the match quality but,
unlike in Jovanovic (1979), they do not gradually learn the truth. Instead, in each period,
the quality of a match is either fully revealed or nothing is learned. The learning process we
adopt in this paper is based on Pries (1994). We extend the original approach by assuming
that the initial signal, agents observe, is not perfectly informative but noisy. This gives rise
to a signal extraction problem, which is key to the informational friction we consider in this
paper.
A common assumption in the literature is that rms condition their hiring decision solely
upon the initial signal. Other information, and in particular that about workers' characteris-
tics is typically disregarded. Consequently, those models predict that all workers, irrespective
of their labor market history, face the same ex ante probability of (a) being hired and (b)
of separating from the rm within a given period7. This is contradicted by empirical nd-
ings. Using a sample of jobs from the NLSY , Farber (1994) documents that an individual's
current job mobility is strongly positively related to the frequency of job change prior to
the start of the job. Gibbons et al. (2005) constructs and estimates a model in which the
market and the worker are initially uncertain about some of the worker's skills. In their set-
7A notable exception is Lockwood (1991) which assumes that the duration of the preceding spell of
unemployment can act as a signal of a worker's productivity.
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skills. Altonji and Pierret (2001) nds support for the hypothesis that rms statistically
discriminate among young workers on the basis of easily observable characteristics such as
education. Then, as rms learn about productivity, the importance of the easily observed
variables falls but that of hard-to-observe correlates of productivity rises.
The results by Gibbons et al. (2005) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) suggest that the
information that accumulates along the career is used by the market to assess the productive
ability of a worker. These ndings lend strong support to the notion proposed in this paper,
namely that the labor market history workers build up along a career is an integral part of
rms' information set utilized in hiring decisions. Existing models in the literature typically
disregard this dimension and so fail to account for the dierent patterns of individual job
mobility across age cohorts.
Two exceptions are Papageorgiou (2009) and Gorry (2009). Papageorgiou (2009) pro-
poses a model in which workers learn about their unobserved skills along their career and
self-select into the occupation that best matches their abilities. In the setup of Gorry (2009),
the experience that is accumulated over time aids workers to assess the quality of future job
matches. While the underlying mechanism of both is similar to that employed in this paper,
they do not explore the implications of learning on individual job mobility. Gorry (2009),
for example, focuses on the age related decline in the aggregate, but not the conditional,
separation rate. That is, Gorry (2009) provides an explanation for why we observe fewer
workers of higher age cohorts separating from their jobs but, unlike this paper, does not seek
to explain why young and experienced workers with the same tenure face dierent rates of
job separation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we present the em-
pirical facts that motivate our analysis. Section 2.3 outlines the structural model that we
estimate later on. In Section 2.4 we discuss a simplied version of the full model in order
to illustrate the channels through which the considered informational friction aects indi-
vidual and aggregate outcomes. In Section 2.5 we outline the computational strategy that
is adopted to solve the full model. Sections 2.6 and 3.3 present, respectively, the estimation
strategy and the data that is used to estimate the structural model. Section 2.8 documents
and discusses the estimation results. Section 3.5 closes the main part of the paper with a
brief conclusion.
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This section uncovers facts that document the variation in individual labor market mobility
across age groups. We focus on outcomes that are various measures of job stability and
turnover, and unemployment rates.
2.2.1 Individual job stability and turnover
The goal of this section is to establish facts which are meant to illustrate how these measures
systematically dier across age cohorts. Farber et al. (1993) and Topel and Ward (1992)
nd that younger workers have substantially higher rates of job loss than older workers. Job
attachments after entry into the labor market are extremely fragile. Topel and Ward (1992)
nds that in the U.S., two thirds of all new jobs among young workers end in the rst year.
However, the probability of job loss declines with experience and jobs become more durable
as a career progresses8. Their results imply that a worker with 12 years of experience is
about half as likely to leave a new job as a new entrant. Hall (1982) arrives at a similar
conclusion and estimates that the 5-years job retention probability for male workers aged
15 24 is only 3:93%, whereas the rate for more experienced workers is substantially higher.
For workers aged 35   39 (45   49), this probability is equal to 16:0% (20:0%).
The job retention probability is a useful conceptual measure of job stability and refers
to the probability that a worker with a given age and tenure will retain his current job for
a certain number of years. Figure (2.1) and Table (2.1) report job retention probabilities
calculated from NLSY 79 data. The sample considered here consists of U.S. white male
workers. Individuals attending school or serving in the army are excluded. Moreover, we
consider only full time jobs, i.e. jobs with  30 weekly hours. The panel dimension of the
NLSY 79 allows us to construct the entire labor market history of each individual in the
sample. Therefore, the reported retention rates are based on the actual labor market tran-
sitions of each observed individual. In particular, the rates are calculated from the number
of workers in a given age-tenure category who move on to higher age-tenure categories. For
example, to compute the probability that a worker aged a years, who has been on the job
for k years and who will remain on the job for s more years, we use
Number of workers aged a + s years with k + s years of tenure
Number of workers aged a years with k years of tenure
(2.1)
8Notice that the probability of job loss in this context refers to the probability of losing a new job.
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years with tenure k = f0;1g, i.e. considering newly employed workers and those with one
year of tenure.
Comparison of the 1-year and 5-years job retention rates for workers aged 18-46 years with 0 years
and 1 year of tenure. Source: Own calculations using data from the NLSY 79
Figure 2.1
Three things are worth noting: (1) The job retention rate for workers with one year of
tenure is always higher than the corresponding rate for newly employed workers. In other
words, tenure substantially increases the likelihood of retaining the current job. This is not
surprising as it is well know that the hazard rate of separating from an employer declines
with tenure. This relation is also re
ected here. (2) Also as expected, the 5-years retention
rate is always lower than the 1-year rate. The longer the retention period the more likely it
is that the job gets destroyed. (3) Most importantly, all reported job retention rates exhibit
a strong increase with age. Evidently, young cohorts are much more likely to leave a new
job than experienced workers. This pattern holds for all tenure classes and for all retention
horizons.
The numbers underlying Figure (2.1) are reported in Table (2.1). The numbers in brackets
are the corresponding retention rates for workers with one year of tenure. A worker aged
18 20 starting a new job has a 40% probability of retaining this job for at least 1 year. For
an individual 30   34 years old, this probability is already 60% and a worker with roughly
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year or longer.
Duration / Age [18-20) [23-26) [30-34) [38-
1 year 0.41 (0.49) 0.51 (0.67) 0.60 (0.71) 0.77 (0.84)
2 years 0.21 (0.31) 0.33 (0.51) 0.42 (0.57) 0.61 (0.58)
3 years 0.12 (0.21) 0.26 (0.42) 0.33 (0.43) 0.45 (0.56)
4 years 0.09 (0.15) 0.21 (0.33) 0.27 (0.39) 0.41 (0.47)
5 years 0.07 (0.13) 0.17 (0.29) 0.24 (0.35) 0.36 (0.44)
Job retention probabilities for workers with a given age (at the time of recruitment). Rows represent
dierent job retention periods. Numbers in (without) brackets are the rates for workers with 52-103
(1-51) weeks of tenure. Source: Own calculations using data from the NLSY 79
Table 2.1
The retention probability drops signicantly when we consider a longer retention horizon.
For young age cohorts the probability of keeping a new job for at least three (ve) years
drops to 12% (7%) whereas the corresponding rate for experienced workers is 45% (36%).
The numbers reported here are slightly higher than those found by Hall (1982). This is not
surprising since the sample of workers considered here consists just of white males whereas
Hall (1982) includes both females and blacks; two groups that are known to demonstrate less
stable job attachments. To sum up, young workers when nding a job face a much higher
probability of losing this job within a relatively short period of time.
Evidently, mismatch is a phenomenon that is strongly concentrated among young co-
horts. High rates of job loss for the young imply a lot of job turnover early in the career,
a phenomenon which is also known as job-shopping. According to Topel and Ward (1992),
a typical US male worker will hold seven full-time jobs, which is about two thirds of his
career total, during the rst 10 years in the labor market9. Own calculations, using the
aforementioned NLSY 79 data, conrm these results. The rst row in Table (2.2) depicts
the mean number of (full-time) jobs for individuals within a given age. Standard deviations
are given in parentheses.
9The sample in Topel and Ward (1992) is taken from the Longitudinal-Employer-Employee-Data (LEED),
which is based on individuals' Social Security earnings records.
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Notice that the "accumulation" of jobs over the life cycle is far from being uniform. The
lower panel of Table (2.2) reports the number of jobs held, until a given age, as a fraction
of the career total. 50% of the total jobs are held within 5 years of labor market entry
and 75% of the total number is held within the rst 10 years (assuming that labor market
entry occurs at age 18). This hints at an enormous degree of job turnover among young
individuals. In the later stages of a career, job changes become substantially less frequent.
Table (2.2) illustrates that the increase in the number of jobs 
attens out at roughly 30 years
of age.
Age [18-20) [20-23) [23-26) [26-30) [30-34) [34-38) [38-
Total number of lifetime jobs
2.58 3.84 5.18 6.61 7.42 8.36 9.18
(1.68) (2.36) (3.01) (3.78) (4.31) (4.88) (5.36)
Number of jobs as a fraction of total number
0.332 0.484 0.629 0.746 0.806 0.882 0.963
(0.211) (0.236) (0.232) (0.211) (0.201) (0.165) (0.084)
Upper panel: Mean number of (full-time) jobs for individuals until a given age. Lower panel:
Mean number of jobs held until a given age, as a fraction of the career total. Standard deviations
are in parentheses. Source: Own calculations using data from the NLSY 79
Table 2.2
Notice that there is substantial variation in the total number of jobs across individu-
als. The standard deviation associated with the average number of jobs is strikingly high.
This suggests a large degree of heterogeneity regarding job changes. Some individuals will
hold very few jobs in their entire career whereas others change jobs frequently. All workers,
however, share the common characteristic that the turnover uniformly declines along the
career path. This can be seen from the standard deviations reported in the lower Panel of
Table (2.2). The turnover pattern we have identied does apply not solely to the U.S. labor
market but it is a common characteristic of advanced OECD labor markets. Evidence for
other countries exists for the UK and for Germany. Booth, Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano
(1997) reports that half of the average ve UK job changes occur in the rst ten years of
labor market participation. For Germany, Winkelmann (1997) nds that almost half of the
average (four) German job changes fall in this period.
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low. Table (2.3) depicts the average tenure of currently employed workers and the average
duration of matches that ended.
Age [18-20) [20-23) [23-26) [26-30) [30-34) [34-38) [38-
Average tenure
0.87 1.46 2.13 3.11 4.43 5.85 7.91
(0.91) (1.38) (2.06) (2.91) (3.95) (5.09) (6.77)
Average duration of dissolved matches
0.494 0.751 1.094 1.429 1.931 2.681 3.665
(0.58) (0.92) (1.33) (1.79) (2.47) (3.35) (4.52)
Upper panel: Average tenure of currently employed workers with a given age. Lower panel:
Average duration of matches that ended for workers with a given age. Standard deviations are in
parentheses. Source: Own calculations using data from the NLSY 79
Table 2.3
The average tenure increases in age as expected and at the same time, the average du-
ration of dissolved matches is roughly half of the duration of existing matches. This is
interesting, especially for prime-age cohorts, as it suggests a coexistence of stable life-time
jobs and high turnover. To shed more light on this issue, we calculate the fraction of workers
within a given tenure class. The results are reported in Table (2.4).
For young cohorts the majority of the workers are in short-term jobs. This is implied
by (a) the high job turnover of young workers and (b) the limited amount of time that has
passed since labor market entry. When we consider later stages of the working life cycle,
more and more individuals can be found holding medium and long-term jobs, though the
fraction of short-term jobs among prime-age workers is still very high10. For the cohort aged
38 and higher, one nds that there exists a strong dualism in the labor market. A substan-
tial fraction of workers are in very stable jobs but at the same time a high proportion of
individuals are subject to high turnover, holding many jobs for a short period of time only.
33% of workers aged 38 years or older are in jobs lasting for 10 years or more. At the same
time, almost one quarter of workers in the same age cohort have less than 2 years of tenure.
10The term "prime-age" refers to workers aged 24   54.
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workers are subject to high turnover and generally face a high probability of job loss. In
contrast, experienced workers are less aected by mismatch and usually end up in more
stable jobs. After labor market entry, young individuals typically hold a number of very
brief jobs in the rst few years. Eventually one job turns out to be a good match and lasts
several years.
Tenure / Age [18-20) [23-26) [30-34) [38-
0   2 0.8952 0.6062 0.3715 0.2394
2   5 0.1011 0.2733 0.2645 0.2134
5   10 0.0036 0.1189 0.2446 0.2156
> 10 0 0.0017 0.1196 0.3316
Fraction of workers of a given age within a certain tenure class. Source: Own
calculations using data from the NLSY 79.
Table 2.4
2.2.2 Unemployment
Unemployment and job turnover are naturally linked to each other since a job separation is
often followed by a period of unemployment. The ndings of the previous section therefore
suggest that we should also observe a strong age dependency for unemployment. Panel (a) in
Figure (2.2) shows the average unemployment rates for young and prime-age male workers
for the period 1985   2004 for selected OECD countries11. Each of the points represents
the combination of young-age and prime-age unemployment rates for a particular country.
If a point lies above the 45 degree line, then the unemployment rate of the young exceeds
that of prime-age workers and vice versa. For all the countries that are considered here, we
observe a large discrepancy in unemployment rates between both age groups. Low rates of
unemployment for prime-age workers typically coexist with high rates for young cohorts. In
addition, there is substantial cross-country variation in the dierence between both rates. In
11We focus on male workers only for matters of comparability. Arguably, some of the variation across age
groups is likely to be driven by dierences in labor force participation between male and female workers.
Hence, putting both groups together would distort the picture.
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Panel (a): Cross-country comparison of the relation between the unemployment rates for young
workers, aged 18-24 years, and prime-age workers aged 24-54 years. Source: OECD Labor Force
Statistics. Panel (b): Unemployment rate for U.S. white male worker aged 18-43 years, Source:
Own calculations using data from the NLSY 79.
Panel (b) in Figure (2.2) provides a more detailed view for the U.S. labor market. In
particular, it draws the unemployment rate for U.S. white males workers belonging to dif-
ferent age cohorts. Unemployment is extremely high for individuals aged 18   20 years but
it falls sharply, within the age interval 18   25 years, from an initial rate of 25%, down to
roughly 8%. It continues to decline, up to age 35 where it levels out at a rate of 3%. For
the remaining part of the working life cycle, that considered here, unemployment stays low
and 
uctuates in a narrow range between 2%   3%12.
2.3 The Model
In this section, we construct a life-cycle model of the labor market that is used to gather
insights on the pattern of individual job mobility identied above. The building blocks of the
model are (a) rms and deterministically aging workers, matching in the labor market, (b)
12Notice that due to the limited time horizon of the NLSY 79, we do not observe individuals until
retirement.
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the quality of a job/worker match, (c) employers, learning about the match quality over
time and (d) workers, building up an idiosyncratic labor market history which aects the
informational friction. In what follows, we discuss each of the elements in turn.
2.3.1 Workers
Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0;1;2;:::. The economy is populated by a continuum
of risk-neutral individuals that are facing a nite life cycle. Let k 2 K = f0;1;::::Kg denote
an individual's age. The aging process is deterministic, i.e. an individual aged k at time t
will be of age k + 1 in period t + 1. Individuals face a certain probability of dying that is
age dependent. Let k 2 [0;1] denote the conditional survival probability from age k to age
k+1. Individuals live up to a maximum of K periods. At age K agents die with probability
one, i.e. K = 0.
Worker, whether employed or unemployed, are characterized by their "type" denoted by
i, where i 2 I = f1;2;:::;Ig. The type is meant to capture all the "ability-related infor-
mation" that could be of value to an employer in order to, ex-ante, screen and categorize a
worker and to assess his productive ability for a given job. We can think of this information
as being based on factors such as curricula vitae, recommendations, personal interviews, test
scores and the like. If a worker is of a high i-type, then more specic information is available
upon which an employer can condition his hiring decision. Instead, for a low i-type worker,
there is little information available. Arguably, with little information about an applicant, it
will be hard for the employer to draw inferences on the worker's productivity and the quality
of a potential match. In other words, when facing low i-type workers it will be hard for an
employer to distinguish stars from lemons. The informational friction that we consider here
is based on exactly this logic, but we will be more specic on this issue shortly.
Clearly, the amount of information that is available is related to workers' labor market
experience. The longer an individual is in the market, the more information will be available
on the basis of which employers can judge a worker's qualication for a given job. Therefore,
i does not remain xed over an individual's working life cycle but it changes over time. We
make the following assumptions about the law of motion of i:
 At the moment of labor market entry, the worker's type is equal to the lowest possible
value, i.e. when k = 0 we have that i = 1.
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with certain transition probabilities. These probabilities depend on the respective labor
market state of the worker. Let s
iji0 denote the probability that a worker with labor
market state s experiences a change of his type from i to i0 within the current period.
The set of labor market states we consider include s = fe-employed, u-unemployed,
b-match break-upg.
Workers do not have access to a savings technology and so consume their entire income
every period. Preferences over consumption are assumed to be representable by a standard
time separable utility function of the form E f
P1
t=1 t 1u(ct)g where  is the time discount
factor and ct represents an individual's level of consumption. Expectations are taken with
respect to the stochastic processes that govern mortality and the matching and signaling
processes in the labor market.
2.3.2 Firms
A rm is assumed to consist of just one job. A rm's job can either be vacant or lled. Notice
that there is no ex-ante heterogeneity on the rm's side, i.e. before being matched with a
worker, rms are all homogenous. In order to produce output, a rm has to be matched
with a worker. A rm/worker match can be of good or bad quality. Good matches produce
yg whereas bad matches produce yb, with yg > yb. The match quality is an experience
good, meaning that it is unknown to the rm and the worker when they rst meet. The
probability that a match between a type i worker and a rm is good quality is given by ,
with   N(;2
) where ;2
  0 and  is unknown. Instead, agents (the rm and the
worker) observe a noisy signal, about , which is denoted by 
. More precisely, the signal

 is assumed to consist of the true value  and a noise component i, i.e. 
   + i. The
noise component is assumed to be worker specic. In particular, we make the following
assumptions about 
 i  N(0;2
;i) where 2
;i  0 8i
 2
;i0  2
;i for i0  i
The latter condition implies that the signal of low i-type workers will contain, on average,




;i). The rm and the worker form beliefs about  on the basis of the
observed signal 
. Let ^  denote the expected probability that the match is good, conditional
67
Duernecker, Georg (2010), Three Essays on Frictional Labor Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/1904on having observed the signal 
. Given the normality assumptions about  and  we can
write ^  as
^   E(j







;i. It follows that ^   N(;s2
i) where s2
i = 2
i. Notice that the worker's
type is key for the formation of beliefs. The higher the type of a worker the smaller the vari-
ance of the noise component 2
;i and hence, the signal will contain more information about
the true match quality. Therefore, more weight will be put on the signal 
. On the other
hand, if 2
;i is high, meaning that the signal will be rather uninformative, more weight will
be put on the mean . In the extreme case of a totally uninformative signal - lim2
;i!1 ^  = .
2.3.3 Match Formation
When a type i worker meets a rm with an unlled job, both parties observe the signal 
 and
form beliefs about . Those beliefs are expressed by the expected conditional probability ^ .
Conditional on the value of ^ , both parties decide whether or not to form a match. When
the match is not formed both continue their search and when the match is formed, the rm
starts producing output in the subsequent period. The state of a rm with a lled job is
given by the triplet (k;i; ^ ) consisting of the age (k), the type (i) of the employed worker
and the common beliefs, ^ .
The output of a match depends on the match quality. In matches of unknown quality,
the rm and the worker don't observe the true output directly but rather y = y + e, where
y 2 fyb;ygg. If output was perfectly observable, all the uncertainty about the match quality
would vanish immediately after the match formation. We assume that the realizations of
the output noise, e, are drawn from a uniform distribution with support [ ;]. At rst,
the quality of a match is unknown. However, workers and rms learn about it over time
on the basis of observed output. Given the assumptions on e, the learning process will be
"all-or-nothing". This approach of modeling the learning of match quality was rst proposed
by Pries and Rogerson (2005).
The name "all-or-nothing" refers to the manner in which new information, that is gener-
ated within a period, is processed by the agents. In particular, if the realization of current
output is such that y > yb +  (y < yg   ) the agents can infer that  y = yg ( y = yb). This
implies that all the uncertainty about the match quality is removed at once. On the other
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the probability that the match quality is revealed within a period is given by ' =
yg yb
2 ,
which is constant over time and independent of tenure. When a match is found to be bad
it dissolves. On the other hand, good matches remain intact until either the worker dies or
the match is hit by an exogenous separation shock.
2.3.4 Value Functions
Unemployed Workers
Workers can be either employed or unemployed. There is no labor force participation or
retirement choice in the model. Unemployed workers encounter rms with open vacancies
at an exogenous, Poisson rate given by ~ . Let  u(k;i) denote the value of unemployment to
an individual with age k and type i. We can write  u(k;i) as follows
 
















where  2 [0;1] is the personal discount factor and k denotes the probability that the
worker survives into the next period. The value of unemployment consists of three parts.The
rst part, given by b  0, is the 
ow value of unemployment. We can think of b as repre-
senting, for instance, the value of leisure, unemployment benets and the like.
The second part is the expected discounted value of encountering a rm with an open
vacancy. Upon meeting a rm, a signal 
 is drawn on the basis of which agents form beliefs
^ . There is a one-to-one mapping between 
 and ^ . Therefore, we can omit the signal in
the value function and work directly with the corresponding beliefs ^ . Let Gi(^ ) denote the
cumulative probability distribution function associated with ^ . Notice that the distribution
of beliefs is worker-specic as the variance of the noise component 2
;i is a function of the
worker's type.
The realized value of ^  will be crucial for whether or not a match is created. In equilibrium
there will be an endogenous threshold for ^ , above (below) which agents nd it optimal
(not optimal) to form the match. We will be more explicit about the determination of this
threshold shortly. If the draw is suciently good then the match is formed, i.e. the worker
agrees to stay with the rm and vice versa. The benet of accepting a job oer, i.e. the value
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he continues searching. In this case, the expected value of unemployment for next period is
P
i02I u
iji0 u(k0;i0). Notice that next period's value takes account the possibility of a change
in the worker's type i. Thus, we can write the maximum value of meeting a rm as
u(k















The expected value of a meeting is obtained by integrating (2.4) over all possible realiza-
tions of the beliefs ^ . The third part of expression (2.3) is the expected discounted value of
remaining unemployed. This value is realized with probability (1 ~ ), which is the likelihood
that an unemployed worker does not encounter a rm with a vacant job.
Firms
The state of an existing match is given by the triplet (k;i; ^ ). Let J(k;i; ^ ) denote the value
of a job to a rm that employs a type i / age k worker, who has beliefs ^ . We can write J
as follows13
J(k;i; ^ ) = max












iji0 [(1   ')J(k
0;i
0; ^ 
0) + '^ J(k
0;i
0;1)]
A rm's outside option is always the value of an unlled vacancy, which in equilib-
rium is equal to zero. Therefore, the max operator represents the rm's optimal choice
with respect to current period employment. The value of a job to a rm consists of the
two parts: the instantaneous return and the continuation value. The latter is denoted by
J+(k;i; ^ ), whilst the instantaneous return is given by the dierence between expected out-
put, E(yj^ ) = ^ yg + (1   ^ )yb, and the wage, w, that is payed to the worker. Wages are
13It is important to note that due to the all-or-nothing learning, agents' beliefs, ^ , stay the same throughout
the period in which the quality of a match is unknown. This would be dierent if we had used a Bayesian
learning approach. Then any new information that becomes available leads to an update of agents' beliefs.
Also note that when the match quality is revealed, ^  takes on the value of either 1 or 0 depending on whether
the match is good or bad.
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Notice that the output realization of the current period is observed after wages have been
negotiated. We do not allow for the within-period re-negotiation of wages.
With probability (1   )k the match survives to the next period. Notice that  2 [0;1]
is the probability that the match is hit by an exogenous separation shock. Three events can
occur in-between two periods: (a) the match quality remains unknown, which happens with
probability (1   ') and yields payo J(k0;i0; ^ ), (b) the match quality is fully revealed and
found to be good, which happens with probability '^  and yields payo J(k0;i0;1) or (c) the
match quality is fully revealed and found to be bad. This happens with probability '(1 ^ ).
Bad matches break up and thus the continuation value associated with case (c) is equal to
zero. If the match survives the worker's type might change. This is taken account for by the
transition probabilities given by e
iji0.
Employed Workers
Similarly we can write the value of a job to a worker as
 
e(k;i; ^ ) = max
(











Every period the worker is free to quit his current job and to leave the rm for unemploy-
ment. A voluntary separation and the subsequent transition into unemployment might cause
a change in the worker's type. Hence, the worker's outside option is given by the expected
value of being unemployed
P
i02I b
iji0 u(k;i0). The value of employment consists of the one
period return, i.e. the current period wage income w, and the continuation value, i.e. the
expected value of staying with the current employer in the next period,  +. The latter part
is dened as follows
 





iji0 ((1   ') 
e(k
0;i













 With probability (1 ') nothing is learned about the match quality. The implied next
period value is  e(k0;i0; ^ ).
14The process of wage bargaining is described in detail in Appendix D.
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value of the job changes to  e(k0;i0;1). Given that the worker stays employed he might
experience a type transition which is captured by e
iji0. The same is also true for the
previous case.
 If the match is revealed to be bad, which happens with probability '(1 ^ ), or hit by an
exogenous separation shock, with probability , the worker transits to unemployment.
The value of unemployment is given by  u(k0;i0). Due to the break-up the worker




All decisions, including those about match formation and break-up, are taken jointly by the
rm and the worker. Hence, the criterion used in the decision making process is the joint
surplus of a match. We can write it as
S(k;i; ^ ) = J(k;i; ^ ) +  








The joint surplus S consists of the sum of the value of the job to the rm and the worker,
net of their respective outside values. The outside option for the worker is given by the value
of unemployment and for the rm it is the value of an open vacancy (which in equilibrium
is equal to zero). One can use the value functions in (2.5) and (2.6) to obtain an explicit
expression for S. We state this expression in Appendix D. As mentioned previously, the
rm and the worker's decision whether or not to form a match depends on the value of their
common beliefs ^ . We can dene the reservation belief as the value of ^  for which the rm
and the worker are indierent between creating and not creating the match. We denote this
value by ^ . For a given (k;i), ^  must fulll
S(k;i; ^ )
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
> 0; 8 ^  > ^ 
= 0; for ^  = ^ 
< 0; 8 ^  < ^ 
(2.7)
In what follows, we state a number of propositions that characterize some important
properties of ^ (k;i). The rst establishes the existence and uniqueness of ^  for all age
cohorts k and all worker types i.
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if yg > b  yb holds.
The proof is provided in Appendix A. Intuitively, rst we show that the surplus function
S() is linear in ^ , which rules out the existence of multiple ^  that are consistent with the
conditions stated in (2.7). Then we establish conditions for which the joint surplus for the
lowest possible value of beliefs, i.e. ^  = 0, is always negative. A necessary and sucient
condition for this to hold is b > yb. This is intuitive, as for ^  = 0 the match produces output
equal to yb every period and thus if b > yb then the value of employment is always lower
than the value of unemployment, so guaranteeing a negative match surplus. Lastly, we seek
conditions that ensure S(;;1) > 0. A necessary and sucient condition is yg > b. The
intuition is as before. For ^  = 1 the match produces output yg with probability one. Hence,
if yg > b then the value of employment always exceeds the value of unemployment, which
guarantees a positive match surplus. The conditions needed for existence and uniqueness of
an equilibrium also ensure that good matches persist and bad matches break-up.
Proposition 2.2 For a given type i, the threshold belief ^ (i;k) is increasing in age k.
For this proposition, we do not provide a fully-
edged proof but rather the intuition.
Notice rst that, due to the Nash bargaining, we have J(k;i; ^ ) = (1   e)S(k;i; ^ ), where
e denotes a rm's bargaining power. Hence, all the properties underlying J() are directly
applicable to S()15. From inspecting (2.5), we can infer that J() is essentially given by the
nite sum over all K   k single period returns E(yj^ )   w(k;i; ^ ), weighted by the survival
probabilities, k. Each of the single period elements is necessarily positive. Therefore, the
longer the horizon over which a rm can collect the prots, the larger will be the total sum
J(). If, however, a worker has only a few periods left in the labor market then it will be less
protable for a rm to match with that worker. J(k;i; ^ ) is decreasing in k, hence, if ^ (i;k)
is such that J(k;i; ^ (i;k)) = 0, it follows that J(k + 1;i; ^ (k;i)) < 0. At the same time, we
know that
@J(k;i;^ )
@^  > 0 (see Proof of Proposition 2.1) and so ^ (k+1;i) > ^ (k;i) is necessary
15Notice that the total surplus of a match is shared between the worker and the rm according
to a sharing rule which is the result of a Nash bargaining process. In the bargaining process, the









. This maximization problem yields the familiar rst or-
der condition (1   e)J(k;i; ^ ) = e
h





. By combining the rst order condition
with the denition of the joint match surplus, one gets the surplus sharing rule used in the text.
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to be compensated with a higher surplus when matching with workers that are close to the
exit age. This is achieved by raising the threshold belief ^ .
Proposition 2.3 For a given age k, the reservation belief ^  is increasing in the type i
We provide the intuition underlying this proposition a little further below, albeit for a
simpler case though. This says that workers that are associated with a more precise signal,
face a relatively higher threshold value than workers with a noisy signal. Next we dene how
the equilibrium can be characterized.
Denition 2.1 A stationary equilibrium of the model consists of the following objects
1. A collection of threshold beliefs f^ (k;i)gk2K;i2I that satisfy condition (2.7)
2. A constant mass of rm/worker matches +(k;i; ^ ) for all possible combinations of
(k;i; ^ ), and a constant mass of unemployed workers  (k;i) for all combinations of
workers' type i and age k.
Before we proceed to study certain properties of the equilibrium and compute aggregate
variables, we provide a brief overview of the within-period timing of the model
1. At the beginning of the period, rms and workers that were already matched in the
period before observe the current state of the match (k;i; ^ ). They then decide whether
to terminate or continue the match. Workers whose matches were dissolved enter
unemployment, where they receive b.
2. Wages w are negotiated bilaterally between rms and workers.
3. Matches that continue, produce output y. Wages w get payed to workers.
4. On the basis of the current output realization, the rm and the worker update their
(common) beliefs about the true quality of the match. This is done in an all-or-nothing
fashion. With probability ' the true match quality is revealed and with probability
1   ' nothing is learned. Matches that are found to be bad are dissolved.
5. Unemployed workers encounter rms with an open job with probability ~ . Each pair
that meets observes a signal 
 about the quality of the match. Conditional on the
signal, they form beliefs about the true probability that the match is good. Those
beliefs are expressed by ^   E(j
;i). On the basis of ^  they decide whether or not
to form a match. New matches start producing output in the next period.
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on their labor market state.
7. Workers die with probability (1   k), jobs get hit by the destruction shock with
probability  and new workers, aged k = 0, enter the market.
2.4 A Simplied Version
The model we have laid out in the previous section includes, subjectively, the most important
features needed to capture the inter-temporal aspect of an individual's working life cycle. In
particular the structure we impose allows us to describe how an individual's labor market
performance during early periods in the working life cycle spills over to the job nding and
hiring conditions they face at a later stage in life. The inter-temporal aspect is captured by
the the notion of worker-type-specic information imperfections in the hiring process that
change as the individual builds up a particular labor market history. The model can, there-
fore, account for the transition process by which individuals move through various stages
of their working life cycle, where each of those stages is associated with dierent conditions
regarding job nding, job turnover, unemployment and the like.
Before we proceed to the empirical part of the paper, it would be of interest to study
how the information imperfections, captured by the type-i-dependent noise component in
the initial signal, aect the labor market conditions of workers of dierent types. By labor
market conditions, we mean variables on the individual level such as job nding and turnover
rates but also aggregate outcomes, such as type-specic unemployment rates. The modeling
framework as it is now, however, is too complex to address these issues by analytical means.
The complexity stems mainly from the life-cycle component which is captured by the type
transition and the age dependent survival probabilities.
In this section of the paper, we consider a simplied version of the original model. The
simplication allows us obtain closed form solutions for individual and aggregate outcomes
and so we can explicitly study the role of worker-specic information imperfections in the
hiring process and how they shape aggregate outcomes, such as job turnover and unemploy-
ment. The simplication is achieved by abstracting from the life cycle component, i.e. we
set (a) k =  8k 2 K, (b) iji0 = 0 8i0 6= i and (c) iji0 = 1 for i0 = i. By the rst condition,
we eliminate the time dependent survival probabilities and instead, we introduce a constant
probability of death. By the latter two, we abstract from the process that governs changes
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his lifetime.
2.4.1 Equilibrium
By implementing these simplications, we arrive at the following expressions for the value
of unemployment and the joint surplus of a match.
 




e(i; ^ )    
u(i);0gdG
i(^ ) +  
u(i) (2.8)
S(^ ;i) = maxfE(yj^ ) + (1   )['^ S
g(i) + (1   ')S(^ ;i)]   (1   ) 
u(i);0g (2.9)
The rst step in analyzing the equilibrium of the simplied model is to nd the threshold
beliefs ^ (i). To this end we make use of the linearity of S(^ ;i) in ^  and the the condition





1   (1   )(1   '^ )
Setting S(^ ;i) = 0 in Equation (2.9) and using the surplus sharing rule  e(i; ^ )  u(i) =
(1 e)S(i; ^ ) together with Equation (2.8) we can write the equilibrium condition as follows
^ S
0(^ )[1   (1   )(1   ')] + y




(^    ^ )dG
i(^ ) (2.10)
Obviously, the ^  that solves Equation (2.10) is a candidate for an equilibrium.
Proposition 2.4 An interior equilibrium exists and is unique iff the following conditions
are met
 yg > b
 b + ~ (1   e) S
0(0;) > yb
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can ask the question of how those beliefs dier across i-types. This question is important
insofar as the threshold value for a particular i-type determines the hiring conditions of type
i workers. Using a simple graphical analysis, we nd that the right-hand side of Equation
(2.10) can be represented by a downward sloping curve which, for the same value of ^ , shifts
to the right for i0 > i. At the same time, the upward-sloping curve that represents the
left-hand side stays the same for all worker types, as it is a function only of ^ . From that
it follows that ^ (i0) > ^ (i) for i0 > i, implying that the equilibrium cuto value is lower for
low type workers. Recall that "low type workers" are those that emit a more noisy signal in
the hiring process.
Notice rst that: the right hand side of Equation (2.10) is the only place where the type
enters the equilibrium condition and, moreover, it is directly related to the expected surplus
of a match for an unemployed worker. Low type workers have a lower expected surplus. This
is due to the fact that the equilibrium distribution of their beliefs is less dispersed than that
of high type workers16. Given that the range of acceptable draws is truncated below by ^ ,
this results in a lower expected value for low type workers. From Equation (2.8) we know
that this reduces the value of unemployment for a worker and thereby makes the outside
option of an employed worker less valuable. A lower outside option implies that a match
is protable for lower draws of ^ , which is due to the fact that those workers require less
compensation for making them leave unemployment.
2.4.2 Threshold signals and threshold beliefs
In the previous section, we have established the result that high noise workers face a lower
threshold belief than workers with a precise signal. But what can be said about the relation
between the actual signals 
 across worker types that induce the respective threshold beliefs?
Recall that the same signal 
 leads to a dierent ^  depending on the worker's type i.
Therefore, we can ask the question how the minimum signal 
 ! ^  compares across types?
For brevity we move the discussion of this issue to Appendix B. Here we continue with the
analysis of aggregate outcomes
16Notice that this is a direct consequence of the way how beliefs are formed. From Condition 2.2 we know
that for high (low) type workers more (less) weight is put on the actual signal and less (more) weight is put
on the mean value . Therefore, the resulting beliefs are more dispersed (more centered around the mean).
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Type-specic unemployment rates
In this section we focus on aggregate equilibrium outcomes and in particular, we consider
three dierent objects: (1) the type-specic unemployment rate, (2) a measure of job turnover
and (3) a measure of individuals' job stability. For expositional convenience we state here
only the most important results. The calculations that lead to these results can be found
in Appendix C. Let ui denote the mass of unemployed, type i workers. The share of each
type in the population is given by Ii, hence
PI







1 + ~ a[1   Gi(^ 
i) + ~ c
R
^ i ^ gi(^ )d^ ]
(2.11)
where ~ a =
~ 
1 (1 )(1 ') and ~ c =
'(1 )
1 (1 ). What can we say about type-specic unem-
ployment rates? Which workers, those with noisy signals or those with precise information,
are more aected by unemployment? To address this issue we can exploit the dependence
of the hiring threshold ^  on the worker's type i. This allows us to write the unemploy-
ment rate as ~ ui = ~ ui(^ 
i(2
;i);2
;i). Computing the change in unemployment in response to
more noise in the signal, d~ ui
d2
;i, therefore becomes a simple application of the chain rule, i.e.
d~ ui
d2




;i + @~ ui
@2
;i. Increasing the amount of noise exhibits a direct eect on unemploy-
ment, represented by the second term, and also an indirect eect through the change in the

































Both terms inside the square brackets have an intuitive economic interpretation. The
rst term relates to the change in the 
ow of workers out of unemployment. As shown pre-




;i < 0. This facilitates the matching of workers to rms since the minimum signal
that is required for a successful match creation falls. A drop in the threshold signal will
make workers exit unemployment more quickly and thereby, it reduces the duration and also
the level of unemployment. The size of the reduction in unemployment is proportional to
the mass of workers that are located at the threshold and are, therefore, aected by the
dierential change in the threshold. This mass is related to the rst term inside the brackets
given by
 
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ployment. This term consists of two parts. The rst relates again to the change in the 
ow
of workers out of unemployment. However, this time the hiring threshold ^  is kept constant
which allows us to capture the variation in the 
ow that can be attributed solely to a change
in the noisiness of workers' signals. This term,  @Gi(^ 
i)=@2
;i, is negative whenever ^ (i) > 
and is positive when the inequality is reversed. Let's rst focus on the case when ^ (i) > .
More noise in the signal changes the way agents form their beliefs about the true probability
that the match is good . In particular, when the signals become less informative agents
rely to a lesser extent on the actual signal and instead they put more weight on the mean
of . Therefore, the same signal leads to lower beliefs ^ . Consequently, it becomes harder
for agents to generate a signal that exceeds the threshold. Any meeting between a rm and
a worker is, therefore, less likely to result in a successful match creation. This impedes the

ow of workers out of unemployment and increases unemployment.
The second term inside the square brackets relates to the change in the amount of mis-
match. As mentioned previously, more noise in the signal leads to beliefs that are more
located around the mean. Consequently, the distribution becomes less dispersed and the ex-
pected value of beliefs above the threshold E(^  > ^ ) drops. E(^  > ^ ) is a natural measure of
the average quality of existing matches. A drop of which indicates that there are relatively
fewer matches in place that were formed on the basis of good beliefs. Consequently, the
amount of mismatch among existing matches rises. Mismatch leads to a separation, hence a
larger fraction of bad matches leads to a rise in the 
ow of workers into unemployment. The
associated rise in unemployment is represented by the term
R
^ i ^ 
@gi(^ )
@2
;i d^  which is negative
for ^  > .
The total eect of more noise on unemployment is ambiguous as it depends on the loca-




;i is always negative. However,
the second eect @~ ui
@2
;i is positive for ^ (i) >  but negative when the inequality is reversed.
Match destruction
Another object of interest is the match separation rate. It is computed as the ratio of bad
matches to the total number of matches with unknown quality. Due to learning, bad matches
eventually dissolve. Thus the fraction of bad matches will be indicative for the prevailing
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dierent i types, we can draw conclusions about which type of worker is more aected by
job turnover and thus, enjoys less stable jobs. Let i denote the match destruction rate that
prevails in equilibrium. We can write is as

i = 1   E
i(^ j^   ^ )] (2.13)
Ei(^ j^   ^ ) denotes the (conditional) mean of beliefs across existing matches and is an
insightful measure for the average quality of the signals on which matches are based upon. It
is particularly insightful because on the basis of it we can assess (a) the degree of mismatch
across existing rm/worker pairs and (b) how mismatch compares across workers of dierent
i-types. We nd that dEi(^ j^   ^ )=d2
;i < 0 from which it follows that di=d2
;i > 0.
It says that workers with a less informative signal are, on average, aected more by job
turnover than workers with a precise signal. This is intuitive as when there is more noise in
the signal, then agents are less likely to generate high beliefs. Hence, the expected value of
^ , conditional on the signal being greater than the threshold, drops. Further, the average
quality of beliefs is lower as fewer matches are based on good beliefs and more mass is
located around the threshold. This is the same as saying that the amount of mismatch
among existing matches rises. Mismatch, once detected, leads to a separation/break-up,
thus workers with less informative signals are more aected by job turnover as their jobs
are, one average, less stable.
Job stability
Regarding job stability, we can compute the ex-ante probability of a worker experiencing a
job destruction. This can be written as
P(destr) =  + (1   )'[1   E
i(^ j^   ^ )] (2.14)
There are two sources of job destruction. A match can be hit by an exogenous destruction
shock, which happens at the Poisson rate , or it can be dissolved due to mismatch, this is
captured by the second part. The probability of experiencing an endogenous separation is
given by the ex-ante probability of ending up in a bad match. The expected duration of a
match which is given by P(destr) 1. We saw previously that dEi(^ j^   ^ )=d2
;i < 0. Thus,
we can establish the result that agents with less reliable signals face a higher probability of
experiencing a job termination.
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This section outlines the solution algorithm that was used to compute the equilibrium of the
full model presented in Section 2.3. The state of an unemployed workee is given by (k;i) and
that of a match is (k;i; ^ ). Notice that k (age) and i (type) are both discrete objects. The
aging process in the model is constructed in a way so that an individual with age k today is
of age k0 = k + 1 next period. Furthermore, the process that governs the type transition is
a discrete valued Markov process implying that the realizations of i all lie on a pre-specied









.  K is the maximum number of periods an individuals
stays in the labor market and I is the highest achievable type. For the beliefs ^ , we adopt
a continuous representation of the state space.
The value function of an unemployed worker and the joint surplus function of a match
are described by the mappings   : K  I ! < and S : K  I  [0;1] ! <. Due to the
discreteness of its domain, we can express   as a collection of points f k;igk2K;i2I. S, on the
other hand, needs to be approximated. We do not use the same method to approximate S
on the entire [0;1] domain but, instead, we combine two dierent methods. The reason for
that is the kink in the value function that is induced by the cuto value ^ . In particular
we have S(k;i; ^ ) = 0 8^   ^  and S(k;i; ^ ) > 0 8^  > ^ . To accommodate for that we use
a piecewise-linear approximation of S for values of ^  2 [0; ^ ) and a Chebyshev polynomial
for ^  2 [^ ;1]. For each node on the K  I grid, we construct the polynomial by running
a Chebyshev regression using 50 collocation nodes. These nodes are given by the collection
fzk;i;xgk2K;i2I;x2f1;2;:::;50g.
The value functions   and S are found jointly using an algorithm that incorporates a
xed-point iterative scheme. The algorithm is structured in the following manner:
1. The rst step involves guessing a joint surplus function S. The initial guess is denoted
by S0.
2. The second step involves computing the threshold beliefs. For each combination of
(k;i) we identify the ^  for which S(k;i; ^ ) = 0.
3. For each pair (k;i) we allocate the collocation nodes in the interval [^ (k;i);1] and
run the Chebyshev regression to nd the approximation coecients associated with S.
Those coecients are given by fck;i;xgk2K;i2I;x2f1;2;:::;50g.
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8i and then working backwards. The integral in Equation (2.3) is computed using a







k2K;i2I it suces to evaluate S(k;i; ^ ) at ^  = 1, 8k;i. This follows
from Sg(k;i) = S(k;i;1).
6. To solve for the new Sj+1 we proceed as follows: We use (a) the value of the previous
iteration step Sj, (b) the terminal condition S(  K;i;z) = 0, 8i;z, (c) the value of
unemployment f k;igk2K;i2I and work backwards for all (k;i;z).
7. Lastly, we evaluate kSj+1   Sjk. If the distance is smaller than some convergence
criterion we terminate the algorithm, else we set Sj = Sj+1 and return to step 2.
2.6 The Estimation Strategy
The structural model is estimated by indirect inference. This method, which was rst pro-
posed by Gourieroux, Montfort and Renault (1993), belongs to the class of simulation-based
estimation procedures17. Estimators of this sort are particularly convenient in situations
when the complexity of the model leads to an intractable likelihood function or when some
of the variables are unobserved in the data. The idea of indirect inference as it is used here
is to match the statistical properties of the simulated data with those of observed data along
selected dimensions. The dimensions, along which the simulated and the observed data are
evaluated, are represented by an auxiliary model. The central idea is then to choose the
parameters of the structural model in a way so that the parameters of the auxiliary model
estimated from actual and from simulated data are as close as possible.
Obviously, a crucial step in the estimation procedure concerns the selection of the auxil-
iary model. A "good" auxiliary model is one that captures well the statistical properties of
the data along the dimension(s) required to identify the model's structural parameters. The
parameters estimated from the auxiliary model have to contain enough information, in the
sense that they have to be suciently responsive to changes in the model's structural pa-
rameters. If that was not the case then the objective function would exhibit relatively little
17Similar estimation methods include ecient method of moments (Gallant and Tauchen (1996)), or
simulated (quasi-)maximum likelihood (Smith (1993)), For a discussion of simulation-based estimators see
Tauchen (1997) and Gourieroux and Monfort (1996).
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ability of an auxiliary model can be judged by looking at the standard errors of the estimated
of the structural parameters. Secondly, the auxiliary model should be fast to compute. The
estimation of the structural parameters typically requires a high number of evaluations of the
model's objective function. This can potentially be very time consuming. Hence, choosing a
parsimonious auxiliary model is key for keeping the computational time at a reasonable level.
As the auxiliary model, I choose a discrete-time hazard model that is tailored to the
analysis of duration data. The choice is motivated by the nature of the economic pro-
cess that we are looking at. The structural model is designed to capture dierences in job
duration across age cohorts. Therefore, a hazard rate model is a natural candidate since it
allows for identication of the eect of individuals' characteristics on the actual job duration.
The data that is used in the estimation consists of observations of individuals' employ-
ment spells. Each observation is indexed by j 2 f1;2;:::;Jg, where J denotes the total
number of observations. For the estimation I divide the time line into N intervals that are
given by [0;1), [1;2), ..., [N 1;N). Intervals are indexed by the subscript n 2 f1;2;:::;Ng.
Let tj denote the duration of employment spell j and let yj;n be a binary variable that is zero
if in interval n the worker is still employed in job j and unity otherwise. Thus, yj;n will be
zero for all intervals n for which n < tj and it will be one for all intervals or which n  ti.
For each employment spell we observe a string of zeros followed by a string of ones18. The
important information is the time interval for which yj;n becomes unity for the rst time.
This is because the switch from zero to one indicates a match separation.
Notice, however, that some observations are right-censored. That is, we can not determine
the exact time when the job ended. This can be due to two reasons: (a) the duration of
the employment spell tj exceeds the time that is captured by the intervals, which is the
case whenever the job lasted longer than the period that is captured by the N intervals, i.e.
tj  N, or (b) if the employment spell is still ongoing at the time the latest survey was
taken (2006). In the rst case, all observations are right-censored at N whereas in the second
case, the observation is right-censored in the interval corresponding to the job duration at
the time of the survey. To account for censoring, we construct the binary variable cj that
is unity when the duration of job j is uncensored and zero otherwise. Notice that for the
estimation it will be important whether the ending of an employment spell represents a true
job loss or is due to censoring. This information will be captured by cj.
18Notice that yj;n = 1 implies yj;n+1 = 1.
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function given by
(t;xj;) = (xj;)n; t 2 [n 1;n) (2.15)
 is a vector of unknown parameters and (xj;) > 0 is a function of observable worker
characteristics. Those characteristics are captured by the vector xj, whereas  is a vector of
unknown parameters. The baseline hazard for each interval is given by n. This specication
implies a constant hazard within a particular interval n, but it allows the hazard to dier
across intervals. Notice that the existence of a baseline hazard makes a constant term as
a covariate super
uous. For a particular employment spell j only the intervals for which
yj;n = 0 can be used to predict the probability of yj;n+1 being zero or one in the subsequent
interval n + 119. These (conditional) probabilities are given by
P(yj;n = 1jyj;n 1 = 0;xj) = P(n 1  tj < njtj  n 1;xj)






= 1   exp[ (xj;)n (n   n 1)]
P(yj;n = 0jyj;n 1 = 0;xj) = exp[ (xj;)n (n   n 1)]
(2.16)
Using those probabilities one can construct the log likelihood function. If for employment











The rst part is the probability the job lasts until nj and the second part is the prob-
ability that it ends in the interval nj. Notice that the latter part is non-zero only when
the observation is uncensored and therefore represents a true job loss. The log likelihood
function for the entire sample is obtained by summing over j = 1;:::;J employment spells.




l(nj;xj;cj;) where yJ = fnj;xj;cjg
J
j=1 (2.18)
19This is due to the fact that once yj;n = 1 we know that yj;n+1 = 1.
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tional form of (;). For a particular employment spell j we use information on: (a) aj: the
worker's age at the time when the match was formed and (b) !j: the percentage deviation
of the worker's initial wage in job j from the average initial wage payed in matches that
were formed by workers of the same age. According to the structural model aj and !j both
contain important information about an individual's hazard rate. Recall that a worker's
age at match formation is a good predictor of his labor market experience which in turn is
indicative for the worker's type. The type determines the precision of the signal that is emit-
ted in the hiring process and it thereby aects the survival probability of the employment
relationship. A worker's age at match formation will, therefore, be informative about the
likelihood of separation.
The channel through which !j aects the hazard rate goes via agents' beliefs. Agents
are rational in the sense they have correct beliefs about the probability that the match
is good20. Consequently, agents' beliefs are inversely related to the actual likelihood of
match separation. The probability of survival determines the joint surplus of a match. More
durable matches generate a higher surplus to the worker and the rm than matches which
are expected to break-up soon. Typically the value of the job is re
ected by the worker's
remuneration, i.e. the wage. As a result, a positive deviation of the worker's initial wage
from the average initial wage, re
ected by a positive !j, is an indication that agents expect
their employment relation to be stable and to yield a high return.
We do not treat the workers age at match formation as a continuous variable. Instead,
we consider age intervals and work with dummy variables. In particular, we divide the "age-
line" into K +1 distinct intervals that are given by [a0;a1), [a1;a2), ..., [aK 1;aK), [aK;1).
Let ~ ak be a dummy variable that is unity when the worker's age at match formation falls
in the interval [ak 1;ak), and zero otherwise. The vector of covariates xj is thus given by
(~ a1;:::~ aK;!j). As a functional form for (;) we choose
(xj;) = exp
 
a0ja1~ a1 + a1ja2~ a2 + ::: + aK 1jaK~ aK + !!j

The age category that serves as a means of comparison is given by the interval K +1, i.e.
[aK;1). Hence, any given age coecient ak 1jak k 2 f1;2;:::;Kg has to be interpreted as
the dierence in the hazard between a worker that starts a new job at age a 2 [ak 1;ak) and
20The term "correct" should re
ect that agents' beliefs are, on average, consistent with the true match
quality.
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the same across age cohorts then, in terms of separation probability, it would not matter at
what age a worker starts a new job.
Using the information on (nj;xj;cj) that is available for each employment spell j, we can
estimate the coecients of the auxiliary model by maximizing the log likelihood function in
(3.3). The vector of coecients we estimate are given by the vector
 = (a0ja1;:::;aK 1jaK;!;1;:::N)
The maximum likelihood estimate of  is
^ J = argmax

L(yJ;) (2.19)
Recall that the ultimate goal of the estimation process is to determine the parameters of
the structural model. Estimating the coecients of the auxiliary model from data can be
considered as an intermediate step that is a convenient way to condense the information that
is contained in the data into something very tractable, i.e. the coecients of the auxiliary
model.
We now turn to the next step in the estimation procedure. Let yS() denote a matrix
of S simulated observations of the endogenous variables fns;xs;csg
S
s=1 using the structural
model and a set of structural parameters given by . Let (yS;) denote the coecients of
the auxiliary model estimated from simulated data yS(). Estimating the parameters of the
structural model essentially amounts to nding the value of  so that the distance between
the coecients of the auxiliary model estimated from simulated data and from actual data
is minimized. Technically,  is chosen so that
~ 
H






















where Q is a symmetric, non-negative denite weighting matrix. Gourieroux, Montfort
and Renault (1993, Proposition 4) shows that the optimal weighting matrix in this case is
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~ H

























The matrices Z0 and Z1 are impossible to compute. However, Gourieroux, et al. (1993)
shows that both can be consistently estimated by evaluating the Hessian using, respectively,













The data I use in the estimation comes from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
(NLSY 79). The NLSY 79 is a representative sample of 12,686 young men and women who
were 14 to 22 years of age when rst surveyed in 1979. The cohort was interviewed annually
through 1994. Since 1994, the survey has been administered biennially. The last survey that
is available was published in 2006. The entire data set I use in the estimation thus consists
of 27 individual surveys. The NLSY 79 contains demographic variables, labor market data
and information on individuals' wealth and consumption.
The advantageous feature of the NLSY 79 is it's panel dimension. Each individual in
the survey is observed from the time when they rst enter the labor market (conditional
on not dropping out). This allows me to construct the entire labor market history of an
individual using the information on the individual's labor market transitions. It might
seem problematic though that the survey is taken annually (and from 1994 even biennially)
considering that a substantial fraction of jobs, especially for young individuals, last for less
than a year. However, the survey is constructed in a way so that during each interview the
individual is asked not just about any ongoing job but also about up to 5 employment spells
that occurred since the last interview. Therefore, it is possible to recover the complete labor
market history of each individual in the survey.
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and a set of individuals characteristics associated with the respective employment spell. As
mentioned previously, each observation j consists of information about (a) tj: the worker's
total tenure on the job, (b) cj: an indicator that is unity when the duration of job j is uncen-
sored and zero otherwise, (c) aj: the worker's age when the match was formed and (d) !j:
the percentage deviation of the worker's initial wage in job j from the average initial wage
payed in matches that were formed by workers of the same age. To guarantee a reasonable
degree of homogeneity across individuals, I exclude certain observations from the data set.
In particular, the nal data set consists of observations of white males that had their rst
job at the age of 18 or later. Moreover, I exclude part time jobs and consider just those
employment spells for which individuals worked for  30 hours per week21.
In constructing the data, particularly in determining the length of a spell of employment,
I take a retrospective approach. More precisely, every time I observe a job separation in
the data I use the information on the worker's total tenure on that job to determine the
length of employment. Individuals are always asked to report the total number of weeks
they have been working for a particular employer, irrespective of whether the job has al-
ready ended or not. Therefore, at the time of the separation I read o the worker's tenure
on the job to determine the duration of the job22. For the jobs that are still ongoing at
the time of the last survey (2006) we do not observe a separation. Therefore, I record the
duration of the job at the time of the last survey and mark the observation as right censored.
The next step concerns the construction of a variable that, for each spell of employment
j, indicates the worker's age at the time of the match formation. To that end, I use informa-
tion on the worker's age at the time of the job separation and the worker's total tenure on
the job. However, using simply the worker's age measured in years which is reported during
21The decision to exclude part-time jobs is based on the following consideration. It seems likely that rms'
hiring practices and workers' job selection decisions are based on very dierent criteria depending on whether
a part-time or a full-time job is concerned. Full-time jobs naturally involve a higher degree of commitment
from both sides and hence, the decision to form a match might dier between both types of jobs.
22The two main advantages of this approach are that (a) I can determine the exact length of each em-
ployment spell and (b) I avoid the possible double-counting of employment spells. An alternative approach
would be to go the other way around, i.e. to follow a job from the beginning to its end and to record the
tenure at each consecutive survey for which the job still exists. This, however, would be prone to error
because any temporary interruption of an individual's record due to the non-availability for the interview,
for instance, would mistakenly be considered as the ending of an employment spell. The double counting of
a single spell would be unavoidable.
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of measurement is too coarse to capture the worker's exact age at the time of the match
formation. To minimize the error I, thus, compute the worker's exact age (in months) at the
time of the interview. This is done by using information on the month and the year of the
current interview and the month and the year of the individual's birth. By subtracting the
worker's tenure on a particular job (measured in months) from his current age, one gets the
individual's precise age when he started the job.
The last step concerns the construction of a variable which measures the percentage
deviation of the worker's initial wage in job j from the average initial wage payed in all
matches that were formed by workers of the same age. The construction of this variable is a
little tricky mainly because the initial wage needs to be recovered for each employment spell
individually. To this end I start, for each employment spell, at the time of separation. In
step (1), I use information on (a) the week number of the current interview, (b) the week
number of the last interview and (c) the total tenure of worker on the current job. By using
(a) and (b) we can determine how many weeks have passed since the last interview. In step
(2), I consult the preceding survey and check whether the very same job has a duration of
less or equal than 52 weeks. If this is the case, I record the reported wage as the worker's
initial wage in that job. If the duration is more than 52, I return to step (1) and continue
until the initial wage is found.
This method has two main advantages: rst it can easily handle the switch from annual
to biennale interviews without losing information. This is because it uses the number of
weeks between two consecutive interviews to identify the survey in which one has to look for
the respective job. Second, for the very same reason, it can manage a temporary discontinua-
tion of the observability of a job which might be due to the non-availability of the interviewee.
Moreover, it is fairly precise. For 79:14% of the employment spells I am able to recover
the initial wage. The failure to get a complete assignment of initial wages to jobs is due to a
variety of reasons, the most important of which is the existence of missing values for wages.
By inspecting the original data it becomes evident that individuals frequently do not report
their wages, especially for jobs with a short duration. Arguably, excluding those observations
with missing values from the data set would introduce a bias. To solve this problem, I choose
to use imputed values to nd the remaining initial wages. The remaining steps in construct-
ing !j are straightforward. For each age cohort I compute the average initial wage and !j
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Number of employment spells, by duration (in years) and by age at match formation
Age / Duration [0-0.5) [0.5-1) [1-2) [2-3.5) [3.5-5) [5-10) [10- Total (age)
[18-20) 996 439 367 163 87 87 36 2,172
[20-23) 2,286 975 806 443 211 218 171 5,110
[23-26) 1,996 985 866 456 205 241 230 4,979
[26-30) 1,591 954 839 437 215 256 320 4,612
[30-34) 885 563 541 340 164 237 302 3,032
[34-38) 461 318 397 309 164 351 114 2,114
[38- 633 478 692 525 300 340 20 2,988
Total (duration) 8,848 4,712 4,508 2,673 1,346 1,727 1,193 25,007
Number of observations across tenure and age groups. "Age" refers to the workers age at the time of recruitment. Sample
consists of white-male U.S. workers. Data: NLSY 79
Table 2.5: Summary Statistics I
The resulting data set consists of 25;007 observations of employment spells, 90:61% of
which are uncensored. Table (2.5) depicts in detail how the total number of observations is
distributed among the dierent tenure and age groups. Notice again that the term "age"
refers to the worker's age at the time when the match was created and not to the worker's
current age. Not surprisingly, the main bulk of employment spells in the data set are of
a short duration. The proportion of jobs surviving into higher tenure classes shrinks as
duration increases. Hence, the distribution of jobs across duration is strongly left skewed.
This pattern holds throughout all age cohorts. Notice, however, that cohorts with higher
age generally have a larger proportion of medium- and long-term jobs than young cohorts.
Table (2.6) provides summary statistics about the worker characteristics. The rst two
rows in the upper panel depict the mean and the standard deviation of workers' age across
tenure classes. From this we observe that there is a positive relationship between the dura-
tion of an employment spell and the average age at which an individual has started working
in the job. In short, matches which last longer are, on average, created by higher age co-
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on average 25.78 years whereas long-term jobs, those that last up to 10 years, are created
by workers aged 30.32 years on average. However, the positive relation that we observe is
not particularly strong. The standard deviation of age is generally quite large across tenure
classes.
Job duration [0-0.5) [0.5-1) [1-2) [2-3.5) [3.5-5) [5-10)
Mean age 25.78 27.01 28.32 29.37 29.78 30.32
(Std.dev. Age) (6.28) (6.81) (7.57) (7.65) (7.71) (6.98)
Mean ! -0.105 -0.032 0.043 0.079 0.127 0.136
(Std.dev. !) (0.35) (0.42) (0.48) (0.51) (0.57) (0.56)
Initial age [18-20) [20-23) [23-26) [26-30) [30-34) [34-38)
Mean tenure 1.435 1.821 2.082 2.444 2.913 3.003
(Std.dev tenure) (2.87) (3.85) (4.05) (4.21) (4.18) (3.29)
Mean ! 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(Std.dev. !) (0.30) (0.33) (0.39) (0.48) (0.51) (0.59)
Upper panel: Mean and the standard deviation of workers' age across tenure classes (rst two
rows). Mean and the standard deviation of ! across tenure classes (third and fourth row). Lower
panel: Mean job duration across age groups (fth row). The standard deviation of ! (last row).
Sample consists of white-male U.S. workers. Data: NLSY 79
Table 2.6: Summary Statistics II
The next two rows in the upper panel depict the mean and the standard deviation of !
across tenure classes. The observations here are in line with our theory. A central prediction
of our model is that matches which pay above-average initial wages are likely to survive
longer. This relation can also be found in the data. Short term jobs had payed initial wages
which were below the average by about 10:5%. On the other hand, initial wages in medium
and long term jobs were roughly 13% above average. Clearly, the survival probability of
a match is positively related to the initial wage that is payed. According to our model,
this relation originates in agents' beliefs that the match quality is a good predictor of the
likelihood of survival. This in turn determines the value of a job and thereby aects the
remuneration payed to the worker.
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rst row contains the mean duration of an employment spell across age cohorts. We observe,
basically, a mirror image of the rst row in the upper panel. In short, the average duration
of matches formed by young cohorts is substantially shorter than for jobs created by experi-
enced workers. The average job duration more than doubles as we move from workers aged
18   20 years to workers aged 34   38 years. Not surprisingly, the mean value of ! is zero.
This is by construction, as we measure ! as the deviation of an individual's wage from the
average wage in the same age cohort.
Arguably more interesting is the last row, i.e. the standard deviation of !. We see a
substantial increase in the standard deviation of !, implying that there is more dispersion in
initial wages for experienced workers than young workers. The dispersion roughly doubles as
we move from the lower to the top age interval. This relation also holds when we use individ-
uals' labor market experience instead of their age as the criterion. The observed increase in
the dispersion can be explained by the stochastic nature of labor market transitions. Within
a group of initially similar workers, the degree of heterogeneity naturally rises over time as
individuals build up their own labor market histories. More heterogeneity across individuals'
characteristics will be re
ected by more dispersed initial wages.
2.8 Estimation Results
2.8.1 Coecient estimates of the auxiliary model
In this section we report the coecient estimates of the auxiliary model using the observed
data. Before we bring the model to the data, we need to specify a grid for the job durations,
n, and age categories, ak. Clearly, the distribution of job separations across duration is
strongly skewed to the left as most separations occur early in a rm/worker relationship.
To account for that we choose a ner grid for short durations and coarser one for long du-
rations. Choosing a grid that is too ne, however, has the disadvantage that relatively few
observations fall in each interval leading to imprecise estimates of .
Bearing in mind these considerations we specify the following grid f0;1;2;3;5;7;10g23.
The choice of the age categories follows a similar logic24. As documented by Section 2.2, most
23Job duration is measured in years.
24Recall that age in this framework refers to the worker's age at the time of the match formation and not
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for that, we make the age categories narrower for young individuals and wider for more expe-
rienced workers. In particular we choose the following grid for age f18;20;23;26;30;34;38;g.
The coecients to be estimated are
 =
 
18j20 20j23 23j26 26j30 30j34 34j38 !;
0j1 1j2 2j3 3j5 5j7 7j10
!
The maximum likelihood estimator of  is given by the solution to the maximization
problem stated in (3.4). Table (2.7) reports the results. Asymptotic standard errors are re-
ported in parentheses. The coecients of the baseline hazard rates, i, are all very precisely
estimated and the values are in line with expectations. The probability of separating from
an employer is decreasing in tenure. This is a standard prediction of models in which rms
and workers learn about the match quality. It is interesting to note though that the decrease
is not linear in tenure.
At the beginning of an employment relationship the baseline hazard rate is fairly high
but, conditional on staying in the job, it falls rather rapidly and subsequently levels out
at a rate that is substantially lower than the initial value. This pattern is intuitive since
most of the learning about the match quality takes place within the rst few periods of an
employment relationship. Matches that are revealed to be good continue to exist whereas
bad matches break up. Thus, after an initial period of learning and selection, each surviving
match is less likely to be of bad quality and leads to the non-linear decline in the baseline
hazard rate. I also report the average hazard rate for each job duration. It is computed as
the mean hazard rate of all observed individuals using the estimated coecients. For in-
stance, the mean hazard rate in the population of separating from an employer in the tenure




Turning to the estimates of the age coecients, . Recall that each of the coecients is
linked to a dummy variable that is unity for the age interval that corresponds to the individ-
ual's age at match formation, and zero for all other age intervals. Furthermore, recall that
the "missing" age cohort, which serves as the means of comparison, is given by the cohort
with age  38 years. Therefore, any of the age coecients reported in Table (2.7) has to be
interpreted as the dierence in the hazard rate between age groups k and K + 1, everything
else being equal.
at the time of separation.
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population, the results of which are reported in the column on the far right of Table (2.7).
Both, the estimates and the marginal eects suggest that the age at match formation is a
fundamental determinant of an individual's probability of separating from an employer.
Coecient Estimate A.H. (%) Coecient Estimate M.E. (%)
0j1 0.4925 0.885 18j20 0.7992 122.4
(0.0133) (0.0345)
1j2 0.3187 0.506 20j23 0.6997 101.3
(0.0095) (0.0306)
2j3 0.2249 0.339 23j26 0.6089 83.85
(0.0077) (0.0308)
3j5 0.1638 0.242 26j30 0.4653 59.24
(0.0058) (0.0320)
5j7 0.1090 0.153 30j34 0.2664 30.53
(0.0050) (0.0336)




j0 denotes the estimate of the baseline hazard rate for the interval [;0), aja0 is the coecient estimate for
the age cohort [a;a0), ! is the coecient estimate for the variable !, A.H. denotes the average eect and M.E.
is the marginal eect. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 2.7: Estimation results: Auxiliary model using observed data
A worker that starts a new job at the age of 18   20 is more than twice (122:39% to be
precise) as likely to separate from the current employer than a worker that starts a new job
at (or above) the age of 38. This eect, however, declines dramatically with age, particularly
within the rst 10 years after labor market entry. An individual that starts a new job at
the age of 30 is already about 60% less likely to separate from the current employer than
they were 10 years previously. For ages higher than 34 years the eect seems to vanish. The
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started at this age is almost as likely to end than a job that is started at age 38 years or higher.
According to the structural model, this eect on the separation probability is due to im-
perfect information in the hiring process. These imperfections are linked to an individual's
labor market experience since for young, as opposed to experienced, workers there is less
information available to facilitate the assessment of the worker's productive ability. Over
time, as an individual stays in the labor market, more and more relevant information ac-
cumulates and so the eect on the separation probability becomes less and less important.
In the data this is re
ected by a decreasing age coecient. Moreover, the pattern in Table
(2.7) suggests that the process which leads to a reduction in the importance of the age eect
is strongly concentrated in the rst 10 years of an individual's entry into the labor market.
At later stages of the career, particularly from age 34 years onward, it becomes negligible.
The lower panel of Table (2.7) depicts the estimate of the coecient of !. The estimate
is highly signicant and has a negative sign. I also report the marginal eect, which is com-
puted as the mean percentage change in the hazard rate in the population induced by a +1%
gap of individual's initial wage to the mean initial wage of the respective age cohort. The
value of the point estimate implies that a positive 1% deviation of a worker's initial wage
from the mean initial wage in the same age cohort leads to a reduction in the individual
hazard by roughly 0:5%. Regarding the sign of !, the structural model yields the same
prediction.
This is based on the following mechanism. When forming a match agents observe a noisy
signal about the unobserved quality of the match. This signal is used to draw inference
about the true quality, resulting in a certain belief. Agents are rational in the sense that
their beliefs are, on average, consistent with the true match quality. Good matches persist,
bad matches break up. Consequently, the value of the initial beliefs is indicative for the
probability of separating from an employer. For this reason they also determine the joint
surplus of a job and thereby also the wage that is payed to the worker.
The hazard rates in Table (2.7) are computed across all age cohorts. Figure (2.3) reports
the hazard rates for selected age cohort separately25. Two things are worth noting at this
25Table (2.14) in Appendix F contains the corresponding numbers for all the age groups we consider in
the estimation.
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from the employer. Though the probability is substantially higher for young workers than
for more experienced ones. (2) Throughout all tenure classes the hazard rate for young
workers is approximately twice as high as that for experienced workers. Therefore, the per-
centage decline with tenure is roughly the same across cohorts, around 84%. The relative
dierence is constant, whereas the absolute dierence in the hazard rates between young
and experienced workers shrinks dramatically, from 0:5920 for newly created jobs to 0:0967
for jobs with 7   10 years of tenure. Thus, it is clearly the case that newly created jobs are
much more likely to break up when a young worker is involved. Interestingly, for established
jobs it matters much less if a young or an experienced worker is involved, as the gap in the
separation probability narrows considerably.
Figure 2.3
Actual hazard rate of separating from a job for selected age and tenure groups. Source: Own
calculations based on data from the NLSY 79.
In order to assess the aptitude of the auxiliary model for capturing the main statistical
properties of the data I perform a series of hypotheses tests. Checking the standard errors
of the individual coecient estimates can be considered as a rst test to evaluate the ex-
planatory power of the model. It appears that each of the estimates is statistically dierent
from zero at the 98% condence level26.
26In a preliminary step, I also included a worker's total labor market experience (measured as the worker's
cumulated number of weeks being employed since labor market entry) as an explanatory variable. This
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the same, i.e. 18j20 = 20j23 = ::: = 34j38. The value is 446:8 with 5 degrees of freedom which
rejects the hypotheses at the 99% condence level. At the same level of condence, I reject
the hypotheses that the baseline hazard rates are all constant across tenure intervals, i.e.
0j1 = 1j2 =;:::;= 7j10. Next, I test for the hypothesis that the hazard rates for any two
consecutive intervals are the same, i.e. j0 = 0j00. The hypotheses 0j1 = 1j2, 1j2 = 2j3,
2j3 = 3j5, 3j5 = 5j7 are rejected at the 99% level, whereas 5j7 = 7j10 is rejected at
the 97:5% level. Next, I perform a similar test to check whether the age coecients of two
consecutive age cohorts are constant, i.e. aja0 = a0ja00. This test rejects 18j20 = 20j23 at
the 97:5% condence level, whereas the remaining hypotheses, 20j23 = 23j26, 23j26 = 26j30,
26j30 = 30j34, 30j34 = 34j38, are all rejected at the 99% level.
Lastly, I test whether the choice of the age grid was an appropriate one. To this end, I rst
estimate the auxiliary model using a ner grid and then use the associated value of the likeli-
hood function to perform a likelihood ratio test for the hypothesis that the grid in the original
specication is as good as the ner one. Here, the term "good" refers to the dierence in the
likelihood of both specications. When using the grid f18;19;20;21;23;26;28;30;32;34;38g
I can reject the hypotheses that the original grid, f18;20;23;26;30;34;38;g; would perform
as well at the 75% condence level only. Extending the grid to include higher ages, i.e.
f18;19;:::;24;26;:::;44g, leads to the same result.
The results of these tests demonstrate that the chosen auxiliary model provides a good
statistical description of the underlying data along the dimensions that are needed for the
identication of the model's structural parameters. These dimensions are meant to capture
any age-cohort eects that, according to the model, are causal for dierences in the job
separation and job turnover behavior of (a) individuals of dierent age and (b) along the
working life cycle of each individual.
measure, however, turned out to be highly correlated with the individual's age variable, causing problems of
multicollinearity.
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Estimating the structural parameters means nding a ~ H
S that solves the minimization prob-
lem stated in (2.20). Performing one evaluation of the objective function involves the fol-
lowing steps:
1. Given the structural parameters  the model is solved for the optimal policy functions.
2. With those at hand we can simulate the life path of a number of individuals to obtain
data on the individuals' employment spells.
3. Using the simulated data we then estimate the parameters of the auxiliary model and
nally evaluate the quadratic form in (2.20).
In order to solve the model we need to take a stand on a variety of issues. Concerning an




and (b) the number of periods an individual stays in the labor market, set  K. The data
that is used here does not allow for the identication of death. We do observe individuals
dropping out of the survey but the cause of dropping out is not specied. It is unlikely,
though, that death plays an important role. The individuals observed in 2006 (the year of
the last survey) are aged 42   48 years. According to the U.S. National Center for Health
Statistics, those individuals can expect to have an additional 30:5   36:9 years to live, de-
pending on their age within the cohort. Moreover, the annualized probability of death for
this age cohort is less than 0:25% indicating that, for those individuals, the risk of death is
fairly low. In light of this, we set k = 1 for k = 1;:::  K. Furthermore, the time dimension
of the NLSY 79 survey is still limited in the sense that we do not observe individuals up
until retirement. Consequently, we can not compute  K from the survey data. Instead we
set  K = 45, implying that individuals spend at maximum 45 years in the labor force.
In the simulation step we simulate the working life cycle of S = 105 individuals. For each
individual we observe a certain number of employment spells, the number and the length
of which depend on the set of parameters 27. Therefore, the number of observations in
the estimation is endogenous and dependent on the set of parameters. This is undesirable
since a low number of observations implies relatively inaccurate estimates of the structural
parameters. To circumvent this problem I introduce a penalization term into the algorithm.
27If, for instance, the policy functions implied by  lead to high threshold beliefs then few individuals will
accept job oers and the number of employment spells in the resulting data set will be relatively low.
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number of observations is lower than a certain critical value. As a critical value I use 2  S.
Furthermore, there are assumed to be two types of worker, denoted by i 2 fi1;i2g. Before
bringing the structural model to the data we need to make the following adjustment. No-
tice that the variance of the noise component is the only characteristic that distinguishes
young from experienced workers. Therefore, the model would attribute all the dierences
in the job separation across age entirely to the information imperfections. This is clearly
an overstatement of the importance of the information channel. Estimates based on the
current specication would most likely be biased. Obviously, there are other sources that
cause separation rates to dier across age. To account for that we do not ex-ante restrict (a)
the exogenous rate of separation  and (b) the job quality, governed by , to be the same
across types. Instead, we allow  and  to vary across i-types, i.e. we consider (i1;i2),
(i1;i2) and estimate them separately.
Moreover, I restrict the process that governs changes in workers' types to be irreversible. In
particular, I set 2j2 = 1, 2j1 = 0, which excludes the possibility of type "depreciation".
This assumption does not seem to be very restrictive. A worker's type is meant to capture
factors that aect the ability to screen a worker, such as the stock of information about
the worker's labor market history. The more information, the better an applicant can be
screened and categorized by the hiring rm. Such information does not get lost over time.
Therefore, it is arguably a minor point to neglect type depreciation. Therefore, the only
free parameter that governs changes in workers' types is 1j2. Notice that 1j1 can be recov-












beforehand. As a normalization, we set yg = 1, due to the fact that, in terms of the expected
per-period output of a match, the important consideration is not the level of yg but the
dierence yg  yb. Therefore, we x yg and estimate yb. We set the personal discount factor
 equal 0:9569 which implies an annual interest rate of 4:5%.Typically, it is dicult to get
reasonable estimates for the personal discount factor , especially in this context where the
existence of individuals' heterogeneity and a nite life cycle render the estimation  within
meaningful bounds even more problematic. We set the rm's bargaining power e equal to
0:5, which is a standard value used in the search and matching literature. The estimation
strategy used here is unlikely to properly identify the arrival rate of new job oers, ~ . This
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eect on the duration of an employment spell. The hazard rate approach which we adopted
focuses on the duration of jobs but it does not process any information on individuals'
unemployment spells. Consequently, ~  would be poorly identied and any estimate of it
would be meaningless. We set ~  = 1, which we believe is a reasonable choice given that
we use yearly observations and the average unemployment spell in the U:S: is signicantly
shorter than a year.





I use a hybrid
method as proposed by Nagypal (2007). This method rst evaluates the objective function
along a relatively coarse grid. The initial grid that I chose has dimension 4  2  6  4 
3  3  4  4  3  3. To economize on computational time I start out with a low number
of simulations. In each subsequent round, I increase the number of simulations leading to
more precise evaluations of the objective function. However, I consider only those grid points
that perform well in the previous round. All the remaining points are eliminated. After this
renement I am left with a grid with 279 points. The values of the objective function on this
grid range from 6:46  10 6 to 2:15  10 5. The method is described in detail in Appendix
E of Nagypal (2007)28. In the next step, I use the remaining grid points as starting values in
a simplex algorithm that solves the minimization problem in (2.20). Table (2.8) reports the
estimates of the structural parameters. To test whether the structural model is well specied
I perform a global specication test that was proposed by Gourieroux et al. (1993). This



























that is asymptotically distributed as a 2 with dim() dim() degrees of freedom. The
test statistic in our case is equal to 1:374, which is well below the critical value of 7:82 for
the 95% condence level with 3 degrees of freedom. Therefore, we can not reject the null
hypotheses that the model is well specied. The standard errors depicted in Table 2.8 are
computed by evaluating the expression in (2.21). For that we consider a 0:0001% deviation
from the estimates in Table 2.8. To get accurately estimated standard errors we rely on
a very large set of simulated data. In particular, we simulate the working life cycles of 20
million individuals, which results in approximately 120 million observations of employment
28Using the terminology by Nagypal (2007), I use a total of 4 rounds in which the number of simulations
is

5  103;104;5  104;105	
.
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precisely. This does not, per se, rule out the possibility that the minimum found is the local
minimum.
To double-check the accuracy of the estimation procedure and in particular, to identify 
at
regions of the objective function surface we compute the objective function xing all but one
parameter at the estimated value, varying the remaining parameter over a range of feasible
values. The results are depicted in Figure 2.8 in Appendix F. Most importantly, we do not
nd any notable 
at regions of the criterion function, which conrms the accuracy of our
estimates29. The possibility of being trapped in a local minimum is nearly entirely ruled
out by the operating mode of the grid search algorithm that was used to obtain the starting
values. This algorithm provides us with a range of values, each of which is potentially close
to a (local) minimum. Using many dierent starting values in the subsequent simplex-search
algorithm guarantees that we can identify (and dismiss) local minima by comparing the val-
ues of the criterion function at all of the points at which the algorithm terminates the search
process.
The estimate of 1j2 is equal to 0.4134, meaning that an employed type 1 worker faces a
41:34% (annualized) probability of becoming a type 2 worker, conditional on staying em-
ployed. Consequently, a young worker would need, on average, 2.42 years of tenure on a
single job before receiving the type-upgrade. However, jobs often do not survive that long
and employment spells are typically interrupted by periods of unemployment. Particularly,
the high turnover for young cohorts is detrimental to a quick upgrade as it prevents the
accumulation of years of tenure on a given job. Thus, it takes substantially longer than 2:42
years until a type change occurs. In the simulated version of the model (an explanation
29An interesting case emerges when we vary s2. The panel in the last row in Figure 2.8 illustrates that for
values of s2 > 0:26 the criterion function increases markedly. This is due to the following reason. s2 is dened
as the standard deviation of a truncated normal distribution with domain [0;1]. To draw random numbers
that follow a truncated normal distribution we have to compute the standard deviation (together with the
mean) of the corresponding un-truncated normal. The issue is, however, that for a truncated normal with
mean in [0;1] there exists an upper bound on the standard deviation which is around 0:288. Any arbitrarily
high value for the standard deviation of the un-truncated normal translates into a value for s that is always
below this upper bound. Consequently, for values of s2 close to that upper bound the implied random draws
for agents' beliefs are that much dispersed so that, in the end, very few draws fall above the threshold
belief. This means that very few individuals get matched and we observe very few employment spells in the
resulting simulated data. As mentioned previously, we incorporate a penalty term into the algorithm that
adds a very high positive number to the objective function whenever the number of simulated employment
spells falls short of a critical value. The case of s2 being close to the upper bound is such a case, hence we
observe the criterion function jumping upwards.
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nd that the average worker moves from type 1 to type 2, 5.25 years after labor market
entry. The quality of a match is initially unknown but rms learn about it, over time, on
the basis of observed output. In each period there is a constant probability, estimated to be
' = 0:6157, that the match quality is fully revealed. As a result, it takes, on average, 1:62
years until the rm learns the true quality of the match.
Parameter Explanation Estimate
yb Output of a bad rm/worker match -3.2433
(0.3350)
b Flow value of unemployment 0.4333
(0.1233)
1j2 Probability of a type change 0.4134
(0.0726)





Type 1 Type 2
i Probability of exogenous job separation 0.2497 0.1084
(0.0122) (0.0323)
i Mean of agents' beliefs 0.3781 0.7571
(0.0969) (0.0706)
si Standard deviation of agents' beliefs 0.0962 0.2030
(0.0097) (0.0156)
Estimates of the structural parameters of the model presented in Section 2.3. The stan-
dard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 2.8: Estimation results: Structural Model
The lower panel of Table (2.8) reports the estimates of the parameters that are allowed
to dier across i types. In our setup,  is the rate at which matches break up for exogenous
reasons. In the estimation it can be thought of as a residual that captures all the separations
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matches with type 1 and type 2 workers is estimated to be 0:2497 and 0:1084, respectively.
The value for experienced workers is close to that usually reported by empirical studies.
Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), for instance, nds that in the U.S. the rate of exogenous job
destruction is 11:3% per year. The rate for young cohorts, we nd, is substantially higher
than the rate for experienced worker. These numbers imply that matches of experienced
workers are hit by an exogenous shock, which leads to a break-up, after an average of 9:2
years, whereas matches of young workers are hit after about 4 years. To test whether the
estimates of i are statistically dierent from one another I perform a Wald test of the
hypothesis that 1 = 2, i.e. the rate of exogenous separation is the same across types. The
statistic associated the with null hypotheses is given by








where W a 2
2 and W is the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix determined in
(2.21). c :  ! < is a continuously dierentiable function on the parameter space  that
incorporates the null hypotheses: H0 : c(0) = 0 and C(~ H
S ) is the gradient of c() evaluated
at the optimal unconstrained estimator ~ H
S . The test statistics associated with the null hy-
pothesis is 10:08, which is above the critical value of 9:2 for the 99% condence level with 2
degrees of freedom. Therefore, we reject the null hypotheses that the exogenous rate of job
separation is the same for type 1 and type 2 workers.
In our model  has a threefold interpretation. On one hand, it is the mean of the distri-
bution from which the true, but unknown, job quality  is drawn from. Given the zero-mean
assumption for the noise component ,  also represents the mean of the observed signal,

, and provided how agents form their beliefs about  it is also the mean of the beliefs
that are realized. The estimates we obtain for 1 and 2 imply that the true job quality is
substantially lower for young workers. Notice, however, that  is not the average quality of
all realized matches but of all potential matches. Not all matches are formed in equilibrium
as encounters with a signal below the threshold do not result in the match formation. Hence,
the actual average quality of existing match is higher and is equal to 0:524 for type 1 workers
and 0:894 for type 2 workers for our purposes. This says that almost half of all employed
type 1 workers, but just 10% of type 2 workers, are in a mismatch30.
30Notice that we are referring to matches whose quality is not yet revealed.
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component. Recall that young workers emit a less informative signal than experienced
worker. A poor signal that is very noisy is more likely to indicate a good match than the
same signal that is precise. Therefore, rms can risk hiring young workers with relatively
poor signals as there is a substantial likelihood that the resulting matches are in fact good.
Consequently, the hiring threshold is lower for type 1 workers and so is the average quality
of existing matches. Lastly, I perform a Wald test on the hypothesis H0 : 1 = 2 to check
whether the dierence in the estimated values is statistically signicant. The test statistic
is 13:09 and so we may reject the hypotheses that the job quality is the same across worker
types at the 99% condence level.
The goal of this paper is to assess the importance of worker-specic informational frictions
for explaining the observed dierences in labor market outcomes across age cohorts. In our
model those frictions are captured by a noise component that distorts workers' signals. The
worker specicity shows up in the variance of the noise component 2
;i, which we assume
to be dierent across worker types. 2









. We did not estimate 2






;i using the estimated values for the standard deviation of agents' beliefs
si. The estimates of s1 and s2 are respectively 0:0962 and 0:2030. We use a range of values
for 2
 and nd that the ratio ;1=;2 takes values of around 2:1. The implied signal to noise
ratio is about 4:5 times higher for experienced workers than for young individuals. Lastly,
I perform a Wald test to check whether the dierence in the precision of workers' signals is
signicant. We nd that the test statistics associated with H0 : s1 = s2 is 12:78 and so we
reject the hypotheses that the informational friction is not worker-type-specic.
2.8.3 Discussion of the Results
In this section, we assess how well the predictions obtained from the structural model match
up with actual data. To that end, we use the estimated parameters and simulate the model
to generate data on individuals' working life cycles. From the simulated data we compute a
variety of statistics we can then use to compare to their counterparts in the observed data.
First, however, we discuss the optimal policy functions implied by the model. Recall that
the policy in this model is given by the threshold value of beliefs for both worker types.
Figure (2.4) depicts the results.
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ual getting ever closer to the exit age becomes less and less valuable for a (new) match as the
time horizon, over which a rm can collect the surplus, shrinks. To compensate rms for the
shorter horizon and for the risk that the match might be bad, a higher surplus is required to
make matching with older workers attractive. Consequently, the threshold increases. Notice,
however, that the threshold is 
at for almost the entire career of type 2 workers, as for these
workers there is very little risk that the match turns out to be bad and so rms do not
require any compensation.
Figure 2.4
(a) Equilibrium threshold value of beliefs for type 1 and type 2 workers (solid and dashed line), (b)
mean value of the initial beliefs (dotted lines), (c) 50% condence bounds around the mean (shaded
area).
We have demonstrated that the threshold for type 2 workers is higher than for type 1
workers in the simple case (see Section 2.4) and it also holds here. The reasoning follows as
before. The outside option of employed type 2 workers is more valuable, as their expected
value of a job is higher than that of a type 1 worker. Therefore, they can extract a higher
fraction of the total surplus, which translates into an increased reservation belief. Figure 2.4
also contains the mean value of the initial beliefs (indicated by the dotted line) and the 50%
"condence bounds" around the mean (shaded area).
105




The 1-year retention rate for newly employed workers (upper two lines) and the 5-years retention
rate for workers with one year of tenure (lower two lines). Comparing the results obtained from the
model (solid line) with the counterpart in the data (dashed line). Source: Own calculations using
data from the NLSY 79.
These bounds indicate the region in which 50% of all realized initial draws fall into. From
there, we clearly see that the initial beliefs of type 1 workers are substantially less dispersed.
This is a consequence of how beliefs are formed (see Equation (2.2)). More noise in the
signal means that, when forming beliefs, more weight is put on the mean value and less on
the actual signal. Thus, there is less dispersion in type 1 beliefs. Furthermore, notice that
the cuto value for type 1 is above the shaded area, meaning that type 1 workers are, on
average, less successful in generating a signal that is sucient for a match formation. Thus
the noise in the signal (combined with a lower mean value of beliefs 1) is basically a hiring
barrier for those workers31.
31This has important implications for the duration of unemployment. According to the model, we should
observe young (type 1) workers having longer spells of unemployment than experienced workers. In reality,
however, this eect might be at least partly oset by a higher arrival rate of job oers for the young, as they
are typically less specialized and so more willing to take on any given job. In our model, we abstract from
this issue and cannot account for age-specic dierences in the duration of unemployment.
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more likely to separate from a new job than experienced workers. We compute job retention
rates from the data and nd that the likelihood of leaving a new job declines with age. Next
we compute the same statistics using the simulated data. Figure (2.5) reports the results for
the 1-year retention rate for newly employed workers (the upper two lines) and the 5-years
retention rate for workers with one year of tenure (lower two lines)32. The solid line is the
prediction of the model and the dashed line is the counterpart in the data.
Table (2.9) contains the results for the remaining retention classes. For all the cases, the
model can capture very well the increase the in the retention probability with age. Also the
level that is predicted is broadly in line with the actual data, though for young workers, the
model slightly overpredicts the short-horizon retention rate. For experienced workers the
predictions of the model are generally closer to the empirical facts.
Duration / Age [18-20) [23-26) [30-34) [38-
1 year 0.41 (0.40) 0.51 (0.49) 0.60 (0.61) 0.77 (0.71)
2 years 0.21 (0.25) 0.33 (0.36) 0.42 (0.48) 0.61 (0.59)
3 years 0.12 (0.20) 0.26 (0.31) 0.33 (0.41) 0.45 (0.51)
4 years 0.09 (0.17) 0.21 (0.26) 0.27 (0.36) 0.41 (0.45)
5 years 0.07 (0.15) 0.17 (0.23) 0.24 (0.32) 0.36 (0.41)
Job retention rates for newly employed workers: Rows represent dierent retention periods, columns indicate
workers' age at the time of recruitment. Numbers in bold (normal font) represent the model (data).
Table 2.9
We also compute the retention probabilities for workers with one year of tenure. Table
(2.14) in Appendix E reports those results. The pattern for that tenure class is generally
very similar to that of newly employed workers. The previous results suggest that job at-
tachments are rather fragile for young workers but become more and more durable in the
later stages of a career. In this dimension, the model matches the empirical facts very well.
32Recall that the x-years retention rate is the probability that a worker with a certain tenure keeps her
current job for x more years.
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the data this is clearly observable as illustrated in Section 2.2.1. In what follows, we present
some tables and gures documenting how well our model can account for observed dierences
in job turnover across age cohorts. In a world with high turnover, we should observe short
short employment spells and individuals holding many jobs in a given period of time. Table
(2.10) reports, for dierent age cohorts, the fraction of workers within a given tenure class.
Tenure / Age [18-20) [23-26) [30-34) [38-
0   2 0.89 (0.84) 0.61 (0.39) 0.37 (0.23) 0.24 (0.21)
2   5 0.11 (0.16) 0.27 (0.39) 0.27 (0.26) 0.21 (0.22)
5   10 0.00 (0.00) 0.12 (0.22) 0.24 (0.31) 0.22 (0.24)
> 10 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.12 (0.20) 0.33 (0.33)
Proportion of workers with  2 f[0;2);[2;5);[5;10);> 10g years of tenure within a given age cohort. Numbers
in bold (normal font) represent the model (data).
Table 2.10
The numbers in bold represent the outcome of the model. Clearly, young workers are
over-represented in short-term jobs as, for them, little time has passed since entry into the
labor market. Then, as the career progresses, more and more workers move into medium
and long term jobs. Actually, for the youngest cohort the model can replicate fairly well
the actual tenure "distribution". It over-predicts the fraction of young workers that move
into medium term jobs (second column). Also the results for more experienced workers are
broadly in line with the empirical facts.
One of the key facts presented in Section 2.2.1 indicates that there is a lot of job-shopping
among the young but substantially less turnover for experienced workers. As a consequence,
individuals typically hold the vast majority of all their lifetime jobs within the rst 10 years
of the career. In Table (2.11) we report the average number of jobs a worker holds until a
certain age as a fraction of the career total. The upper panel shows the data and the lower
panel contains the numbers produced by the model.
Generally speaking, the model can replicate quite well the observed pattern, i.e. the
steep increase in the number of jobs during the early years in the career and the 
attening
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the amount of turnover for young workers. Therefore, the initial increase is less pronounced
than in the data.
Age [18-20) [20-23) [23-26) [26-30) [30-34) [34-38) [38-
Data
0.332 0.484 0.629 0.746 0.806 0.882 0.963
(0.211) (0.236) (0.232) (0.211) (0.201) (0.165) (0.084)
Model
0.211 0.376 0.539 0.661 0.765 0.854 0.948
(0.185) (0.209) (0.213) (0.203) (0.185) (0.156) (0.093)
Each entry represent the average number of jobs a worker holds until age a as a fraction of the
total number of jobs hold in the entire career. The standard errors are in brackets.
Table 2.11
However, there is substantial heterogeneity in the number of jobs individuals hold along
the career. This is indicated by the large standard deviation. In order to get a better picture,
Figure (2.6) plots the mean number of jobs together with the 50% condence area around
the mean. This area determines the region in which 50% of the individuals belonging to a
given age cohort fall into. In this gure, we see that there is actually a lot of overlap between
the model outcome and the actual data.
Next, we report the number of newly employed workers as a fraction of total employment.
Panel (a) in Figure (2.7) compares the model outcome with the empirical counterpart. In
the data we dene a newly employed as a worker having at most 20 weeks of tenure. In
this dimension the model does extremely well. Table (2.10) shows that it generally under-
estimates the proportion of workers with tenure less than 2 years but it is highly accurate
predicting the very short run horizon. Lastly, we depict the age-specic unemployment rate,
obtained from the model, and compare it to the data. Panel (b) in Figure 2.7 contains the
respective plots.
Qualitatively, the model can capture the observed decline in unemployment with age.
However, quantitatively, the model overestimates unemployment for basically all age groups.
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rameters of the model, only uses information on individuals' employment spells but does
not make use of information regarding unemployment spells. Thus, there is no target in the
auxiliary model that captures the observed pattern of unemployment.
Figure 2.6
The 50% condence area around the average number of jobs a worker holds until a certain age as a
fraction of the career total. Comparing the model (light-grey area) with the data (dark-grey area).
Source: Own calculations using data from the NLSY 79.
In the previous section, it can be seen that the model accounts fairly well for the observed
age-specic dierences in labor market outcomes. It was also demonstrated that all the pa-
rameters that were allowed to dier across i-types, i.e. ,  and s, are actually statistically
signicant from one another. The question concerning the contribution of each of those pa-
rameters in explaining the observed life-cycle dynamics of individual job mobility remains.
To address this question, we run an experiment in which we implement various restrictions
on the parameters and compare the outcomes of the model obtained under the restrictions
with both the data outcome and the results of the unrestricted model. For this, we take the
results for the job retention probabilities as a standard of comparison. In particular, we use
the 1, 3 and 5-year retention rates for newly employed workers.
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dierence in the f1;3;5g-year retention rate between workers with a given age (top row) and
workers aged 18   20 years. Basically, we capture the increase in job stability over the life
cycle. The rst row in each panel is the data outcome. The rst entry, for instance, means
that newly employed workers aged 23 26 years are 10:1% more likely to retain the job than
newly employed workers aged 18 20 years. Each of the rows thereafter contain a particular
outcome of the model obtained under a given parameter restriction.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.7
Panel (a): The number of newly employed workers with a given age as a fraction of total employment
(of the same age group). Comparing the results obtained from the model (solid line) with the
empirical counterpart (dashed line). Panel (b): Comparing the unemployment rate generated by
the model (solid line) with the empirical counterpart (dashed line). Source: Own calculations using
data from the NLSY 79
The restrictions we implement are as follows: (1) i = ;i = ;si = s, 8i (second row),
which means that we do not allow for any type-specicity of parameters. (2) i = ;i = 
(third row), which implies we allow only the noise component to be dierent across i types.
(3) i =  (fourth row), so we allow  and s to dier. The last row depicts the outcomes of
the unrestricted model that we obtain by using the parameter estimates from Table 2.8. In
each of the restrictions, we x the parameter at some value that is given by the arithmetic
mean of the estimated, type specic values. For instance,  = (1 + 2)=2. The leftmost
column in Table 2.12 reports the average agreement of the respective scenario with the data-
outcome. For brevity we only provide a description of the results for the 1-year job retention
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account, on average, for 98:5% of the increase in the observed 1-year rate.
Age [23-26) [26-30) [30-34) [34-38) [38- % explained
1-year job retention rate
Data 0.101 0.139 0.198 0.245 0.364
- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
s 0.026 0.055 0.092 0.122 0.141 0.418
;s 0.077 0.135 0.192 0.233 0.272 0.873
;;s 0.091 0.146 0.205 0.261 0.313 0.985
3-years rate
Data 0.141 0.164 0.220 0.272 0.329
- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
s 0.018 0.046 0.069 0.095 0.113 0.287
;s 0.058 0.108 0.152 0.186 0.221 0.624
;;s 0.095 0.155 0.212 0.265 0.316 0.906
5-years rate
Data 0.096 0.118 0.169 0.189 0.289
- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
s 0.014 0.028 0.046 0.064 0.076 0.259
;s 0.039 0.072 0.104 0.124 0.152 0.562
;;s 0.078 0.127 0.172 0.212 0.261 0.992
Each entry in the rst ve columns represent the dierence in the f1;3;5g-years retention rate
between workers with a given age and workers aged 18   20 years. The rst row in each panel is
the data. The following rows represent the model outcome obtained when restricting certain type-
specic parameters to be the same across i-types. We report the parameters that are allowed to
dier across i-types. The leftmost column reports the average agreement with the data-outcome.
Table 2.12
When we restrict all the parameters to be the same across i-types (second row) the model
is not able to generate any life-cycle dynamics. The zeros indicate that, in this scenario, there
isn't any change in the retention rate as workers age. Consequently, all of the age-specicity
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s to dier across i-types.33.
Introducing worker-specic information imperfections considerably improves the empiri-
cal t of the model. 41:8% of the observed increase in the 1-year retention probability can be
accounted for solely by the worker-specicity of the imperfections. The contribution is lower
but still substantial for the 3-year and 5-year retention rates. Keeping  xed but allowing,
in addition to s, the job quality  to dier as well, adds another 45:5%. The remaining 11:2%
can be explained by introducing worker-type-specic rates of exogenous match separation.
Clearly, the major part of the observed increase can be explained by introducing worker-
type-specicity in  and s. Both parameters are fundamental for the signal extraction
process, as  represents the mean of the observed signals and s relates to the amount of
noise in a signal. The contribution of  seems negligible, at least for the short-term horizon.
However, when looking at the results depicted in the middle and lower panels of Table 2.12,
it becomes clear that contribution of  rises substantially when we consider the medium
and long term horizon. For the 3-year and 5-year retention horizons the contribution of  is
28:2% and 43%, respectively. There is an intuitive explanation for why  is less important
for explaining the short-run separation pattern but substantially more important for the
medium and long run horizons.
In our model all the mismatches break up upon the revelation of the bad match quality.
According to the estimates, the quality of a match is revealed, on average, after 1:62 years
but an exogenous break-up occurs, on average, only after 4 years (young) and 9:2 years
(experienced). Therefore, most of the match separation in the short run is due to endogenous
separation whereas break-ups in the medium and long term are driven by exogenous shocks.
Furthermore, the important factor for the magnitude of endogenous break-ups is primarily
the distribution from which the signals are drawn. This distribution is shaped by  and s.
As a result, it is  and s that govern the separation process in the short run whereas  drives
job destruction in the medium and long run.
33In all the cases in which we allow parameters to dier across types we set them equal to the respective
estimated value.
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In this paper we present new empirical evidence documenting the life-cycle dynamics of in-
dividual job mobility in the U.S. labor market. Based on NLSY 79 data, we nd that the
job retention probability for newly employed workers is strongly increasing with an individ-
ual's age and labor market experience. We estimate that the rst 10 years of labor market
experience raise the probability of retaining a new job for one year or longer by roughly 20%.
Moreover, we nd that, until the age of 45 years, a typical white male U.S. worker holds
about 9 full time jobs, 50% of which are held within the rst 5 years after labor market
entry and roughly 75% within the rst 10 years. This suggests an enormous amount of
job turnover for individuals in the rst years after labor market entry. In the later stages
of a career, job attachments become substantially more durable and job changes less frequent.
To gather insights on the observed pattern of individual job mobility we construct and
estimate a life-cycle model of the labor market whose main characteristic is an information
imperfection in the matching process. The key ingredient is that the imperfection is assumed
to be worker-specic and in particular, it is linked to an individual's previous labor market
history. We estimate the structural parameters of the model by indirect inference on data
from the NLSY 79. Using the estimates we evaluate the empirical content of our framework
by assessing how well certain predictions, regarding individual and aggregate labor market
statistics, obtained from the structural model match up with actual data. We nd that the
model can capture very well the observed life-cycle dimension of a variety of individual labor
market outcomes. In particular, it can account for the fact that job attachments tend to be
very fragile early in an individual's career but become increasingly durable as workers accu-
mulate more and more labor market experience. Furthermore, we nd that the informational
frictions considered in the model are key for replicating the life-cycle prole of individual
labor market outcomes.
Beyond contributing to our understanding of the observed life-cycle dynamics of job
mobility, the ndings of this paper have important implications, especially for the design of
optimal labor market policies. Our results stress that the accumulation of work experience is
key for an individual's job stability and job security. With more experience accumulated on
past jobs any future employment relationship will be more stable and secure. This implies a
certain path dependency which is important for labor market policies in general. Any policy
that deters young workers from moving into jobs, or that prevents rms from hiring them,
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taxes or excessive employment protection are examples of policies that typically discourage
rms from hiring young workers.
On the other hand, policies that foster the attachment of young workers to, and their in-
tegration into, the labor market can have signicant positive employment and welfare eects
as the work experience accumulated in the early years positively aects the job situation later
in an individual's career. On-the-job training programs, such as the German apprenticeship
program, is a good example for such a policy. The design of optimal labor market policies
has to take a fundamental account of this life-cycle dimension. The aggregate welfare eects
of a policy must be evaluated considering not only that, at each point in time, the policy
can have a dierent impact on young individuals than on experienced workers but also that
each individual is aected dierently by the policy depending on the stage of the life-cycle.
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2.10.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
First we show that the surplus function S() is linearly increasing in ^ . We make use of the
denition of S() as stated in 2.33. This gives
@S(k;i;^ )












yg   yb is positive by denition and Sg() > 0 holds whenever yg > b. Furthermore,
 u  0 for all (i;k) whenever b  0, therefore the expression in the lower line is non-negative
since
P
i02I e(i0u(k0;i0) is a convex combination of  u(k0;1) and  u(k0;2) and we have that
 u(k0u(k0;1). Given this, it remains to nd an expression for
@S(k0;i0;^ )
@^  . This can be done by
recursion. Starting at the terminal date K and using  u(K;i) = b we get
S(K;i; ^ ) = y
g^ ) + y
b(1   ^ )   b (2.25)
from which it follows that
@S(K;i;^ )
@^  = yg   yb > 0. Inserting this into (2.24) proves that
@S(K 1;i;^ )
@^  > 0. By recursion we thus establish that
@S(k;i;^ )
@^  is increasing in ^  for all k. Next
we prove that S() is linear in ^ . Using 2.24 we nd
@2S(k;i; ^ )








Applying recursion again and using
@2S(K;i;^ )
@^ 2 = 0 establishes the result. To prove that
S(k;i;0) < 0, we make use of J(k;i;0) = (1   e)S(k;i;0) and show that J(k;i;0) < 0. We
proceed by stating
J(k;i;0) = y








Notice that J(K;i;0) = eyb   b which is negative for b > yb. We substitute J(K;i;0) =
eyb b into J(K  1;i;0) which becomes J(K  1;i;0) = yb w(K  1;i;0)+(1 )k(1 
')(eyb  b). J(K  1;i;0) < 0 follows immediately from w(K  1;i;0) > b. Using this result
we can apply recursion to nd that J(k;i;0) < 0 for all (k;i). To prove that J(k;i;1) > 0 we
make use of J(k;i;1) = Jg(k;i), hence it remains to show that Jg > 0 for all (k;i). Jg(k;i)
is given by
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Notice that Jg(K;i) = eyg b which is positive whenever eyg > b. We substitute Jg(K;i)
into Jg(K 1;i) which becomes Jg(K 1;i) = yg w(K 1;i;1)+(1 )k(1 ')(eyg b).
Jg(K   1;i) > 0 follows immediately from w(K   1;i;0) < yg. Applying recursion to this
expression we can establish the result that Jg(k;i) = J(k;i;1) > 0 for all (k;i).
2.10.2 Proof of Proposition 2.4
Let A0 and A1 denote two functions that, respectively, represent the expressions on the
left-hand side and on the right-hand side of Equation (2.10). Those functions are given by
A
0(^ ) = ^ S
0(^ )[1   (1   )(1   ')] + y
b
A




(^    ^ )dG
i(^ )




[1   (1   )]2
1   (1   )(1   '^ )
S
0
(^ ) > 0
with intercepts A0(0) = yb and A1 = yg34. On the other hand A1 is strictly decreasing
for all ^  2 [0;1] since
A
1
^  =  ~ (1   e)

'(1   )
1   (1   (1   '^ ))
S
0






with intercepts A1(0) = b + ~ (1   e)S
0(0) and A1(1) = b. Given the restrictions on
the parameters and on yg and yb, we know that ~ (1   e) S
0(0) > 0. Moreover if yg > b
and b + ~ (1   e)S
0(0) > yg there exists at least one ^  2 (0;1) for which A0(^ ) = A1(^ ).
Uniqueness follows from the fact that A0
^ ^  =< 0 and A1
^ ^  > 0. Notice that restricting yg, yb
and b so that the condition yg > b > yb is fullled is actually sucient for the existence of
an unique interior equilibrium. To ensure that it is always optimal to dissolve bad matches
the following condition needs to hold in equilibrium
y




(^    ^ (i))dG
i(^ )
34Notice that A0
^  denotes the partial derivative of A0 with respect to ^ .
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This section analyzes the mapping between the threshold beliefs ^  and the corresponding
signal 
. For convenience we call the signal which induces beliefs equal to the threshold value
^  as the threshold signal, which we denote by ^ 
. Take two workers of type i and j where
j > i, hence type i worker emits a more noisy signal 2
;i > 2
;j. Therefore, ^ (j) > ^ (i).
Recall that ^  = (1   ei)  + ei
. It follows that for ^ (i)    the relation is 
(i) < 
(j). The
condition says that if the threshold belief for the type i worker is below or equal the mean
value of beliefs, , then the minimum necessary signal for type i is always lower than for
the worker with the more precise signal. In other words, if agents accept forming matches
that are based on relatively poor beliefs (re
ected by a hiring threshold that is below the
mean belief ) then they prefer these particular matches to be created on the basis of a
noisy rather than a precise signal. This can be explained by the fact that a match that is
based on a bad, yet precise, signal is more likely to turn out to be bad than a match with a
bad, yet noisy, signal. The high amount of noise in the signal increases the likelihood that
a bad-signal match is in fact good. Therefore, agents accept a lower threshold signal 
 for a
match creation.
For the case ^ (i) >  matters are less clear-cut. There are two counteracting eects.
Whenever ^ (i) > , then type j workers require a lower signal, 
, to achieve the same value
^  as type i workers. This is implied as the relative advantage of type j workers, in terms
of the informativeness of their signal. A good signal that is informative is more likely to
indicate a good match than a good signal that is noisy.
On the other hand, we show that type j workers face a higher threshold for their beliefs.
To achieve this higher threshold workers naturally require a better signal 
. Which of these
two eects dominates depends how far apart the threshold beliefs ^ (i) and ^ (j) are from
each other. If ^ (j) is suciently close to ^ (i), then the rst eect dominates and we get
that 
(j) < 
(i), i.e. the minimum signal required for a successful match creation is lower
for type j workers. If, however, ^ (j) is far from ^ (i) then the reverse is true. Hence, there is
a certain distance between the respective threshold values for which the two eects exactly
balance, implying that 
(i) = 
(j). Let us express the threshold for type i as the deviation
from the mean, ^ (i) =  + with   0. Using that notation one can show that the critical





 . Moreover, it is true that
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. It is easy to see that for ^ (i)    (i.e.   0) there is no
^ (j) > ^ (i) such that ^ (j)  ^ 
. To sum up, if the critical threshold for type i is at or below
the mean  then type j can never have an advantage in the threshold signal 
. If ^ (i) > ,
then it depends on the exact location of ^ (j) with respect to ^ 
 whether or not type j enjoys
an advantage.
2.12 Appendix C: Computing aggregate variables in the simple
model
2.12.1 The type-specic unemployment rate
In each period, a fraction of agents, (1   ), die and exit the model. To keep the size of the
population constant we need the same amount of agents entering the market. Labor market
entrants are initially unemployed. Remember that the simple version of the model abstracts
from the transition of agents' types. For new labor market entrants, we assume that they
are split equally between the varioud types. Consequently, a fraction (1 )=nI of the total
new labour market entrants goes to each of the types. nI denotes the total number of types
in the economy.
Let ui and ri denote, respectively, the mass of unemployed type i workers and the mass
of employed type i workers that are in a match with known quality. Furthermore, let ni(^ )
denote the mass of employed type i workers that are in a match with beliefs ^ . The total
number of new matches for each worker type is ~ [1 Gi(^ 
i)]ui and the mass of new matches for
each value of beliefs is uigi(^ ),where gi(^ ) is the type-specic probability density function
of the beliefs. The laws of motion for ui, ri and ni(^ ) are given by
 Law of motion for unrevealed matches for each value of beliefs:
n
i
t+1(^ ) = (1   )(1   ')n
i








ow is given by the the mass of new matches for each signal, given by ~ uigi(^ );
whereas the out
ow is given by the surviving matches for which the match quality gets
revealed.









i(^ )d^  (2.30)
The in
ow is given by the mass of matches whose quality is revealed to be good.




















ow out of unemployment, represented by ~ (1   Gi(^ )), consists of workers that
encounter a vacancy and generate a signal that is above the respective reservation
signal. The in
ow is made up by matches that are destroyed either exogenously or by
the revelation of mismatch.
In a stationary equilibrium xi
t+1 = xi
t = xi for x 2 fr;n;ug, hence we express ni(^ ) and
ri as
n
i(^ ) = ~ au
ig
i(^ ) r




i(^ )d^  (2.32)
where ~ a =
~ 
1 (1 )(1 ') and ~ c =
'(1 )
1 (1 ). Combining Equations (2.32) and (2.31) yields
expression (2.11) in the text.
2.12.2 Match destruction
The rate of match destruction, i, is computed as the ratio of bad matches to the total
number of matches with unknown quality, i.e. i =
R
^ i(1 ^ )ni(^ )d^ 
R
^ i ni(^ )d^  . To arrive at the expression
used in the text, we ma ke use of the steady state value of ni(^ ) = ~ auigi(^ ).
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2.13.1 The joint surplus function
The denition of the joint surplus of a match with (k;i; ^ ) is given by S(k;i; ^ ) = J(k;i; ^ )+
 e(k;i; ^ )  
P
i0 b
iji0 u(k;i0). Using the value functions (2.5) and (2.6) to substitute for
J(k;i; ^ ) and  e(k;i; ^ ) and the surplus sharing rule 







)J(k;i; ^ ) we arrive at the following expression for S
S(k;i; ^ ) = E(yj^ )
+k(1   )
P
i02I e(i0ji)f(1   ')S(k0;i0; ^ ) + '^ Sg(k0;i0)g













Wages are determined by bilateral Nash bargaining between the worker and the rm. In
particular, the wage is chosen to maximize the Nash product, hence it has to solve














where e is the fraction of the total surplus that goes to the rm. The optimality condition













= (1   e)J(k;i^ ) (2.35)
Using (a) the value functions (2.5) and (2.6) to substitute for J(k;i; ^ ) and  e(k;i; ^ )
and (b) the denition of the surplus function (2.33) we arrive at the following expression for
the wage function
w(k;i; ^ ) = E(yj^ )
 e

S(k;i; ^ )   k(1   )
P
i02I e
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Actual hazard rate, by job tenure and by age at match formation
Age / Tenure [0-1) [1-2) [2-3) [3-5) [5-7) [7-10)
[18-20) 1.1282 0.6932 0.4868 0.3513 0.2336 0.1841
[20-23) 1.0275 0.6328 0.4431 0.3139 0.2117 0.1748
[23-26) 0.9514 0.5793 0.3990 0.2940 0.1910 0.1512
[26-30) 0.8376 0.5032 0.3563 0.2556 0.1656 0.1314
[30-34) 0.6963 0.4186 0.2915 0.2065 0.1433 0.1095
[34-38) 0.5846 0.3593 0.2459 0.1773 0.1129 0.0936
[38- 0.5362 0.3340 0.2267 0.1627 0.1054 0.0874
Estimates of workers' actual hazard rate of separating from a job for selected age and tenure
groups. Source: Own calculations based on data from the NLSY 79.
Table 2.13
Duration / Age [18-20) [23-26) [30-34) [38-
1 year 0.49 (0.57) 0.67 (0.63) 0.71 (0.72) 0.84 (0.79)
2 years 0.31 (0.43) 0.51 (0.51) 0.57 (0.60) 0.58 (0.67)
3 years 0.21 (0.37) 0.42 (0.43) 0.43 (0.52) 0.56 (0.59)
4 years 0.15 (0.29) 0.33 (0.37) 0.39 (0.45) 0.47 (0.52)
5 years 0.13 (0.25) 0.29 (0.33) 0.35 (0.41) 0.44 (0.46)
Job retention rates for workers with one year of tenure in the current job: Rows represent dierent retention periods,
columns indicate workers' age at the time of recruitment. Numbers in bold (normal font) represent the model (data).
Table 2.14
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Figure 2.8
The value of the objective function (stated in Equation (2.20)) evaluated at the optimal estimator
for all but one parameter. The remaining parameter is varied over a range of feasible values.
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On the Determinants, Nature and Consequences of
Job Separation
Abstract
This paper uncovers and explores the main elements related to the causes and conse-
quences of job separation. In particular, it empirically addresses the following three ques-
tions using data on white males from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979):
(a) What are the determining factors of separation hazard of employment relationships? (b)
Which employer-employee matches are more likely to dissolve due to a layo rather than
a voluntary separation? (c) What are the eects of a voluntary separation and a layo on
re-employment wages? This paper oers a set of answers to those questions, some of which
conrm previous ndings in the literature, whereas others provide new facts and insights and
also pose a challenge to conventional theoretical labor market models, such as the standard
job ladder model. The controversial elements will be used as a point of departure for future
research on individuals' labor market dynamics.
JEL Classication: C33, C41, E24, J63
Keywords: Job separation, Reemployment, Quit gains, Firing losses, NLSY 79




This paper addresses three sets of questions related to the determinants and the consequences
of job separation:
Question 1: What are the determining factors of separation hazard of employ-
ment relationships? In the data we observe a tremendous amount of labor reallocation.
All in all, 6:7% of all U.S. employee-employer matches are dissolved in an average month.
At the same time, 4:3% of the civilian noninstitutional population aged 16 and over began
to work in a new job (Fallick and Fleischman (2004)). The duration distribution of em-
ployment spells in the US labor market is, therefore, highly skewed to the left but despite
the high turnover it is clearly non-degenerate. Many of the newly created matches survive
only for a short period of time, a signicant proportion, however, are more durable and turn
into medium and long term jobs. This raises an obvious question, namely: what are the
underlying factors and determinants that make some of the new matches likely to survive
longer than others. Job survival is not a purely random process and we may presume that
it is in fact governed by a given (possibly very large) set of determinants.
One objective of this paper is to identify worker- and match-specic factors that are causal
for the observed systematic dierences in the actual duration of employment spells. To
achieve this goal, I apply econometric methods that are tailored to the analysis of duration
problems. In particular, I estimate a discrete-time hazard rate model that is augmented by a
set of possible explanatory variables. The variables considered in the analysis mainly include
factors that relate to the characteristics of (a) the employed worker (e.g. age, education,
etc.), (b) the worker's current employment spell (e.g. the wage) and (c) the worker's recent
labor market history (reason of separation of last job, number of weeks not employed, etc.).
The second question the paper addresses is a follow-up on the rst one:
Question 2: Which employer-employee matches are more likely to dissolve
due to a layo rather than a voluntary quit? From a worker's viewpoint, the separa-
tion from the current employer can be voluntary or involuntary. I will refer to the rst case
as quit and to the latter as layo. The nature of a separation is crucial for the economic
well-being of the individual involved. A layo is typically perceived as an adverse (and of-
ten unexpected) economic shock against which markets provide only incomplete insurance.
Moreover, it is associated with serious consequences that may come in the form of income
and skill loss, especially when it leads to prolonged periods of unemployment. On the other
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seen) transition to another job and thereby to an improvement in an individual's economic
situation. The second goal of the paper is to identify factors which help to assess whether
a given match is likely to dissolve due to a layo rather than a quit. This issue is analyzed
by using an estimated binary response model which relates the probability of observing an
involuntary separation to a pre-dened set of explanatory variables. The third question of
the paper closes the circle:
Question 3: What are the eects of a voluntary quit and a layo, respec-
tively, on re-employment wages? After a job separation, workers eventually become
reemployed. In the case of a quit, reemployment is often equivalent to a job-to-job transi-
tion. Since those transitions are mostly initiated by the worker, we would generally expect
voluntary separations to be followed by wage gains. The impact of a layo is less clear. It
may be associated with the loss of rm- or industry-specic skills, which would generally
lead to a lower reemployment wage. On the other hand, a separation can also re
ect the
break-up of a bad match and the subsequent reallocation of a worker's labor input towards a
possibly more productive job. In that case, the wage earned in the new occupation is likely
to be higher than the previous. The last part of the paper addresses very brie
y the issue of
how wages after reemployment compare depending on the nature of the preceding separation.
This paper is purely empirical and as such, conclusions derived herein follow exclusively
from an econometric rather than theoretical or structural study. The questions above are
addressed using data on U.S. white males from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979, (henceforth NLSY 79). What is the purpose of asking and addressing the aforemen-
tioned questions? This study is meant to be a preparatory study which should uncover and
explore the main elements related to the causes and consequences of labor market transitions
and in particular, job separations and reemployment. It is not intended to be a "stand-alone"
work but rather a point of departure for future, mostly theoretical or structural, research.
The aim is to gather insights and to establish a set of facts on the process surrounding labor
market transitions. The insights and facts that are established by this paper to be, empiri-
cally, both important and relevant will be pursued in future research.
For example, the results of this paper pose a severe challenge to the logic and predictions
of the standard job ladder model, as used by Pissarides (1994), Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) and Burdett and Coles (2003) among others. This challenge stems from a set of em-
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ladder model. (The specic details will be dealt with later). The idea is then to make use
of the insights gathered here to address the issue theoretically and in particular, to come up
with a modeling device whose predictions are in line with the empirically observed patterns.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the empirical
framework that is used to address the aforementioned questions and issues. Section 3.3
describes the data used in the estimation. This section also provides a detailed explanation
of the way in which each of the considered variables is constructed1. Section 3.4 reports
the results obtained from the empirical analysis and Section 3.5 discusses the results and
concludes.
3.2 The Empirical Framework
In this section, I discuss the empirical framework that is used to analyze the rst two ques-
tions formulated at the outset. The third question is not addressed within a formal economet-
ric framework. The reason being that preliminary analysis has revealed that reemployment
wages are highly dispersed, even within narrowly dened groups. A formal econometric anal-
ysis would be doomed to fail as the expected large standard errors would make the estimates
meaningless. Nonetheless, I intend to make a statement about Question 3 and to that end,
I report certain descriptive statistics, which are meant to provide a rough illustration of the
issue.
3.2.1 Addressing Question 1: The determinants of job separation
The aim is to detect factors that are causal for the observed dierences in job duration. To
that end, I estimate a discrete-time hazard rate model that formalizes the mapping from
observable factors (such as worker characteristics) to the job separation probability. The
specication used here is similar to that in Duernecker (2009) where the model serves as the
auxiliary model in the structural estimation. The main dierence is the set of explanatory
variables considered in the estimation.
The data that is used in the estimation consists of observations of individuals' employment
spells. Each observation is indexed by j 2 f1;2;:::;Jg, where J denotes the total number
of observations. For the estimation I divide the time line into N intervals that are given by
[0;1), [1;2), ..., [N 1;N). Intervals are indexed by the subscript n 2 f1;2;:::;Ng. Let
1The raw and processed data that is used in this study is available upon request.
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interval n is modeled as a piecewise constant function given by
(t;xj;) = (xj;)n; t 2 [n 1;n) (3.1)
 is a vector of unknown parameters and (xj;) > 0 is a function of observable worker
characteristics. Those characteristics are captured by the vector xj, whereas  is a vector of
unknown parameters. The baseline hazard for each interval is given by n. This specication
implies a constant hazard within a particular interval n, yet it allows the hazard to dier
across intervals. Using the hazard rate dened in (3.1) one can construct the log likelihood
function of observation j.
l(nj;xj;cj;) =  
Pnj 1







The rst part is the probability the job lasts until nj and the second part is the probability
that it ends in the interval nj. Notice that the latter part is non-zero only when the obser-
vation is uncensored (cj = 1) and therefore represents a true job loss. The log likelihood
function for the entire sample is obtained by summing over all j = 1;:::;J employment spells.





where yJ = fnj;xj;cjg
J
j=1. Using the information on (nj;xj;cj) that is available for each
employment spell j we can estimate the vector of unknown parameters  by maximizing the
log likelihood function in (3.3).
^ J = argmax

L(yJ;) (3.4)
Before estimating  one has to take a stand on the functional form of (xj;) and which
explanatory variables to include in x. The functional form for (;) is chosen to be (xj;) =
exj and the vector of explanatory variables, considered in the estimation, consists of three
sets of categories.
1. Match-specic characteristics
Variables falling into this category are meant to describe the current state of the
employer-employee match. The state is likely to in
uence the separation decision.
Therefore, any variable that characterizes the match along a particular dimension
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percentage deviation of the initial wage payed in spell j from the average initial wage
payed to individuals that are similar in characteristics to the worker in spell j.
2. Worker-specic characteristics
age: The worker's age at the point in time when the match was formed. Duernecker
(2009) shows that a worker's experience in the labor market, as proxied by his age, is
an important determinant of job duration. Coll:: A dummy variable that is unity if
the individual holds a college degree and zero otherwise.
3. Characteristics that relate to the workers (recent) labor market history
!
prev
in : The percentage deviation of the initial wage payed in job j from the last wage
payed in the worker's previous occupation. !
prev
in being positive indicates that the
worker made a leap upwards in the wage ladder.  D: A dummy variable that is unity
(zero) if the separation from the previous job was due to a layo (quit). prev: The
worker's total tenure on the previous job. ~ w: The duration of non-employment. This
variable eectively counts the number of weeks between separation from the previous
job and start of the current one.
3.2.2 Addressing Question 2: Investigating the nature of job separations
For this part of the analysis, I restrict the attention to those employment spells for which
we observe a true separation. Whenever a respondent in NLSY reports that he stopped
working for a particular job he is also asked if this was due a quit or a layo2. We can
therefore assign to each employment spell j a binary variable, denoted by zj, that is unity
if for job j we observe a layo and zero otherwise. The goal is then to nd the eect of a
set of variables on the probability of observing a layo. The variables I consider here, again,
consist of worker- and match-specic characteristics and broadly correspond to the three
categories mentioned above.
More formally: The task is to estimate the vector of parameters, captured by the K  1
vector , that denes
P(zj = 1j xj) = G( xj) (3.5)
 x denotes the J  K matrix of explanatory variables. I assume that G is the cumulative
distribution function of a standard normal distribution which makes the model in (3.5) a
2More precisely, the respondent is asked to classify the nature of the separation using a list of predened
categories. I will be more specic about those categories in Section 3.3.
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given  xj can be written as
f(zj xj;) = [G( xj)]
z [1   G( xj)]
1 z z = 0;1 (3.6)
From (3.6) we can derive the log-likelihood of observation j as function of the parameters 
and the observed data ( xj;zj)
li(zj;  xj;) = zj log[G( xj)] + (1   zj)log[1   G( xj)] (3.7)
Let's dene yJ = fzj;  xjgJ
j=1. The log likelihood of the sample is therefore given by
L(yJ;) =
PJ
j=1 lj(zj;  xj;) and the probit estimator of , denoted ^ , maximizes this log
likelihood. More formally
^  = argmax

L(yJ;) (3.8)
Under the standard regularity conditions, ^  is consistent and asymptotically normal. The
covariates included in  x correspond to those in x used in the previous section. In addition, I
consider two more variables, namely: (1) : The workers total tenure on the current job by
the time of the separation and (2) !last
in : The percentage deviation of the last wage payed
in job j from the initial wage payed in the same occupation. This variable indicates the
total amount of wage growth a worker has experienced in job j
3.3 The Data
The data used in the estimation comes from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
(NLSY 79). The NLSY 79 is a representative sample of 12,686 young men and women who
were 14 to 22 years of age when rst surveyed in 1979. The cohort was interviewed annually
through 1994. Since 1994, the survey has been administered biennially. The last survey that
is available was published in 2006. The entire data set used in the estimation thus consists
of 27 individual surveys. The NLSY 79 contains demographic variables, labor market data
and information on individuals' wealth and consumption.
The data set I construct consists of employment spells, each denoted by j, and a set of
individuals characteristics associated with the respective employment spell. To guarantee
a reasonable degree of homogeneity across individuals I exclude certain observations from
the data set. In particular, the nal data set consists of observations of white males that
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sider just those employment spells for which individuals worked for  30 hours per week.
Lastly, I do not consider employment spells that began while the worker was simultaneously
employed also in one or more other jobs. For a spell to be considered, there has to be a re-
ported separation from any previous job. I do this exclusion mainly for homogeneity reasons.
The construction of the data set requires nding, for each j, (a) the total length of spell
j, denoted tj, (b) the value of the binary variable cj that indicates a censored observation,
(c) the nature of the separation zj (only for the Probit estimation) and (d) the values of the
relevant covariates xj and  xj. The interested reader is referred to Duernecker (2009), which
describes in detail how the values for t, c age and !in: are recovered. Here I proceed by
explaining how the remaining variables are constructed.
Coll: denotes a binary variable that is unity if the individual employed in job j has completed
college and is zero otherwise. This variable is relatively straightforward to construct as each
respondent in the NLSY is asked about his formal education during every interview.
!
prev
in is the percentage deviation of the initial wage payed in job j from the last wage
payed in the worker's previous occupation. It is essentially the wage gain/loss the worker
makes by moving to a new job. To compute !
prev
in it is rst necessary to identify the job
that is preceding the current spell j, secondly to determine the date of separation, third to
nd the last wage paid and lastly, to compute the percentage deviation to the initial wage
in spell j3. For each employment spell, I observe the week number of its start and, if appli-
cable, also of the separation. This is the key information needed to identify the job that was
preceding job j. If this is accomplished, all that is left is to read o the last wage that was
payed in that job and to compute the percentage deviation to the initial wage in spell j.
 D is a binary variable that is unity if the separation from the previous job was due to a
layo and it is zero if the separation was a quit. For constructing  D it is useful that in
the previous step we have, for each j, already identied the preceding job. Next, we simply
record the nature of the separation from that job. In the same way I construct prev, which
3Notice that all wages are measured in real terms. Therefore, !
prev
in is not aected by the duration of
non-employment between two consecutive jobs. If wages were measured in nominal terms then any non-zero
aggregate (nominal) wage growth would cause the wage gap between two jobs to rise proportionally with
the spell of non-employment. This eect is netted out by using real wages. To obtain the real wage, the
nominal one is de
ated with the weekly CPI de
ator.
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(measured in weeks) between the separation from the previous job and the start of spell j.
To compute ~ w I use the week number of the start of spell j and the week number of the
previous separation. ~ w is then simply the dierence between the two gures.
z is the dependent variable in the Probit estimation. It is a binary variable that is unity
(zero) if employment spell j ends due to a layo (quit). To classify the nature of a separation,
each respondent in the NLSY is given a range of possible reasons. For most of the survey
years those typically include the following: "Layo", "Plant closed", "End of temporary or
seasonal job", "Discharged or red", "Quit for pregnancy or family reasons", "Quit to look
for another job", "Quit to take another job" and "Quit for other reasons". In the coding
of z and of  D, I consider the rst four categories as indicating a layo, and the latter four
as describing a quit. !last
in denotes the dierence (in %) between the initial and the last
wage payed in job j. Here, I once again make use of the knowledge about the week number
of each event. In that way I can identify the exact date of the separation and the last wage
that was payed in job j. Computing !last
in is then straightforward.
The data set used to estimate the hazard rate model consists of 17;966 observations of
employment spells, 87:68% of which are uncensored. The data set used in the Probit es-
timation consists of 14;835 observations. Censoring is not an issue here, as all the spells
for which we do not observe a separation are excluded. Table 3.1 reports the summary
statistics, in terms of the mean and the standard deviation, for all the variables included in
the estimation. Panel (a) depicts the sample used in estimation of the hazard rate model,
whereas Panel (b) represents the data for the Probit regression.
Not surprisingly the mean job duration , depicted in the rst column, is lower in Panel
(b) as all the ongoing jobs are excluded there. The standard deviation of  is fairly large in
both samples, indicating that the pool of jobs consists also of a sizable fraction of medium
and long term jobs. The mean of !in: is zero. This follows by construction as !in: rep-
resents the deviation of a worker's initial wage from the average initial wage of the group
the worker belongs to. The characteristics dening a group are a worker's age (at match
formation) and education. Notice that the dispersion of !in: across individuals is fairly
large. For both samples, the reported standard deviation is more than 30%.
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that the majority of separations are voluntary (from the worker's point of view). The next
two columns (5 and 6) report the average number of weeks a worker stays non-employed
prior to the start of a new employment spell. The columns are distinguished from each other
by the nature of the separation from the previous job. Columns 5 and 6 respectively refer to
spells of non-employment after a layo and a quit. In both Panels (a) and (b), the average
duration until reemployment is substantially shorter after a quit than a layo. This is plausi-
ble as many of the observed quits are the result of a job-to-job transition. Typically, in those
cases the worker already has a job lined up before the separation is eectively implemented.
Thus the average period of non-employment is relatively short. Instead, a dismissal often
constitutes an unforeseen separation from the existing job. This forces workers to search for
a new job, which naturally takes time and so extends the period of non-employment.
 age !in:  D ~ wjfir: ~ wjquit !
prev
in Coll: prev !last
in
(yrs.) (yrs.) (%) (%) (wks.) (wks.) (%) (%) (yrs.) (%)
Panel (a): Hazard rate model
Mean(x) 2.01 26.7 25.82 11.8 6.5 13.2 25.5 1.32
Std(x) 3.62 6.7 35.37 12.9 11.1 42.9 2.38
Panel (b): Probit model
Mean(x) 1.28 25.9 26.66 11.6 6.8 12.1 22.9 1.09 1.8
Std(x) 2.09 6.2 31.41 12.8 11.4 38.8 1.89 21.1
Mean and standard deviation of all variables used in the estimation of the hazard rate model and the Probit model outlined
in Section 3.2. Sample consists of U.S. white male workers aged 18-48 years. Data: NLSY 79.
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics
Column 7 shows that the average wage dierential of two consecutive jobs amounts to
approximately 13% (Panel (b):  12%). The gain seems remarkable but this number is not
very robust as the standard deviations are very large and in this case, they are around 3
times the mean value. Roughly one in four observations involves a worker holding a college
degree. This number is just slightly lower in the second data set. The penultimate column
shows that the average length of the job that is preceding spell j is 1.32 years in Panel (a)
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as workers accumulate experience in the labor market. This is also given here, as can be
seen by comparing the rst column with the eighth column which depict, respectively, the
duration of the current and the preceding job. The most recent job is, on average, more
durable than the previous one.
The last column of Table 3.1 reports that the average total wage growth on a given job
is 1:8%. However, the average across all employment spells is not very meaningful as some
jobs last much longer than others and therefore, the total wage change will naturally dier.
The large standard deviation is largely due to that reason. To achieve a better comparison,
I normalize the total wage growth by job duration. More specically, I compute the average
monthly wage growth for each employment spell and nd that on-the-job wage growth is,
on average, 0:42% per month. The standard deviation associated with this gure is fairly
large, 5:44%.
3.4 Estimation Results
3.4.1 Results for Question 1: The determinants of job separation
This section reports the results obtained from estimating the hazard rate model in (3.1)
- (3.3). Before the model is estimated, one has to clarify some issues regarding the exact
specication:
 The rst issue concerns xing the width of the intervals within which the baseline haz-
ards, n, are assumed to be constant. This amounts to choosing N grid points n which
dene [0;1), [1;2), ..., [N 1;N). Most separations occur early in an employment
relationship. To account for this, I make the intervals ner for short durations and
wider for long durations.
The nal grid consists of 10 intervals which are separated by the endpoints:
f0:25;0:5;0:75;1;1:5;2;3;5;7;10g. Each of these points denotes job duration as mea-
sured in years. All separations occurring after 10 years or more are, therefore, right-
censored.
 I do not treat age as a continuous variable but instead, I dene a set of dierent age
groups and work with dummy variables. More specically, I dene 7 age groups with
endpoints f20;22;25;28;31;34;38g, the lowest starting at age 18 years. The reference
group is that with age > 38 years.
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of weeks of non-employment ~ w on the subsequent separation hazard. To account for
this,
 intervals and dummy variables are also used in this case. In particular, I dene the
following two intervals for ~ w, namely [0;2], (2;10] and use the group with ~ w > 10 weeks
as the reference group.
 Table 3.1 has shown that the period of non-employment diers signicantly in length
depending on the nature of the preceding separation. Thus, I include an interaction
term in the estimation namely,  D ~ w, which is designed to pick up any eect associated
with the previous separation. I also include the interaction term  D  prev
4.
The total number of parameters that are estimated is 28. Those are: (a) the ten baseline
hazard rates n and the coecients associated with (b) seven age dummies agek, (c) the
deviation of the worker's initial wage from the group average !in:, (d) the dummy vari-
ables indicating the spell of non-employment ~ w0j2; ~ w3j10;  D  ~ w0j2;  D  ~ w3j10, (e) the wage gap
between the current and the last job !
prev
in , (f) the binary variable indicating the worker's
education Coll: and (g) the worker's tenure on the previous job prev;2
prev;  Dprev;  D2
prev.
Notice that I also consider a quadratic term for prev and the interaction term  Dprev. The
vector of parameters is estimated by solving the maximization problem stated in (3.4). The
results are reported in Table 3.2.
Let us rst focus on the estimates of the baseline hazard rates, n. These are all quite
accurately estimated and statistically signicant at the 99% level of condence. Comparing
across intervals, the estimated values are generally in line with expectations. Hazard rates
at short durations are generally very high but decreasing in job tenure. This pattern is
intuitive as most of the learning concerning the match quality takes place within the rst
few periods of an employment relationship. Matches that are revealed to be good continue
4Conventional models of the labor market, such as the job ladder model, predict a very dierent hazard
for a worker's current spell depending on the length of the previous job and the nature of the separation.
In such a model, a quit that is ending a long term job indicates a transition to a new job that must have a
higher productivity than the previous one and is, thus, expected to last a relatively long time. However, a
dismissal from the same job would mean that the worker falls o the ladder and subsequently faces a period
in which he holds a series of short-lived jobs before nding a stable match. On the other hand, a separation
from a short-term job implies that the worker is still in the lower part of the job/wage ladder. In that case,
the dierence in the expected duration of the next job is fairly similar - irrespective of whether the preceding
separation is a quit or a layo.
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and long-run is less likely to be of bad quality, which explains the non-linear decline in the
baseline hazard rate.
Coe. Value A.H. Coe. Value av: ref: Coe. Value av: ref:
0:25 1.038 1.44 age20 0.584 -24.1 -51.1 ~ w0j2 -0.223 17.1 33.8
(0.051) (0.041) (0.037)
0:5 1.019 1.27 age22 0.557 -21.1 -49.1 ~ w3j10 -0.034 -8.3 4.9
(0.051) (0.038) (0.041)
0:75 0.769 0.91 age25 0.526 -17.6 -46.8  D ~ w0j2 0.369 -29.2 -19.1
(0.041) (0.036) (0.035)
1 0.648 0.72 age28 0.417 -4.1 -38.1  D ~ w3j10 0.043 -13.6 -1.37
(0.036) (0.037) (0.038)
1:5 0.559 0.58 age31 0.329 7.6 -30.6 !
prev
in -0.189 2.5 12.9
(0.029) (0.039) (0.024) (10%) (50%)
2 0.438 0.42 age34 0.204 25.1 -19.3 Coll: -0.261 26.9 38.9
(0.025) (0.042) (0.019)
3 0.361 0.34 age38 0.059 46.4 -5.6 prev -0.156 15.9 75.9
(0.021) (0.042) (0.009) (1 yr) (5 yrs)
5 0.264 0.23 !in: -0.510 6.8 35.8 2
prev 0.006
(0.015) (0.031) (10%) (50%) (0.001)
7 0.165 0.13  Dprev -0.051 24.9 105.8
(0.011) (0.01) (1 yr) (5 yrs)
10 0.137 0.11  D2
prev 0.002
(0.011) (0.001)
# Obs.: 17,966 logL = -35,699.8, LR Tests: H0 : only i (p: 0.000)
 denotes the estimate of the baseline hazard rate for the interval with endpoint . The remaining coecients are labeled
in the same way as the respective covariate A.H. denotes the average eect. av: is the change (in %) in expected job
duration (of the average worker) implied by a given change in the respective explanatory variables. ref: is the same for
dummy variables using the reference group as benchmark. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3.2 Estimation Results: Hazard Rate Model
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hazard rate of all observed individuals using the estimated coecients. For instance, the
mean hazard in the population of separating from an employer in the tenure interval [n 1;n)
(conditional on still being in the job) is given by (n)
PJ
j=1 exj=J. Conditional on surviv-
ing one year, a match is half as likely to break up than a new match. After two years the
separation probability is already more than 70% lower and after 5 years, shrinks by about
85%.
Let us next turn to the coecient estimates of the explanatory variables. To facilitate
the interpretation of the estimates, I provide two measures of comparison. av: computes
the percentage change in the expected job duration implied by a given change in one of
the explanatory variables. Since (x;) = ex, it obviously matters for the marginal eect
at which point (;) is evaluated. To make things comparable, I evaluate the estimated
hazard rate function at the mean value of each of the covariates, i.e. I compute the haz-
ard rate (and the expected job duration) for a hypothetical "average worker". Thus, av:
eectively represents the change in the expected job duration of the average worker. For
all dummy covariates, I also compute the percentage change in the expected job duration
with respect to the reference group (instead of the average worker). This is denoted by ref:.
The expected job duration is straightforward to compute and is derived using the es-
timated hazard rate function. For a new job it is given by
R 1
0 tf(t)dt where f(t) =
(t)(1   F(t)) is the probability density function of job duration. (t) denotes the haz-
ard rate of job separation at duration t and F(t) is the probability that the job survives
until t. In our setting, F(t) = 1 e 
R t
0 (s)ds and (t) =  (t)(x;), where  (t) is the implied









Let us next turn to the estimated eect of age on the separation probability. The coef-
cients for all, but one, age groups are statistically dierent from zero at the 99% level of
condence. In our setup this implies that a worker aged 34 years or less faces a hazard rate
that, ceteris paribus, is dierent from the hazard rate of the reference group (the group aged
38 years and above). In contrast, the hazard of the group aged 34   38 years is statistically
indistinguishable from the reference group. An individual aged 38 years and above has an
expected job duration of 2.99 years. For the young, aged 20 years and below, it is only half
5 (t) is computed by linearly interpolating the estimated values of n.
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years faces an expected job duration that is only about 6% lower than that of the reference
group. Assuming that individuals enter, on average, at age 20 we can infer that the rst 10
years of labor market experience raise the predicted job duration by about 40%
The coecient on !in:, which is the dierential of an individual's initial wage from the
group average, is highly signicant and has a positive sign. This is plausible as the wage, es-
pecially the initial wage, can be thought of as re
ecting the employer's perception about the
quality of a match. An employer that is willing to pay an above average wage (!j;in: > 0)
is probably rather optimistic about the worker and his productivity. If the beliefs are, on
average, correct then we would expect jobs with !j;in: > 0 to last longer. Indeed, the
estimation reveals that jobs with a 10% higher initial wage are expected to last 7% longer
than the "average job"6. A wage dierential of 50% leads to a rise in job duration by 36%.
The spell of non-employment between two consecutive jobs turns out to be fairly im-
portant for the survival probability of the new job. The coecient on ~ w0j2 indicates that
having a short spell, of at most 2 weeks, increases the expected duration of the current job
by 34% relative to a situation in which the time until reemployment is 10 weeks or more.
The longer the duration of non-employment, the weaker the (positive) eect on the hazard.
For spells of 3-10 weeks the dierence to the reference group (10 weeks and more) is already
fairly small, namely about 5%. Not only is the duration of non-employment important but
also how the preceding job ended. A worker who quits and becomes reemployed within 2
weeks has a 65% higher expected job duration than a worker who was red. A short period
of non-employment, most likely, represents a job-to-job transition. Thus, the large dierence
in job duration seems quite plausible.
However, one might argue that the returns to searching are increasing in duration (at
least up to a certain point)7. Thus, the comparison of the 0-2 weeks horizon for quits with the
0-2 weeks horizon for layos is meaningful only to a limited extent. To address this concern,
I compute the expected job duration after a job-to-job transition (quit + reemployment after
0-2 weeks) and after a layo. When we consider a longer search horizon after a layo then
the dierence in expected job duration drops drops from 65:4% (q: 0-2 weeks / f: 0-2 weeks)
6The expected job duration for the average worker is 1.93 years.
7If the unemployed are given more time to search for a suitable match then they are more likely to nd
a good and, therefore, longer lasting job.
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horizons, the dierence always remains above 20%. Thus, the returns to searching (in terms
of job stability) are clearly positive but nevertheless, the dierence between a job-to-job and
a job-to-nonemployment-to-job transition always remains signicant.
The wage gain between two consecutive jobs, represented by !
prev
in , has a positive and
statistically signicant impact on the current hazard. However, the economic eect is rather
small. A wage gain of 10% (relative to the mean) reduces the hazard of separating and
increases the expected job duration by about 3%. The positive sign is plausible as a wage
gain represents an upward move in the wage ladder. Jobs that are higher up in the lad-
der are typically more productive and, therefore, also more durable. Low skilled workers
are known to be particularly aected by job loss. By contrast, high skilled workers typ-
ically hold relatively stable jobs. This pattern is also given here. The coecient on the
college dummy Coll: is highly signicant and has a negative sign. A college graduate, ce-
teris paribus, has a 39% higher expected job duration than a worker without a college degree.
The last four coecients reported in Table 3.2 measure how the duration of the preceding
job aects the probability of separating from the current job. As mentioned previously, I
include a quadratic term to account for possible non-linearities. In addition, I also condition
on how the previous job ended. Let us rst focus on the case  D = 0, i.e. the worker came
into the new job after quitting the previous one. The linear and the quadratic term, ex-
pressed by prev and 2
prev are both highly signicant. The estimates show that the duration
of a worker's previous job positively aects the survival of the current one. One additional
year of tenure (relative to the mean) raises the duration of the subsequent job by 16%. This
eect is non-linear but decreasing, as indicated by the positive sign of 2
prev.
The interaction term  D  prev is also signicant and has a negative sign. This is indeed
interesting. It implies that a worker who is red from a long term job has a higher expected
duration in the new job than a worker who quits from the same job. This result, essentially,
challenges the basic job ladder model. A central prediction of which is that long-term jobs
ending in layos (quits) are, generally, followed by a job that is less (more) durable than the
previous one. Here, instead, we nd that new jobs after a layo, ceteris paribus, are more
stable than after a quit.
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specication. First, I test for the joint signicance of the included explanatory variables. In
particular, I estimate a model in which I consider only the baseline hazard rates, n. This
is achieved by setting  = 0. Then I compare the implied log likelihood with that of the
unrestricted model. This is essentially a likelihood ratio test. The test statistic is asymptot-
ically distributed as a 2 with 20 degrees of freedom. In our case, the test statistic is equal
to 3,275.1, well above the critical value of 37.57 for the 99% condence level with 20 degrees
of freedom. Therefore, I can reject the restricted model. Next, I test the hypothesis that
the coecients of the age dummies are jointly equal to zero. The test statistic associated
with this hypothesis is equal to 495.28, which leads to the rejection of the hypothesis at the
99% condence level. At the same level of condence, I also reject the hypothesis that all
the coecients on w are jointly equal to zero (test statistic: 186.22).
The question that remains to be answered is how well the predictions of the estimated
model match up with the observed job durations in the data. To address this issue, I proceed
in the following manner: For each observation j in the sample I compute the expected job
duration predicted by the estimated model. This is done by using the observed characteristics
xj and the expression in (3.9). The resulting predicted value is then compared with the
actual duration of employment spell j. The discrepancy between both terms is denoted by
 = jtpredicted   tactualj.
I nd that the mean absolute value of the prediction error, , is 0.97 years. Moreover,
the proportion of jobs for which the prediction error is less than half a year is around 20%.
For a maximum prediction error of one year, the proportion is 51% and for more than 90% of
all spells the discrepancy  is less than 3 years. The t of the model increases substantially
if we restrict attention to certain subgroups in the sample. Consider, for instance, the group
of workers aged 25 years and below, with no college degree and who were laid o from their
previous job. For 40:9% of all spells in this subsample, the prediction error  is less than half
a year. For 92:3% the discrepancy is less than one year. The large increase in the model's
predictive power is partly driven by the lower average (actual) job duration in the sample,
but also by the fact that certain subsamples, including the one considered here, are more
homogenous in outcomes than others. This applies, in particular, to the group of young
workers and those without a college degree.
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This section reports the results obtained from estimating the Probit model in (3.5) - (3.7).
Recall that the goal of the estimation is to identify factors that help to predict the nature
of a separation. The dependent variable is P(zj = 1j xj), i.e. the probability that job j ends
due to a layo, conditional on (a) a separation taking place and (b) a set of observables.
The explanatory variables included in the estimation are the same as in the previous section.
However, the specication diers slightly, as a worker's age (at match formation) and total
tenure on the job are both treated as continuous variables. Moreover, I do not include the
interaction term  Dprev, but instead, consider the worker's tenure on the previous job prev
and how he separated from it,  D, as two distinct variables8. Lastly, I also treat the number
of weeks of non-employment ~ w as a continuous variable. The interaction term with  D stays
in place as before.
In total, 14 parameters are estimated: coecients on (a) the constant term denoted c,
(b) the worker's age age, age2, (c) the worker's total tenure , 2, (d) the binary variable in-
dicating the worker's education Coll:, (e) the dierence between the initial and the last wage
payed !last
in , (f) the binary variable that indicates the nature of the previous separation  D,
(g) the deviation of the worker's initial wage from the group average !in:, (h) the wage
gap between the current and the last job !
prev
in , (i) the worker's tenure on the previous job
prev, 2
prev, (j) the duration of non-employment w, Dfir:w. The coecients are estimated by
solving the maximization problem stated in (3.8). The results are reported in Table 3.3. In
addition to the point estimates, I also report the change in the probability of facing a layo,
P(z = 1j) induced by a change in each of the independent variables. The reference point
for this comparison is the dismissal probability of a hypothetical average worker9.
The estimates reveal that the probability of experiencing a layo is decreasing (at a de-
creasing rate) with age. Both coecients, age and age2, are statistically signicant. Notice
again that "age" refers to a worker's age when he started the current job. The young are
more likely to be red than experienced workers. A rise in age by one year, relative to the
average worker, lowers the probability of a layo by 1:2%. This eect is decreasing with age
as indicated by the positive sign on age2. It reached its maximum at the age of 45 years and
8Preliminary results reveal that the interaction term  Dprev is insignicant, also when a quadratic term
is added.
9The average worker in the sample faces a layo probability of 27:87%, conditional on experiencing a
separation.
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Coe. Value av: ref: Coe. Value av: ref:
const: 0.208  D 0.426 40.7 62.1
(0.203) (0.032)
age -0.049 -11.7 !in 0.232 0.8





 -0.043 -3.9 prev -0.025 -2.2




Coll: -0.337 -28.7 -34.9 ~ w 0.003 1.9
(0.028) (0.001) (1 wk)
!last
in 0.128 1.5  D  ~ w -0.004 -0.2 -4.5
(0.058) (+10%) (0.002) (1 wk.) (1 wk.)
Dependent variable: y = Prob(layoffjxi;separation), Mean: E(y) = 0:2787
# Obs.: 14,835, logL = -8,792, Percentage correctly predicted: 70:02%
LR Test: H0 : only constant (p: 0.000)
The coecients are labeled in the same way as the respective covariate. av: and ref: are
dened as in Table 3.2. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3.3 Estimation Results: Probit Model
The same pattern applies to a worker's total tenure on the current job. Short term jobs
are more likely to end due to a layo than long term jobs. One more year of tenure lowers
the probability of a layo by 3:9%. This eect reaches its maximum at a duration of 8.5
years and gradually diminishes for  > 8:5. Education guarantees more stable jobs, as shown
in the previous section, and also shields workers from layos. The coecient on the college
dummy is negative and highly signicant. The estimate implies that college graduates are
34:9% less likely to be red than workers without a degree.
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on !last
in is positive, indicating that jobs with positive wage growth are more likely to end
with a layo than jobs with a 
at wage prole. A 10% wage gain on the job (relative to
the mean) raises the layo probability by 1:5% implying that, economically, this eect is not
too important. The positive sign is intuitive: Positive wage growth raises the value of the
worker's current job and makes it is less likely that the worker nds it optimal to quit and
leave the rm for a better job. Since P(z = 1j) = 1 P(z = 0j) and @P(z = 0j)=@!last
in < 0
we observe a rise in the layo probability.
A similar logic can be applied to interpret the coecient on !
prev
in , which is positive.
The larger the wage gain of moving to a new job, the lower probability that the worker
quits. Hence, when we observe a separation it is more likely to be due to a layo. The
estimates imply that a 10% wage gain between jobs translates into an increase in the layo
probability by 2:8%. A worker who jumps upwards in the wage ladder is less likely to quit
than a worker that falls downwards. Consequently, we expect the former to have a higher
relative probability of being red than the latter. Further, the coecient on !in is positive
and in contrast to the previous two, highly statistically signicant. However, the deviation
of the initial wage from the group average appears to be of only minor economic importance
only. A positive deviation of 10% raises the relative layo probability by just 0:8%, which is
rather negligible. A more important consideration is how a worker's preceding job has ended.
The coecient on the dummy variable  D is positive and highly signicant. The value of
the estimate implies that a previously laid-o worker is 62:1% more likely to be laid o from
the current job than a worker who previously quit. Two possible reasons for this pattern
could be: (1) The existence of a path dependency in the labor market as a dismissal may
stigmatise a worker for his future career path, or (2) There may be an inherent dierence in
turnover across workers. Some workers just change jobs more often than others do. Duer-
necker (2009) shows that the career-total number of jobs diers enormously across workers.
This may be an indication for such inherent dierences that cannot be explained by the
observable job and worker characteristics used here. In the current framework, one could
control for the job turnover rate at the individual level and this may shed some light on the
issue.
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by 2:2%. This eect might be due to the accumulation of skills that are (at least partly)
transferable across jobs. The longer a job lasts, the more skills a worker can accumulate
and, therefore, the more valuable he will be for any subsequent employer. Thus, the risk of
being red is lower.
The waiting time until reemployment increases the layo probability in the new job. Workers
who stay out of employment longer are more likely to be red than those that return more
quickly. An additional week raises the relative layo probability by 1:9%. An explanation
for this pattern could be the depreciation of skills during a spell of unemployment. The
longer the spell, the more skills are lost and the less valuable a worker is for the subsequent
employer. The coecient on the interaction term  D  ~ w is negative but its signicance is
rather weak. Hence, on a formal basis, we cannot reject the null that the eect of ~ w on the
relative layo probability is the same after a quit and after a layo.
Lastly, I perform a likelihood ratio test to test for the joint signicance of the covariates.
To this end, I rst estimate a restricted model that has only a constant term and then
compare the implied log likelihood with that of the unrestricted model. The test statistic,
asymptotically distributed as a 2 with 13 degrees of freedom, is equal to 560.56 and is well
above the critical value of 27.69 for the 99% condence level with 13 degrees of freedom.
Therefore, the restricted model is rejected. Moreover, I test for the joint signicance of all
the variables that appear (a) in levels and squared or (b) together with an interaction term.
The hypotheses that are tested are the following (1) age = 0;age2 = 0, (2)  = 0;2 = 0,
(3) prev = 0;2
prev = 0 and (4) ~ w = 0;  D  ~ w = 0. The test statistics for hypotheses (1)
and (2) are, respectively, 17.75 and 14.31, which are above the critical value of 9.21 for the
99% condence level with 2 degrees of freedom. Thus, we can reject the null that age and
tenure have no signicant eect on the layo probability. The test statistic for (3) is 3.97
and implies that we can not reject the third hypothesis, even at the 90% condence level.
Hypothesis (4) is rejected only at the 99% level but not at the 95% level of condence.
Lastly, I evaluate the predictive power of the model. To that end, I compute the fraction
of separations in the sample for which the model correctly predicts the nature. I nd that
70:02% of all observations are correctly predicted.
3.4.3 Results for Question 3: Reemployment Wages
This section closes the circle. The rst questions addressed ongoing employment spells and
investigated the factors in
uencing the likelihood of job separation. The second question
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predict whether employment spells will end due to a layo or a quit. After the separation
from a job, individuals eventually become reemployed in a new job. This is the point where
the third question becomes relevant. It considers the wage of the previous and of the new
job (the last and the initial wage respectively) and investigates how much a worker gains
or loses by transiting to a new job. For most of the analysis, I will condition on how the
previous job ended. More specically, I compute wage gaps separately for jobs that follow a
layo and those that follow a quit. Quits and layos inherently dier from each other not
only in cause but also in the implications, as shown in the previous two sections. Thus, it is
natural to consider both cases separately.
The variable of interest in this section is !
prev
in , i.e. the wage dierential between the
current and the last job. More precisely, !
prev
in is the dierence (in percentgage terms)
between the initial wage payed to a worker in job j and the last wage payed in the job
preceding spell j. What are the determining factors and magnitude of the "between-jobs"
wage dierential? These are the questions that will be the main focus of this section. Unlike
the previous two sections, the issue of this section is not addressed within a formal econo-
metric framework. The reason for this is the enormous dispersion of !
prev
in in the sample,
even within narrowly dened groups. The signicance of any point estimate obtained from a
econometric model would, most likely, be eroded by high standard errors10. For the moment,
however, I refrain from performing a fully 
edged econometric analysis. Instead, I report a
set of descriptive statistics that are meant to provide just a rough illustration of the issue.
I will focus on non-college worker only, mainly for homogeneity reasons. For comparison, I
often report also the respective gure for college workers. Moreover, the main statistic of
interest will be the sample-median of !
prev
in . The high dispersion makes the median the
more informative measure than, for instance, the mean as it also mitigates the bias induced
by extreme values.
The median wage gain associated with moving to a new job, coming either directly from
another job or via a spell of unemployment, for U.S. white male non-college workers aged
18 years and above is 3:72% (college workers: 6:73%). After a quit the median wage gain is
5:6% (8:48%) and after a layo the median wage loss is 0:05% (0%). For a more dierenti-
ated picture, I split the sample into dierent age groups and compute !
prev
in for each group
separately. The results are reported in Table 3.4. The rst column depicts the outcomes for
10Though controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the sample might help to get reasonable estimates.
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gains after a quit are relatively homogenous across age groups. They are the highest for
workers aged 18   23 years, 6:92% (11:08%), and are slightly lower for higher age groups.
The gain is lowest for age group 28 33 years, 4:93% (9:5%). Interestingly, for workers aged
between 33   40, the wage gain starts rising again to a rate of 5:17% (5:73%). Two points
are worth mentioning here: (1) Over the life cycle until the age of 40, the wage gains for
non-college workers are U-shaped. As we will see later on, this pattern is remarkably stable
even when we consider more rened groups. (2) The wage gains are generally higher for
college-educated workers. For this group, the gains do not feature a U-shape but are strictly
decreasing with age.
All prev  1 yr. prev  2 yrs. ~ w  5 wks.
Quit Firing Quit Firing Quit Firing Quit Firing
All 5.79 -0.05 6.06 -2.96 4.21 -3.32 3.52 -0.14
18-23 6.92 1.94 12.71 0.61 15.18 2.62 4.93 4.47
23-28 5.06 -0.02 6.32 -5.25 4.99 -7.74 3.52 -1.12
28-33 4.93 -1.88 2.50 -9.33 0.00 -10.20 2.06 -5.74
33-40 5.17 -0.09 5.97 -0.05 3.85 0.00 0.77 -1.33
Median wage gap in percent between previous and current employment spell. prev is the duration of the previous
job, ~ w is the duration (in weeks) until reemployment. Sample: U.S. white male workers. Data: NLSY 79.
Table 3.4 Reemployment Wages
Let us next turn to post-layo reemployment wages. The median wage gap is generally
lower than after a quit, as would be expected, and the dierences across age groups are more
pronounced. The second column in Table 3.4 shows that young workers generally gain from
being red (in terms of wages) but prime-age workers loose. The median wage gap for the
group 18   23 is positive and equal to 1:94% (4:84%) and negative for workers older than
23 years. The largest ring losses, 1:88%, are experienced by the group aged 28   33. The
U-shape is readily identiable also here.
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capital might be an explanation as the wage earned in an occupation is likely to be based
partly on the worker's level of specic skills. Prime-age workers typically have higher job
tenure than the young. Thus, they also accumulate more (rm) specic skills. In case of a
layo, those skills are destroyed and reemployment wage are lower. By contrast, the young
have less specic skills to loose. In addition, at the age of 18  23 years, individuals are still
in the process of nding the right match. Hence, a layo will often end a bad match after
which the worker continues the search process. Any new job oer (that is accepted) is likely
to be a better paid job.
The duration of the previous job is obviously an important factor. To further investigate
this issue I now consider all those jobs for which prev  1 year and prev  2 years, i.e I
consider jobs for which the preceding employment spell lasted longer than one year and two
years. When considering the full sample, I nd that the gains for a quit remain positive
and substantial. For jobs with prev  1 the median gain is 6:1% and it is slightly lower for
prev  2, namely 4:2%. For layos there is a clear pattern emerging as we increase prev. In
the pooled sample the ring losses are negative ( 0:05%) but negligible. The longer is the
duration of the previous job the more individuals lose in terms of reemployment wages. For
jobs with prev  1 and prev  2 the median loss, respectively, is 2:9% and 3:3%. This is
consistent with the existence of specic skills. Longer-lasting jobs are associated with more
specic-skills that are destroyed in the event of a layo. Notice that for both quits and
layos, the U-shape is preserved across age groups. Young workers are harmed least by a
layo. In all cases depicted here, the ring gains for the age group 18 23 years are positive
and clearly higher than for any other groups. By contrast, prime age workers generally suer
a substantial loss from a layo. For those aged 28 33 it amounts to a loss of 9:3% and even
10:2% when prev  2.
The last case depicted in Table 3.4 reports the median wage dierential for jobs that began
after a spell of non-employment of at least 5 weeks. In general, the quit gains are lower and
the ring losses are more negative than in the full sample. Evidently, the duration until
reemployment worsens individuals' wage prospects. One thing is especially worth looking
at: Arguably, a quit that is followed by more than 5 weeks of non-employment hardly re
ects
a job-to-job transition. A quit of this sort is probably motivated by things other than an
imminent job switch. Therefore, an obvious question is, what distinguishes two individuals
each with ~ w  5 where one has quit the previous job while the other was laid-o? This
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on ~ w  5, is almost the same after a quit (20.37 weeks) as after a layo (20.58 weeks).
Despite a ~ w that is roughly the same, we observe a wage gap that is very dierent for quits
and rings. This pattern generally holds for the prime age groups but strikingly, however,
for the young the dierence is practically nonexistent.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) to identify important determinants of job separa-
tion, (2) to nd relevant factors that help predict whether a given employer-employee match
will be dissolved due to a quit or a layo and (3) to quantify the respective eects of a quit
and a layo on reemployment wages. These issues are addressed using data on white males
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979). The main results of the paper can
be summarized as follows:
Job tenure signicantly reduces the likelihood of separating from the current employer. This
is a well known result and many studies in the literature nd that the separation hazard
exhibits a negative duration dependence. New in this paper is that job tenure reduces the
hazard not only in the current but also in the worker's subsequent employment spell. The
longer a worker is employed in one job, the more durable his next one will be. The esti-
mates imply that a one-year increase in current tenure raises the subsequent job duration
by 16   25%. Very importantly, this result is independent of whether the current match
separates due to a quit or a layo. The negative duration dependence after a layo is indeed
a surprising result and challenges the standard job ladder model. A key prediction of which
is that after a layo, short and long duration jobs are both followed by a series of short-
term jobs. This prediction is contradicted by the data as it violates the negative duration
dependence across subsequent jobs.
Current tenure improves future (and current) job stability but it generally lowers reemploy-
ment wages after a job change. This is especially true in the case of a layo. Individuals
that are being laid o from a medium term job suer signicantly higher wage losses than
workers that are displaced from short term jobs. An explanation for this is likely to be the
destruction of (rm) specic skills in the event of a layo.
A quit and a layo have markedly dierent consequences for a worker's subsequent em-
ployment outcomes. After a layo, a worker typically holds relatively short and unstable
jobs that are likely to result in another layo. Moreover, the wage loss upon reemployment
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ects a transition to new, and also stable, job
which is accompanied by a wage gain. With respect to quit gains and ring losses we observe
signicant dierences across age groups. After a layo, the young enjoy higher reemploy-
ment wages whereas all other workers generally suer a wage loss. The gains after a quit are
positive for all age groups but they are again highest for the young.
The typical pattern is that the young hold rather unstable jobs and are more likely to be laid
o than prime age workers. However, each time they separate and transit to a new job they,
generally, experience a wage increase. By contrast, prime age workers seem to hold more
stable jobs and any separation is more likely to be due to a quit than a layo. However,
if they are laid o they generally suer a substantial wage loss. From a general point of
view, job loss and instability for the young are not a bad thing after all as they both seem
to promote the ecient reallocation of labor. In contrast, job loss for prime-aged workers
can have serious negative, possibly long-lasting, eects on their career paths.
The spell of non-employment between two consecutive jobs is an important determinant of
a worker's prospects after reemployment. Generally speaking, the longer the period between
job separation and reemployment, the more workers lose in terms of wages. An explanation
could be the loss of skills during non-employment. At the same time, we observe that jobs
that started after a long non-employment spell are more likely to result in a layo than in
a quit. Furthermore, I nd that the returns to job search, in terms of future job stability,
are positive and substantial. A job that is accepted very quickly, within 0-2 weeks after the
layo, is likely to last considerably shorter than a job that is selected within 3-10 weeks.
This result lends support to the hypothesis presented in Marimon and Zilibotti (1999), that
workers are more likely to end up in a mismatch when they take up a new job relatively
quickly.
Several limitations should be considered when interpreting the results of this paper. The
specications estimated in Section 3.2 do not control for business cycles or industry xed
eects, both of which may be important. Job separation rates are typically pro-cyclical as
matches are more likely to dissolve during recessions. Hence, it would make sense to include
a variable in the estimation that indicates the current, aggregate state of the economy.
Omitting such a variable could cause a bias in the estimates. Industry xed eects are due
to inherent dierences across industries in worker turnover rates. Some industries, such as
many of those within the service sector, exhibit substantially larger job separation rates
than others. By not considering these dierences we run the risk of mistakenly attributing
a substantial part of the observed separations to the explanatory variables. Future research
will address these concerns.
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